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Abstract  
  
This  research  starts  from  the  observation  that  the  cultural  construction  of  the  
category   ‘living  dead’  does  not  usually  account   for  a  particularly  interesting  
area  of  western  literary  and  artistic  productions  from  the  mid-­‐‑18th  century  to  
the  present  day.  This  area   is   inhabited  by  characters,  worlds,  and  narratives  
that   not   only   destabilize   a   binary   opposition   crucial   to   human   identity   by  
blurring   the   border   between   life   and   death;   they   also   do   so   outside   the  
traditional   taxonomy   that   frames   living-­‐‑dead   identities   themselves   (ghosts,  
vampires,  zombies,  mummies,  ghouls  and  a  very  few  others).  
This  work  aims  to  chart  this  periphery  of  the  thanatological  imagination  
and  trace  its  emergence  from  the  cultural  processes  that  have  redefined  the  life-­‐‑
death  boundary  from  the  half  of  the  XVIII  century  to  the  present  day.  In  order  
to  do  so,  it  focuses  on  a  corpus  of  novels,  short  stories  and  films  from  the  North  
Atlantic  world  that  force  us  to  reconsider  how  intermediate  states  between  life  
and  death   can  be   represented   in   fiction,   from  Poe’s  Valdemar   to  Kafka’s  The  
Hunter  Gracchus,  from  Dick’s  Ubik  to  Rowling’s  Harry  Potter  and  the  Chamber  of  
Secrets,  from  Jacob’s  Ladder  (Adrian  Lyne,  1990)  to  Swiss  Army  Man  (Dan  Kwan,  
2016).    
After   an   introductory   section,   in  which   these   texts   are  defined  as   the  
members  of  an  ad-­‐‑hoc  category  called  ‘residual  states  between  life  and  death’  
(r.s.),  I  propose  a  cultural  genealogy  of  r.s.  by  discussing  a  corpus  of  medical  
texts,   from   Jacques-­‐‑Jean   Bruhier’s  Essai   sur   l’incertitude   des   signes   de   la   mort  
(1752)  to  Adrian  Owen’s  Into  the  Grey  Zone  (2017).  I  then  move  on  to  show  how  
technologies  and  media  shape  the  semiotics  of  residual  states  in  science-­‐‑fiction  
texts;  how  the  in-­‐‑between  zones  separating  life  from  death  are  constructed  in  
spatial  terms;  and  how  such  zones  can  become  a  crucial  site  for  the  redefinition  
of  both  the  immanent  and  the  divine,  for  the  mise  en  fiction  of  the  process  of  
dying,   and   for   questioning   our   ideas   of   self   and   realism.   The   conclusions  










This  is  what  makes  the  world,  Ms.  Lin.  I  believe  
this  to  be  the  fundamental  dynamic.  Transition.  
The  point  where  one  thing  becomes  another.  It  is  
what  makes  you,  the  city,  the  world,  what  they  
are.  And  that  is  the  theme  I’m  interested  in.  The  
zone   where   the   disparate   become   part   of   the  
whole.  The  hybrid  zone.  
C.  Mieville,  Perdido  Street  Station  
  
C’est  le  sens  de  l’avant-­‐‑dernier.  Tout  s’estompe.  
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Section  1.1  is  a  revised  version  of  The  Chinese  Encyclopedia  and  the  Living  Dead.  
A   Queer   Approach   to   Categorization   and   Taxonomy   in   Comparative   Literature,  
published  in  Whatever  1(1),  2018.  
  
In  accordance  with  the  regulations  of  Sorbonne  Université,  a  summary  of  the  








The  construction  of  the  binary  opposition  ‘living  vs.  dead’  through  the  practice  
of   burial   rituals   is   unanimously   considered   a   fundamental   stage   in   the  
development  of  early  human  cultures.  Together  with  the  opposition  ‘human  
vs  animal’,  its  function  is  to  transform  the  individual  into  a  member  of  a  social  
and   cultural   entity:   the   community   of   living   humans.   Such   a   community   is  
defined   by   its   crucial   opposition,   on   the   one   hand,   to   the   community   of  
animals,   and   to   that   of   the   dead,   on   the   other.   Of   course,   both   the   divide  
between   the   living  and   the  dead  and   that  between  humans  and  animals  are  
considered  here,   from  a  constructionist  perspective,  as  cultural  artifacts   that  
are   not   in   any   way   ‘natural’.   Social   figures   like   the   shaman   establish   and  
maintain  the  relationships  between  the  world  of  the  living  and  the  world  of  the  
dead,  while  highly  ritualized  moments  of  passage  are  created  in  order  to  keep  





Nevertheless,  despite  all  efforts,  violations  to  this  binary  opposition  can  occur.  
These  events  release  some  of  our  most  primitive   fears,   thus  representing  an  
inexhaustible   source   of   horror   and   uncanniness.   The   agents   of   these  
ontological  and  cultural  violations  are  what  we  call  ‘the  living  dead’.    
In  this  cultural  landscape,  fantastic  fiction  (on  the  definition  of  which  I  
will   return   at   the   end   of   this   introduction)   has   been   for   centuries   –   and  
continues   to   be   –   a   practice   of   key   importance   for   the   construction   and  
proliferation  of  the  entities  that  violate  the  polarity  ‘life  vs  death’.  Nevertheless,  
the  current  notion  of   ‘living  dead’,  while  pervading  cultural  (and  academic)  
discourses,   allows   us   to   deal   only  with   a   relatively   small   number   of   these  
entities:  ghosts,  vampires,  zombies,  mummies,  ghouls  and  a  very  few  others.  
This  study  starts  from  the  observation  that  the  cultural  construction  of  
the  category  ‘living  dead’  does  not  account  for  a  particularly  interesting  area  
of  western  literary  and  artistic  productions  from  the  mid-­‐‑18th  century  to  the  
present  day.  This  area  is  inhabited  by  characters,  worlds  and  narratives  that  
not  only  destabilize  a  binary  opposition  crucial  to  human  identity  by  blurring  
the   border   between   life   and   death;   they   also   do   so   outside   the   traditional  
taxonomy   that   frames   living-­‐‑dead   identities   themselves.   The   protagonist   of  
E.A.   Poe’s   famous   horror   tale  The   Facts   in   the   Case   of  Mr.   Valdemar   (1845)   is  
mesmerized  in  articulo  mortis  and  his  existence  lingers  on  for  several  months  
in  a  state  of  hypnotic  suspension  after  the  death  of  his  body.  In  Franz  Kafka’s  
journal   fragments   about  der   Jäger  Gracchus   ([1931]   1993),   a   hunter  dies   after  
falling  into  a  ravine  but,  as  a  result  of  an  incomprehensible  mistake,  he  cannot  





protagonist  of  Philip  K.  Dick’s  science-­‐‑fiction  novel  Ubik  (1969),  finds  himself  
literally  frozen  in  a  state  called  ‘half-­‐‑life’  after  an  explosion.  His  consciousness  
is  separated  from  the  world  of  the  living  and  inhabits  a  new  plane  of  existence,  
suspended   between   life   and   death.   In   J.K.   Rowling’s   Harry   Potter   and   the  
Chamber  of  Secrets  (1998),  the  wizard  Voldemort  manifests  his  presence  among  
the  living  through  the  diary  of  Tom  Riddle,  a  paradoxical  living  object  infused  
with  a  piece  of  a  dead  man’s  soul.  In  regards  to  cinema,  the  mysterious  Jacobs’s  
Ladder  (Lyne  1990)  plunges  the  viewer  into  the  consciousness  of  an  American  
soldier  at  the  moment  of  his  passage  from  life  to  death,  while  in  Wally  Pfister’s  
Transcendence  (2014)  the  brain  patterns  of  the  dying  protagonist  are  encoded  in  
the  software  of  an  artificial  intelligence:  he  thus  loses  his  mortal  body  in  order  
to  literally  inhabit  the  Internet,  eventually  becoming  the  Internet  itself.  
This  work  aims  then  to  investigate  a  new  category  within  the  cultural  
imagination:   the   residual   undead.   The   members   of   this   category   are   the  
leftovers  of  a  categorization  process  that  has  placed  a  corpus  of  prototypical  
figures   at   the   center   of   contemporary  North  Atlantic   culture,  while  moving  
those  narratives  that  didn’t  match  a  pre-­‐‑determined  set  of  parameters  to  the  
periphery.  
The  idea  of  periphery  implies  the  spatialization  of  the  abstract  notion  of  
‘culture’.  However,   I   will   not   extend   this  metaphor   to   describe   the   present  
work  as  ‘mapping’  a  yet  ‘uncharted’  field  of  fiction.  Such  a  description  would  
imply   a   twofold   metaphor,   in   which   the   object   of   study   is   constructed,   in  
geographical   terms,   as   a   space,   and   the   researcher   is   constructed   as   a  





think   that   the  hermeneutic  work   I  am  proposing  here  consists   in   the  simple  
description  of  something  that  is  ‘already  there’,  ‘in  the  text’,  visible  to  everyone,  
just   like   a   cartographer   ‘describes’   lakes,   mountains   and   coast   profiles  
according  to  a  predetermined  set  of  conventions.  On  the  contrary,  I  assume  a  
constructivist  view  of  description  as  a  necessarily  argumentative  act.  The  traits  
that   emerge   from   a   description   are   not   ‘things   in   the   text’,   or   properties  
immanent  to  it,  that  simply  need  to  be  ‘found’  and  organized  by  the  researcher.  
Rather,  traits  are  actively  construed  by  the  researcher  in  its  relationship  with  the  
text,   which   means   that   different   researchers   could   potentially   provide  
completely  different  descriptions  of  the  same  set  of  objects  or  the  same  ‘region’  
of  fiction.  
Having  refused  to  interpret  the  aim  of  this  research  as  that  of  ‘mapping’  
the  ‘field’  of  narratives  dealing  with  the  representation  of  the  residual  undead,  
I   had   to   restructure   the   interpretation   of   the   subject   of   my   study.   I  
progressively  came  to  think  of  it   less  as  a  space  and  more  as  a  mass  of  dots,  
each  one  apparently  isolated  from  the  others,  and  of  myself  as  someone  who  
connects   these   dots   in   an   attempt   to   draw   constellations   and   networks.   I  
became  aware  of  this  shift  after  reading  Franco  Moretti’s  (2007)  discussion  of  
the  difference  between  maps  and  diagrams:    
[The   map]   offers   a   model   of   the   narrative   universe   which  
rearranges   its  components   in  a  non-­‐‑trivial  way,  and  may  bring  
some   hidden   patterns   to   the   surface.   And   patterns   are   indeed  
what  I  have  been  discussing  throughout  this  chapter.  But  are  they  
also   the   proper   object   of   geographical   study?   In   an   intelligent  
critique  of  the  Atlas  of  the  European  Novel,  the  Italian  geographer  
Claudio   Cerreti   [(1998)]   has   questioned   this   assumption,  





to  extension,  where   ‘objects  are  analysed   in   terms  of   reciprocal  
positions  and  distances   […]  whether   they  are  close  or   far   from  
each  other  or   from  something   else’.  This  however   is  not   really  
geography,  Cerreti  goes  on,  but  rather  geometry;  and  the  figures  
of  the  Atlas,  for  their  part,  are  not  really  maps,  but  diagrams.  The  
diagrams   look   like   maps,   yes,   because   they   have   been  
‘superimposed   on   a   cartographic   plane’:   but   their   true   nature  
emerges   unmistakably   from   the   way   I   analyse   them,   which  
disregards  the  specificity  of  the  various  locations,  to  focus  almost  
entirely   on   their  mutual   relations;  which   is   indeed   the  way   to  
read  diagrams,  but  certainly  not  maps  (53-­‐‑54)  
  
[I]f  I  keep  making  diagrams,  then,  it  is  because  for  me  geometry  
‘signifies’   more   than   geography.   More,   in   the   sense   that   a  
geometrical  pattern   is   too  orderly  a  shape   to  be   the  product  of  
chance.   It   is   a   sign   that   something   is   at   work   here—   that  
something   has   made   the   pattern   the   way   it   is»   (56,   original  
emphasis).    
This  textual  diagrammatics  has  been  guided  by  two  questions:  how  are  
residual  states  between  life  and  death  made  culturally  possible?  And  how  are  
they   constructed   in   fiction?   I   have   tried   to   answer   these   questions   by  
pinpointing  analogies,  recurrences,  and  contrasts  in  the  construction  of  space,  
time,   technology,   and   the   self   in   residual   states   narratives,   as   well   as   by  
providing  a  context  for  the  study  of  these  elements  with  the  tools  of  cultural  
genealogy.   I   will   focus   particularly   on   what   renders   the   residual   undead  
original  and  unique  in  relation  with  the  traditional  undead,  and  on  how  they  
can  open  up  new  perspectives  on  the  mise  en  fiction  of  the  relation  between  life  
and   death.   My   approach   to   the   corpus   of   fictional   texts   will   be   resolutely  
interdisciplinary,   and   the   perspectives   of   comparative   literature   will  





theory,  cultural  history,  and  media  studies.  As  my  choice  of  providing  a  long  
quote  from  Moretti  has  already  suggested,  I  will  often  let  the  works  on  which  
I  draw  speak  for  themselves,  instead  of  summarizing  or  paraphrasing  them.  I  
hope   this   will   contribute   to   construct   my   arguments   as   dialogues   with   a  
multiplicity  of  research  contexts,   rather   than  as  hermeneutic  operations   that  
need  to  borrow  tiny  bits  and  pieces  here  and  there  in  order  to  be  validated.  
  
The   present   introduction   provides   a   preliminary   definition   of   the  
residual   undead,   clarify   my   objectives   by   contrasting   them   with   those  
expressed   by   parallel   works   in   comparative   literature,   science   studies   and  
literary  theory,  and  define  the  notion  of  fantastic  fiction  on  which  I  will  base  
my   analyses.  Chapter   one   proposes   a  methodology   for   the  modelization   of  
peripheral  categories  and  looks  at  comparative  literature  through  the  lens  of  
queer  hermeneutics.  Chapter  two  traces  a  history  of  the  main  cultural  factors  
that   catalyzed   the   emergence   of   residual   states   in   the   context   of   the  
thanatological  imagination.  Coherently  with  the  interdisciplinary  perspective  
I  would   like   to   adopt,   these   first   two   chapters   are  not   intended  as   the  mere  
‘background’  against  which  the  comparative  analysis  will  be  carried  on  in  the  
second  part   of   the   study,  but   as   an   integral  part   of   the   analyses   that   aim   to  
answer   the  general  questions   I  posited  above.  Chapter   three   identifies  some  
key  features  of  residual  states  by  looking  at  their  most  basic  coordinates:  time  
and   space.   Chapter   four   focuses   on   how   electricity   and   communication  





construct  relations  between  the  ‘here’  of  the  living  and  the  ‘elsewhere’  of  the  
residual  undead.    
  
Death  in  not   just  a  ‘natural’  event.  What  the  concept  of   ‘death’  means  
and   implies   is   determined   by   a   complex   system   of   cultural   practices:  
«Although  every  human  being   is  mortal,   there   is  no  such   thing  as  a  natural  
way  of  dying,  death  or  grief.  Death  and  dying  are  always  culturally  defined  
and  embedded  in  a  system  of  cultural  beliefs  and  values»  (Kalitzkus  2004,  142).  
In   order   to   understand   in   what   sense   the   residual   undead   differ   from   the  
traditional  undead,  a  fundamental  opposition  between  two  paradigms  for  the  
definition  of  the  relationship  between  life  and  death  needs  to  be  posited.  Until  
very   recent   times—in   terms   of   cultural   history—Western/North   Atlantic  
culture  has   conceptualized   life   and  death  as   the   two  elements  of   a  polarity.  
Within  this  long-­‐‑standing  cultural  tradition,  an  expression  like  ‘partially  dead’  
would  make  no  sense:  one  must  be  either  alive  or  dead.  The  traditional  living  
dead  (ghosts,  vampires,  zombies,  mummies)  can  violate  this  polarity—as  the  
consequence,   for   example,   of   a   cultural   ‘malfunctioning’   in   the   grieving  
process—by  returning  to  the  world  of  the  living  after  their  death.  On  the  other  
hand,  the  emergence  of  the  residual  undead  coincides  with  the  emergence  of  a  
new  cultural  paradigm:  as  I  will  show  in  chapter  2,  life  and  death  have  slowly  
and   progressively   turned   from   the   two   elements   of   a   polarity   into   the   two  
extremes  of  a  continuum  over  the  course  of  the  last  two  centuries  and  half.  Within  
this  new  paradigm,  deciding  where  a  person  should  be  placed  along  such  a  





dead  are  not  only  those  who  return  from  the  grave,  but  also  those  who  have  
taken  a  step  outside  life  without  entirely  leaving  life  behind,  that  is,  those  who  
are  not  alive  anymore,  but  at  the  same  time  are  not  dead  yet.    
The  traditional  living  dead  are  characterized  by  the  return  of  the  past,  
the  acknowledgment  of  death,  and  the  violation  of  the  strong  polarity  into  which  
they  are  inscribed;  the  residual  undead,  for  their  part,  have  much  more  to  do  
with   resistance   to   death   and   the   blurring   of   the   life-­‐‑death   polarity   through  
postponing,  preservation,  and  time  dilation.  The  traditional  living  dead  are  dead  
beings  who  come  back   to  (some  sort  of)   life;  the  residual  undead  are  beings  
beyond  life  that,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  desperately  try  not  to  die.  A  few  texts  
of  the  corpus  present  exceptions  to  this  preliminary  taxonomy,  and  the  reason  
for  their  inclusion  in  the  study  will  be  motivated  when  needed.  
The  general  semiotic  coordinates  along  which  residual  states  narratives  
develop  could  be  further  clarified  by  contrasting  them,  on  the  one  hand,  with  
those  identified  by  Alice  Bennet  in  her  study  of  afterlife  narratives,  and  with  
those  pinpointed  by  Frédéric  Weinmann  in  a  monography  devoted  to  what  he  
calls  récit  autothanatographique,  on  the  other.  Both  authors  focus  on  narratives  
in  which  a  character  goes  on  living  after  her/his  death.  However,  they  adopt  
rather   different   approaches.   Bennet’s   narratological   work   starts   from   the  
premise   that   «[w]riting   about   the   afterlife   means   writing   about   the  
metaphysical,   but   also   involves   the   metafictional,   because   it   leads   to   a  
consideration  of  the  fit  between  the  tools  for  representing  the  world  and  the  
world  itself»  (Bennett  2012,  197).  From  this  perspective,  Bennet  argues,  afterlife  





a  reaction  against  widely  realist  attempts  to  represent  the  world  
and  the  human  experience  of  it;  against  the  general  category  of  
life-­‐‑   writing   and   of   writing   about   ‘real   life’.   Consequently,  
settings  in  and  voices  from  the  afterlife  throw  off-­‐‑kilter  categories  
relating   to   narrative   temporality,   plot,   deixis   of   person,  
omniscience,  the  descriptive  labels  for  narrators,  and  the  models  
we   have   for   identifying   the   source   of   fictional   statements   and  
fictional  worlds.  Ultimately,  narrative  fictions  set  in  the  afterlife  
force   us   to   reassess   many   of   the   conventions   and   concepts   of  
narratology  (Bennett  2012,  192).  
«What  this  fictions  are  after»,  Bennet  argues,  «is  narratology  itself»:  
As  we  work  more   […]  with   the   categories  of  narratology   they  
become   more   flexible.   So,   rather   than   a   matrix   of   categories  
covering   a   heterodiegetic   vs   a   homodiegetic   narrator,   or  
prolepsis  vs  analepsis,  for  example,  we  end  up  with  limber  –  even  
acrobatic  –  thinking  that  can  stretch  the  boundaries  and  spaces  
between   categories.   […]   Afterlife   fictions   therefore   match   a  
movement   within   narrative   theory   that   has   moved   from  
descriptive  categorisation  of  fictional  types,  to  a  narratology  that  
aims  to  hypothesise  the  possibilities  for  narrative  (Bennett  2012,  
194–95).  
Bennet’s  reflection  may  be  seen  as  the  transposition  on  the  plane  of  narratology  
of  the  claims  made  by  Jan  Alber  (2009)  in  his  cognitivist  approach  to  impossible  
storyworlds.   By   modelizing   the   cognitive   strategies   «by   means   of   which  
readers   can   use   real-­‐‑world   and   literary   scripts   to   naturalize   unnatural  
scenarios»1   (Alber   2009,   82),   Aber   argues   that   such   narratives   catalyze   the  
                                                                                              
  
1  Alber  borrows  his  definition  of   ‘unnatural’  from  Doležel:  «The   term  
unnatural   denotes   physically   impossible   scenarios   and   events,   that   is,  





remodeling  of  the  cognitive  frames  through  which  we  understand  both  reality  
and  fictional  worlds:  
Readers   may,   for   example,   generate   new   frames   by   blending  
schemata,  in  Fauconnier  and  Turner’s  (2002)  sense2.  This  strategy  
(“blending   scripts”)   is   crucial   with   regard   to   our   attempts   to  
come  to  terms  with  scenarios  in  which  the  narrator  is  an  animal,  
a  corpse,  or  an  inanimate  object  (Alber  2009,  82).  
From   a   cognitive   standpoint,   then,   this   is   how   Alice   Sebold’s   best-­‐‑selling  
afterlife  narrative  The  Lovely  Bones  works:  
This   scenario  departs   from  our   real-­‐‑world  parameters,   and  we  
have  to  adjust  our  reading  frames  to  come  to  terms  with  it.  First  
of  all,  we  have  to  activate  our  knowledge  about  people  who  are  
alive  (and  able  to  tell  stories)  and  our  awareness  of  the  fact  that  
the   dead   cannot   speak.   In   a   second   step,   we   combine   these  
schemata   to  picture  a  scenario   in  which  a  corpse  speaks.  What  
might  the  potential  functions  of  this  unnatural  scenario  be?  The  
Lovely   Bones   invites   us   to   stretch   our   cognitive   categories   to  
picture   a   situation   in   which   the   dead   narrator   continues   to  
interact   with   the   world   she   had   to   leave.   The   novel   can   be  
explained   in   terms   of   our   inability   to   envision   death   as   the  
definite   end   of   our   existence,   or   in   terms   of   the  wishes   of   the  
bereaved  that  the  dead  somehow  continue  to  exist  (Alber  2009,  
90).  
But  Alber  also  proposes  a  fascinating  alternative  to  naturalization:    
                                                                                              
  
logically  impossible  ones,  that  is,  impossible  by  accepted  principles  of  logic»  
(Doležel  1998,  115–16;  quoted  in  Alber  2009,  80).  
2      Fauconnier   and   Turner   define   ‘blending’   as   a   «general   mental  






as  an  alternative  to  my  own  approach,  I  would  like  to  mention  
the  Zen  way  of  reading,  which  might  be  adopted  by  an  attentive  
reader  who   repudiates   the   above-­‐‑mentioned   explanations   and  
simultaneously   accepts   the   strangeness   of   unnatural   scenarios  
and  the  feelings  of  discomfort,  fear,  or  worry  that  they  evoke  in  
her  or  him  (Alber  2009,  83).  
By   looking   at   r.s.   through   the   lens   of   Alber’s   framework,   I   would  
suggest   that,  while   the   narratives  within  which   they   are   inscribed   certainly  
adopt  a  wide  array  of  devices  aimed  at  naturalizing  our  understanding  of  these  
highly   unusual   ontological   conditions,   they   are   also   far   removed   from   the  
strategies  through  which  we  naturalize  the  traditional  living  dead  enough  to  
catalyze  what  Alber  calls  ‘Zen  way  of  reading’.    
An  ‘area’  of  fiction  that  is  partially  coextensive  with  afterlife  narratives  
has  been  pinpointed  by  Frédéric  Weinmann,  who  defines  it  as  the  domain  of  
the  narration  autothanatographique:  
L’autothanatographie  serait  a  priori  (en  calquant  la  définition  de  
son  antonyme  dans  le  Robert),  un  écrit  ayant  pour  objet  l’histoire  
d’une  mort  particulière,  racontée  par  le  mort  lui-­‐‑même.  Ce  serait  
par   consequent  un   récit  doublement  paradoxal  puisque,  d’une  
part,  la  mort  peut  sans  doute  se  définir  comme  la  suspension  du  
temps  et  l’arrêt  de  l’histoire  […]  et  que,  d’autre  part,  à  supposer  
qu’il  se  passe  quelque  chose  après  l’instant  fatal,  que  la  mort  soit  
une  action,  qu’il  y  ait  matière  à  raconteur,  on  peut  se  demander  
comment  le  récit  pourrait  émaner  du  mort  lui-­‐‑même,  d’un  être  
ayant  perdu  la  vie  et  quitté  le  monde  des  humains  (si  la  mort  est  
silence,   qu’est-­‐‑ce   qu’une   fiction   autothanatographique   ?)  
(Weinmann  2018,  12–13).  
The  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  autothanatographie  is  that  it  is  narrated  in  





according  to  Weinmann,  the  emergence  of  the  récit  autothanatographie  marks  a  
significant  shift  in  the  cultural  history  of  literature:  
La  littérature  donne  souvent  la  parole  aux  morts:  qu’on  songe  au  
théâtre,  à  l’élégie,  à  l’épopée,  aux  histoires  des  fantômes…  Mais  
elle  hésite  manifestement  […]  à  attribuer  la  narration  à  un  mort,  
comme   si   même   la   fiction   s’arrêtait   devant   le   paradoxe  
pragmatique  de  l’énoncé  “je  suis  mort”  (Weinmann  2018,  24).  
As  a  consequence,  while  Bennet  is  interested  in  the  narratological  implications  
of  afterlife  narratives,  Weinmann  focuses  on  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  récit  
autothanatographie  in  relation  to  the  genre  of  autofiction:  
Si  l’autothanatographie  participe  d’un  nouveau  type  de  fiction  à  
la   première   personne,   à   la   fois   conséquence   et   moteur   d’une  
redéfinition  du  genre  romanesque  à  cette  époque  charnière,  on  
remarquera   en   effet   qu’elle   n’induit   pas   une   “réévaluation   du  
sujet”  (comme  on  le  lit  souvent  à  propos  de  l’autofiction),  mais  
plutôt   une   redéfinition   complète   de   cette   notion.  
L’autothanatographie   signe   la   fin   des   interrogations   inquiètes  
sur  la  nature  de  l’existence  humaine  et  sur  le  statut  ontologique  
de   l’individu   car   elle   répond   à   ces   questions   par   la   négative  
(Weinmann  2018,  245).  
Just   as   the   autothanatographie   resolves   the   cultural   anxieties   relative   to   the  
ontological   condition  of   the  Western   subject  by   forcing   the   subject   to   speak  
from  beyond  life,  it  also  resolves  the  quest  for  transcendence  and  salvation  by  
denying  their  possibility:  
Malgré   ce   qu’affirment   les   narrateurs   de   certains   récits  
autothanatographiques   […],   leur   mort   n’est   pas   une  
metamorphose.   Ils   ne   racontent   pas   une   nouvelle   vie   où   leur  
individualité   subsisterait   malgré   la   destruction   de   leur  





et   une   dissolution   totale   de   la   conscience   de   soi,   imminente  
(Weinmann  2018,  242).  
Therefore,   «l’autothanatographie   n’élabore   pas   un   nouvel   imaginaire   de   la  
mort»  (242),  as  it  prefers  to  focus  on  the  redefinition  of  the  individual  ad  devoid  
of   ontological   consistency   and   on   the  mise   en   fiction   of   a   subject  who,   after  
her/his  death,  realizes  that  she/he  can  only  exist—and  has  always  existed—as  
a  pure  function  of  language.  In  conclusion,  Weimann  argues,  «[o]n  peut  par  
conséquent  voir  dans  la  narration  autothanatographique  la  transliteration  plus  
ou   moins   consciente,   plus   ou   moins   réfléchie   de   phénomènes   majeurs   qui  
caractérisent  la  redefinition  du  “sujet”  ou  de  “l’humain”  à  la  fin  du  XXe  siècle»  
(246).  
Weimann’s  argument  allows  me  to  observe  by  contrast  that,  contrary  to  
the   narration   autothanatographique,   one   of   the   main   cultural   functions   of   r.s.  
narratives   resides   precisely   in   their   re-­‐‑elaboration   of   the   thanatological  
imagination.  Since  they  are  not  set  after  death,  but  rather  in  the  intermediate  
state   that   follows   life   and   precedes   death,   they   are   not   concerned   with  
exploring   the   (possibility   of   an)   afterlife,   which   remains   mysterious   and  
inaccessible.  Moreover,  this  intermediate  position,  while  certainly  putting  into  
question   the   nature   of   existence   and   subjectivity,   does   not   lead   to   the  
conceptualization   of   the   individual   as   a   pure   function   of   language.   On   the  
contrary,  as  chapters  3  and  4  will  show,  r.s.  narratives  often  thematize  and  are  
centered  on  the  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  the  undead  self  and  






The  analyses  by  both  Bennet  and  Weinmann,  however,  while  offering  
precious  insights  on  r.s.  narratives,  can  do  so  only  by  contrast,  since  they  do  
not  call   into  question  the  polarity  life  vs.  death  itself  as  r.s.  narratives  do.  In  
order   to   encounter   a   study   dealing   with   such   a   radical   ontological  
problematization,  one  must  move  from  the  domain  of  literary  studies  to  that  
of  science  studies.  Susan  Merrill  Squier’s  Liminal  Lives:  Imagining  the  Human  at  
the  Frontiers  of  Biomedicine  (2004)  addresses  the  issue  of  how  «the  foundational  
categories  of  human  life  have  become  subject  to  sweeping  renegotiation  under  
the   impact  of   contemporary  biomedicine   and  biotechnology»   (2)   in  order   to  
explore   «the  ways   literature   and   science   collaborate   on,   and   contest,   a   new  
vision   of   human   life»   (3).   In   order   to   do   so,   Squier   focuses   on   liminal  
biomedical  entities  that  «test  the  boundaries  of  our  vital  taxonomies,  whether  
social,  ethical,  biological,  or  economic»  (4),  the  most  notable  examples  of  which  
are   represented   by   the   engineered   intrauterine   fetus   and   the   artificially  
rejuvenated  person.  These   ‘liminal  lives’  are  «beings  marginal   to  human   life  
who   hold   rich   potential   for   our   ongoing   biomedical   negotiations  with,   and  
interventions  in,  the  paradigmatic  life  crises:  birth,  growth,  aging,  and  death»  
(9).   The   framework   for   the   analysis   of   liminal   lives   delineated   by   Squier   is  
crucially   relevant   to   the   investigation  of   the  residual  undead   in   at   least   two  
respects.   Firstly,   it  proposes   a   redefinition  of   the  notion  of   liminality  which  
represents  an  essential  premise  for  the  understanding  of  the  r.u.  in  the  context  
of  cultural  history.  Secondly,  it  modelizes  the  relationship  between  literature  
and  science  in  terms  that  open  up  fascinating  new  perspectives  to  both  science  





In  order  to  highlight  how  the  interpretation  of  liminal  lives  depends  on  
the  de-­‐‑naturalization  of  some  of  the  notions  that  we  consider  fundamental  to  
our  definition  of  ourselves  as  biological  individuals,  Squiers  begins  by  quoting  
from  Victor  Turner,  the  leading  theorist  in  the  anthropology  of  liminality:  
«the   movement   of   a   man   through   his   lifetime,   from   a   fixed  
placental  placement  within  his  mother’s  womb  to  his  death  and  
ultimate   fixed  point  of  his   tombstone  and   final   containment   in  
his   grave   as   a   dead   organism   [is]   punctuated   by   a   number   of  
critical  moments   of   transition  which   all   societies   ritualize   and  
publicly   mark   with   suitable   observances   to   impress   the  
significance  of  the  individual  and  the  group  on  living  members  
of   the   community.   These   are   the   important   times   of   birth,  
puberty,  marriage,  and  death»  (Turner  1967,  94;  quoted  in  Squier  
2004,  6).  
Squier  aptly  comments  on  this  passage  from  a  perspective  that  is  reminiscent  
of  queer  theory:  
Stressing  the  role  of  cultural  rituals  to  mark  the  facts  of  human  
life,  Turner  relies  on  a  foundational  opposition  between  nature  
and  culture.  Implicitly,  he  assumes  the  intransigence  of  biology  
(both  gestation  and  burial  are  “fixed”  in  their  placement)  in  order  
to   focus   instead   on   the   cultural   construction   of   meaning   […].  
Thus,  as  Turner  understands  it,  while  the  liminal  is  shifting,  life  
is  still  stable.  It  is  here,  I  argue,  that  contemporary  biomedicine  
necessitates   a   significant   revision   of   Turner’s   thesis,   one   that  
acknowledges  the  shifting,  interconnected,  and  emergent  quality  
of  human  life  (6).  
The   conclusion  of   Squier’s   critique  of  Turner  posits   one  of   the   fundamental  
premises   for   the   study   of   the   residual   undead:   «No   longer   stable,   the  
boundaries  of  our  human  existence  have  become  imprecise  at  best,  contested  





As  regards  the  way  in  which  Squier  conceptualizes  the  field  of  inquiry  
that  usually  falls  under  the  label  ‘literature  and  science’,  her  approach  may  be  
considered  innovative—at  least  by  literary  scholars—in  that  it  relies  upon  the  
fundamental  cultural  analogies  between  the  two  fields:    
I   am   adapting   for   science   studies   Teresa   de   Lauretis’s  
modification  of  Foucault’s  notion  of  technologies:  techniques  and  
discursive   strategies   that   are   put   to   the   service   of   gender  
production   and   construction.   I   understand   both   literature   and  
science   as   technologies   because   they   incorporate  
“institutionalized   discourses,   epistemologies   and   critical  
practices”   [(De  Lauretis  1987,  2–3)]   to  define  what   is  knowable  
and  to  bring  those  objects  into  being  (Squier  2004,  3).  
Science  and  literature  can  share  the  same  definition  because  they  are    
more   like   each   other   than   they   are  different,   not   only   because  
both   operate   in   culture   and   society   to   produce   subjects   and  
objects  but  also  because  both  fields  have  come  into  being  through  
a   crucial   act   of   institutional   self-­‐‑creation:   the   creation   of   a  
disciplinary   divide   between   scientific   and   literary   knowledges  
and  practices  (31).  
From  this  point  of  view,  the  concise  cultural  genealogy  of  the  residual  undead  
that   I   will   propose   in   Chapter   2   can   be   read   as   the   story   of   how   science,  
medicine,   folklore   and   literature   have   collaborated   in   constructing  
intermediate   states   between   life   and   death   as   objects   of   knowledge   and   in  
bringing  them  into  being.  In  more  abstract  terms,  the  perspectives  that  such  an  
approach  to  literature  and  science  can  open  up  are  extremely  fascinating:  
a  genuinely  reciprocal  understanding  of  the  ways  literature  and  
science   collaborate   and   compete   to   construct   the   subjects   of  





culture   within   which   both   fields   find   their   place:   the  
Enlightenment  epistemology  of  subjects  and  objects  (44).  
  
I  will  conclude  this  introduction  by  finally  discussing  an  issue  that  was  raised  
in   the   very   first   page   of   this   study:   the   definition   of   fantastic   fiction.   In   the  
present   work,   the   term   ‘fantastic’   should   not   be   considered   as   the   English  
equivalent  of  the  French  ‘fantastique’,  but  rather  as  an  umbrella  term  designed  
to  include  a  wide  range  of  ‘non  realistic’  fictions  in  the  context  of  an  theoretical  
approach   to   these   fictions   that   is   specifically   Anglo-­‐‑Saxon   (and,   later,  
American).  Rather   than   focusing  on  a   specific   set   of  genres,   I  will   adopt   an  
interpretation  of  the  fantastic  as  a  mode  of  fiction.  From  this  perspective,  the  
concise  theoretical  outline  that  follows  may  be  considered  as  complementary  
to  the  one  provided  by  Lazzarin  (2000),  which  is  mainly  based  on  theoretical  
sources  elaborated  in  France.  An  extremely  general  definition  of  the  fantastic  
mode  can  be  found  in  Brian  Attebery’s  (1992)  seminal  essay  on  the  theory  of  
fantasy  fiction:  «The  fantastic  mode  […]  is  a  vast  subject,  taking  in  all  literary  
manifestations  of  the  imagination’s  ability  to  soar  above  the  merely  possible»  
(294).   Such   a   definition,   however,   is   rendered   problematic   by   its   lack   of  
historicity:  contrary  to  Attebery,  my  analyses  will  move  from  a  conception  of  
the   fantastic   as   a  mode  of   fiction   that   is   always  historically  determined  and  
works  in  specific  ways  for  each  historical  period.  The  necessity  of  historicizing  
not  only   the  genres  of   the  fantastic,  but  also  the   fantastic  as  a  mode,  will  be  
addressed  a  few  years  after  Attebery’s  essay  by  Remo  Ceserani  (1996).  Such  an  
historicized  modal   approach   to   the   fantastic   invites   us   to   look   at   what   the  





genre  from  the  others,  and  this  is  precisely  the  approach  on  which  the  analysis  
in  this  study  will  be  based.  In  this  sense,  I  use  the  term  ‘fantastic  fiction’  as  a  
synonym  of  the  still  underused  term  fantastika,  first  employed  by  John  Clute  to  
refer,   in   an   inclusive  manner,   to   «the  generic   iterations  of   the  non-­‐‑mimetic»  
(2017,   18)   that   can   be   thought   of   as   «expressive   of   a   larger   enterprise   than  
realism»  (15):  
The   word   fantastika   as   I   began   to   use   it   then   came   from  
Continental  criticism  and  general  usage,  and  had  been  applied  
there   very   variously   indeed   to   describe   the   literatures   of   the  
fantastic  in  the  Western  World.  I  took  the  term  initially  to  allow,  
at  the  least  hortatory  level  possible,  its  use  as  a  generalised  non-­‐‑
imperialist  polythetic  umbrella  designation  for  those  literatures.  
Over  and  above   that   initial  broad  usage,   I  proposed   to  use   the  
term  primarily  to  describe  works  written  (very  roughly)  from  the  
last  decades  of  the  eighteenth  century  onward:  works  that  might  
be  deemed  therefore  to  have  been  written  in  a  consciousness  of  
their  generic  nature.  I  now  use  the  term  fantastika,  in  these  two  
primary  senses  (plus  a  few  others),  in  everything  I  write  (16).  
Clute’s  definition  of  fantastika  is  articulated  in  eight  points,  the  most  significant  
of  which  are:  
1)  Fantastika  consists  of  that  wide  range  of  fictional  works  whose  
contents  are  understood  to  be  fantastic.    
2)   Fantastika   is   a   child   of   Romanticism   in   Europe.   It   soon  
monstrously  outgrew  these  swaddling  clothes  (16).  
  
5)  the  default  understanding  of  a  tale  of  fantastika  is  literal,  not  
metaphorical;   for  metaphors   in   fantastika   can  mean  what   they  
say.   Fantastika   is   a   grammar   of   the   literal;   it   is   not   a   lesson  
imparted   to   the  world   from  without.  A   story   told   literally   is   a  
story  which  believes  what  it  sees,  no  matter  how  "ʺmarvelous"ʺ  the  






19)   […]   the   world   is   the   fourth   wall   of   fantastika.   […]   Any  
reading   of   any   text   of   fantastika   that   dissevers   text   from   its  
worldly  context  throws  out  the  bathwater  and  the  baby  (18).  
This  definition  leads  Clute  to  formulate  the  project  of  a  ‘diagrammatical  study  
of   the   fantastic  mode’   that  is  crucially  resonating  with   the  perspective   that   I  
propose  to  adopt  for  the  study  of  the  residual  undead:  
If  fantastika  can  be  seen  as  encompassing  sacred  games  of  insight  
and  analysis  within  an  eruv,  a  shift  of  emphasis  is  likely  to  occur,  
with  less  attention  paid  to  taxonomic  descriptions  of  particular  
genres,  and  more  paid   to   the  multiple  interactions  of   text  with  
text,  a  dance  of  synchrony  and  diachrony  within  the  permission  
of   the   eruv   that  makes   something   of   a  mock   of   definitions   of  
particular  texts  that  privilege  the  Apollonian  purity  of  the  done  
thing.  The  inherent  grammar  –  the  engendering  fire  –  of  fantastika  
is  not  to  be  found  in  the  thing  done,  or  in  strategic  groupings  of  
texts   under   various   partial   rubrics,   but   in   the   grammars   of  
connection  between  texts;  it  lies  in  the  beat  that  marks  a  tensing  
of  the  limbs  of  story,  in  the  gap  between  the  repose  of  the  already  
told  and  the  alarums  of  something  new  (19).  
Clute’s  focus  on  the  «grammar  of  interconnections  between  texts»  within  the  
field  of  fantastic  fiction  significantly  echoes  Gary  K.  Wolfe’s  project  of  a  ‘post-­‐‑
genre’  approach  to  the  fantastic,  an  approach  to  which  the  present  study  may  
represent  a  contribution.  According  to  Wolfe,  the  tendency  of  the  genres  of  the  
fantastic  to  constantly  transgress  definitions  and  limitation  is  inherent  to  their  
very  structure:        
the  fantastic  genres  […]  seem  evolutionary  by  their  very  nature:  
science   fiction   must   accommodate   the   shifting   and   often  
counterintuitive  visions  of  base  reality  that  science  itself  reflects;  





of  the  anxiety  that  it  seeks  to  exploit;  fantasy  must  accommodate  
the   shifting   dreams   of   a   world   no   longer   governed   by   the  
conventionalized  desires  of  pastoral  idealism.  In  the  end,  science  
fiction,  fantasy,  and  horror  are  the  genres  that  at  their  best,  and  
by   the   very   terms   of   the   imaginative   processes   involved,  
transcend   or   supersede   the   old   notions   of   genre.   They   are  
narrative  modes   that  already  have   leaked   into   the  atmosphere,  
that  have  escaped   their  own  worst  debilitations,  and   that  have  
therefore  survived  (2011,  53).  
  
Because  of  the  uncertainty  of  these  genre  markers,  the  fantastic  
genres   contain   within   themselves   the   seeds   of   their   own  
dissolution,  a  nascent  set  of  postmodern  rhetorical  modes   that,  
over   a  period  of   several  decades,  would  begin   to   supplant  not  
only   the  notion  of  genre   itself,  but   the  very   foundations  of   the  
modernist   barricades   that   had   long   been   thought   to   insulate  
literary  culture  from  the  vernacular  fiction  of  the  pulps  and  other  
forms  of  noncanonical  expression  (23).  
I   would   like   to   conclude   this   introduction   by   positing   Wolfe’s   post-­‐‑genre  
approach   to   fantastika   as   the  main   theoretical   premise   of   this   study,  while  
integrating  it  with  Attebery’s  proposition  of  a  reader-­‐‑oriented  approach  to  the  
fantastic,   which   offers   an   original   solution   to   the   issue   relative   to   the  
‘placement’  of  hybrid  texts  in  rigid  genre  grids:  
The  interesting  question  about  any  given  story  is  not  whether  or  
not   it   is   fantasy   or   science   fiction   or   realistic   novel,   but   rather  
what   happens   when   we   read   it   as   one   of   those   things.   What  
happens   when   we   read   Frankenstein   as   an   instance   of   the  
philosophical  Gothic?  How  does  that  reading  differ  from  one  that  
looks  for  the  markers  of  science  fiction,  or  horror?  Depending  on  
the   generic   perspective   one   favors,   certain   details   of   plot   and  
motivation   will   stand   out,   while   others   will   recede   into   the  
background.  The   central  questions  will   shift.  Different   reading  





works.  Like  individual  performers  within  the  same  storytelling  
tradition,   individual   readers  will   perform   the   same   texts  with  
very  dissimilar   results:   sometimes  more   effectively,   sometimes  
less  (2014:  32).  
I  will  show  in  the  next  chapter  how,  in  the  context  of  r.s.  narratives,  the  genres  
of   the   fantastic—from   the   supernatural   to   fantasy,   from   science   fiction   and  
speculative  fiction  to  horror—all  achieve  the  same  goal:  that  of  exploring  new  
ontologies  and  new  planes  of  existence.  But  before  coming  to  the  issue  of  the  
pragmatics  of  fantastic  fiction,  I  will  shift  the  focus  of  my  attention  to  category  
theory   in   order   to   understand   in   what   sense   the   residual   undead   can   be  







Theorizing residual states 
narratives 
1.1   The Chinese encyclopedia and the living dead: 
categorizing the residual 
After  having  posited  the  general  framework  within  which  the  study  of  residual  
states  between  life  and  death  comes  into  focus,  my  most  urgent  task  is  to  define  
with   precision   what   do   I   mean   by   ‘residual   undead’.   As   said   in   the  
introduction,   the   r.u.   are   characterized   by   the   presence   of   a   double   level   of  
cultural  subversion:  they  violate  the  polarity  ‘life  vs.  death’  and  they  do  so  by  
violating  the  taxonomy  of  the  living  dead.  This  seems  to  make  queer  theory  the  





apply   queer   hermeneutics   to   the   construction   of   a   corpus   in   a   comparative  
study,  examining  the  strategies  of  categorization  that  make  this  construction  
possible.    
The  construction  of  r.s.  will  be  first  formalized  through  the  intersection  
of  two  approaches  to  categorization,  both  developed  in  the  field  of  cognitive  
sciences   as   elaborations   of   Wittgenstein’s   notion   of   family   resemblance:  
Eleanor   Rosch’s   prototype   theory   and   George   Lakoff’s   discussion   of  
classification  strategies  in  the  Dyirbal  language.  
I  will  then  try  to  analyze  the  epistemological  implications  deriving  from  
restructuring   the   taxonomy   of   the   living   dead   in   the   light   of   the   notion   of  
‘nonce   taxonomy’,   described   by   Eve   Sedgwick   in   Epistemology   of   the   Closet  
(1990)  and  recently  reconsidered  by  Carmen  Dell’Aversano.  Sedgwick  posits  
nonce-­‐‑taxonomy   as   a   strategy   for   the   construction   of   identities   mediating  
between  the  need  to  account  for  the  uniqueness  of  every  human  being  and  the  
very  small  number  of  axes  of  categorization  available  in  our  culture.  However,  
while   recognizing   the   crucial   role   nonce-­‐‑taxonomy   has   played   in   the  
deconstruction  of  the  category  of  ‘the  individual’,  Sedgwick  doesn’t  provide  
any  theoretical  framework  for  the  description  of  this  strategy.  Dell’Aversano  
has   recently   contributed   to   the   theoretical   (re)definition   of   nonce   taxonomy  
from   a   radical   perspective,   showing   how   it   could   work   as   a   tool   for   the  
segmentation  of  one’s  reality  according  to  absolutely  idiosyncratic  criteria.  
I  will  conclude  by  intersecting  the  approaches  to  categorization  deriving  
from  cognitive  sciences  with  those  deriving  from  queer  theory.  My  aim  will  be  





theoretical  support  it  needs;  and  secondly,  how  the  field  of  comparative  studies  
could  be  queered  through  the  systematic  use  of  prototype-­‐‑based  and  nonce-­‐‑
taxonomic  categorization.  
The   analyses   that   follow   will   hopefully   show   how   questioning   the  
hermeneutics   of   comparative   studies   through   queer   theory—defined,   in   a  
broad  sense,  as  a  fluid  set  of  tools  possessing  «the  potential  to  subvert  accepted  
ways  of  thinking  on  any  issue»3  (Dell’Aversano  2010,  74)—may  open  up  new  
perspectives  in  the  study  of  fiction  by  raising  awareness  of  the  categorization  
processes   at   work   in   the   field   of   comparative   literature,   in   general,   and   of  
thematics,  in  particular.  
1.1.1   The living, the dead, the living dead, and all the others 
When  asked  “What  comes  to  your  mind  when  I  say  ‘the  living  dead’?”,  
people  normally  answer  with  a  list  of  supernatural  and  horror  figures:  ghosts,  
                                                                                              
  
3   «Subversion,   as   well   as   fluidity,   is   definitory   of   queer;   indeed,   its  
fluidity  is  not  an  end  in  itself,  but  simply  the  most  effective  and  aesthetically  
fulfilling   means   to   accomplish   the   political   and   metaphysical   task   of  
permanent   and   neverending   subversion.   [Q]ueer   does   not   simply  maintain  
that   it   is   OK   to   be   gay,   lesbian,   bisexual   or   transgender   (this   is   a   given   of  
progressive  common  sense,  about   the   least  queer  position   imaginable...)  but  
states  that  any  construction  of  identity  (including  LGBT  ones)  is  a  performance  
constituting   a   subject  which   does   not   “exist”   prior   to   it,   and  encourages   to  
bring   into   being   (both   as   objects   of   desire,   of   fantasy   and   of   theoretical  
reflection   and   as   concrete   existential   and   political   possibilities)   alternative  






vampires,  zombies  and  mummies.  In  particular,  the  association  of  ‘living  dead’  
with   zombies   is   almost   instantaneous.  Horror  buffs   and   connoisseurs   could  
add  other  minor  figures,  like  the  ghoul  or  the  white  lady.  Some  people  mention  
Frankenstein.   When   asked   to   think   of   other   examples   outside   fictional  
characters   or   supernatural   beings,   people   sometimes   point   to   permanent  
vegetative  state  and  NDEs  (Near  Death  Experiences)  as  possible  examples  of  
living-­‐‑dead-­‐‑like  conditions.  
This   evident   cognitive   hierarchy   in   the   cultural   construction   of   the  
category   ‘the   living   dead’   cannot   be   explained   by   the   so-­‐‑called   ‘classical’  
theories  of   categorization.  According   to   these   theories,   categories  have   clear  
boundaries  and  are  defined  by  common  properties:  
From   the   time   of   Aristotle   to   the   later   work   of   Wittgenstein,  
categories   were   thought   to   be   well   understood   and  
unproblematic.   They   were   assumed   to   be   abstract   containers,  
with   things   either   inside   or   outside   the   category.  Things  were  
assumed  to  be  in  the  same  category  if  and  only  if  they  had  certain  
properties  in  common.  And  the  properties  they  had  in  common  
were  taken  as  defining  the  category.  (Lakoff  1987,  6)  
The   description   of   categorization   processes   according   to   classical  
theories  entails  at  least  two  fundamental  consequences:  
First,   if   categories   are   defined   only   by   properties   that   all  
members  share,  then  no  members  should  be  better  examples  of  
the  category   than  any  other  members.  Second,   if   categories  are  
defined   only   by   properties   inherent   in   the   members,   then  
categories   should   be   independent   of   the   peculiarities   of   any  





However,  as  we  have  just  seen,  both  these  statements  do  not  apply  to  
how  people  describe  the  category  ‘living  dead’.  In  order  to  be  accounted  for,  
this   process   has   to   be   studied   in   the   light   of   the   prototype   theory   of  
categorization,  developed  by  Eleanor  Rosch  as  an  elaboration  of  Wittgenstein’s  
notion  of  ‘family  resemblance’4,  that  is,  «[t]he  idea  that  members  of  a  category  
may  be  related  to  one  another  without  all  members  having  any  properties  in  
common   that   define   the   category»   (Lakoff   1987,   12).   In   particular,   Rosch  
enriches  Wittgenstein’s  view  of  categorization  by  introducing  the  key  concept  
of  ‘centrality’,  defined  as  «[t]he  idea  that  some  members  of  a  category  may  be  
‘better  examples’  of  that  category  than  others»  (Lakoff  1987,  12).  According  to  
Rosch  
experiments   indicate   that   people   categorize  objects,   not   in   set-­‐‑
theoretical   terms,   but   in   terms   of   prototypes   and   family  
resemblances.   For   example,   small   flying   singing   birds,   like  
                                                                                              
  
4  «Consider   for  example   the  proceedings   that  we  call   'ʹgames'ʹ.   I  mean  
board   games,   card   games,   ball   games,   Olympic   games,   and   so   on.  What   is  
common  to  them  all?  Don'ʹt  say,  "ʺThere  must  be  something  common,  or  they  
would   not  be   called   'ʹgames'ʹ"ʺ   -­‐‑-­‐‑   but   look   and   see  whether   there   is   anything  
common  to  all.  For  if  you  look  at  them  you  will  not  see  something  common  to  
all,  but  similarities,  relationships,  and  a  whole  series  of  them  at  that.  To  repeat:  
don'ʹt   think,   but   look!   […]   And   the   result   of   this   examination   is:   we   see   a  
complicated  network  of  similarities  overlapping  and  criss-­‐‑crossing:  sometimes  
overall  similarities,  sometimes  similarities  of  detail.  […]  I  can  think  of  no  better  
expression  to  characterize  these  similarities  than  ‘family  resemblances’;  for  the  
various  resemblances  between  members  of  a   family:  build,   features,  color  of  
eyes,  gait,  temperament,  etc.  Etc.  Overlap  and  criss-­‐‑cross  in  the  same  way.—
And  I  shall  say:  ‘games’  form  a  family»  (Wittgenstein  [1953]  1999,  171).  For  a  





sparrows,  robins,  etc.,  are  prototypical  birds.  Chickens,  ostriches,  
and   penguins   are   birds   but   are   not   central   members   of   the  
category—they   are   nonprototypical   birds.   But   they   are   birds  
nonetheless,  because  they  bear  sufficient  family  resemblances  to  
the   prototype;   that   is,   they   share   enough   of   the   relevant  
properties   of   the   prototype   to   be   classified  by   people   as   birds  
(Lakoff  and  Johnson  1980,  71).  
In  other  words,  Rosch’s  experiments  demonstrate  that,  contrary  to  what  
the  classical  theory  of  categorization  holds,  the  relationship  between  an  object  
and  a  category  is  not  defined  in  rigid  yes-­‐‑or-­‐‑no  terms,  but  rather  that  there  are  
degrees   of   membership,   which   are   determined   by   differences   involving  
degrees  of  typicality.    
Even   though   prototype   theory   has   been   criticized   by   a   number   of  
logicians   and   philosophers   of   mind,   as   well   as   challenged   by   other  
categorization  theories5,  these  views  mostly  approach  categorization  from  an  
abstract  perspective,  which  tends  to  disregard  what  is  most  important  to  the  
analysis   that   I’m   going   to   propose:   the   ‘cultural   life’   of   categories.   On   the  
contrary,   Rosch   provides   us   with   an   invaluable   model   for   mapping   how  
categorization  concretely  works  in  a  culture  and  in  our  everyday  lives:  
It   should  be  noted   that   the   issues  in  categorization  with  which  
we   are   primarily   concerned   have   to   do   with   explaining   the  
categories  found  in  a  culture  and  coded  by  the  language  of  that  
                                                                                              
  
5  For  an  overview  of  the  subject,  see  Weiskopf  (2013)  and  Margolis  and  
Laurence   (2014).  Criticisms   to  prototype   theory  have  been  raised  notably  by  
Fodor  (1998).  For  advances  in  the  study  of  categorization  in  cognitive  science  





culture   at   a   particular   point   in   time.   When   we   speak   of   the  
formation  of  categories,  we  mean  their  formation  in  the  culture.  
This   point   is   often   misunderstood.   The   principles   of  
categorization  proposed  are  not  as  such  intended  to  constitute  a  
theory  of  the  development  of  categories  in  children  born  into  a  
culture  nor  to  constitute  a  model  of  how  categories  are  processed  
(how  categorizations  are  made)  in  the  mind  of  adult  speakers  of  
a  language  (Rosch  1999,  189).  
By   interpreting   the   difference   between   prototypical   and  
nonprototypical  members   through  a  geographical  metaphor  –  as  Lakoff  and  
Johnson  do  in  the  above  quotation  –  a  category  can  be  viewed  as  a  city  area:  it  
has  a  center,  inhabited  by  the  prototypical  members,  and  a  number  of  outskirts,  
inhabited  by  the  nonprototypical  members.  The  boundaries  delimiting  the  two  
areas  are  neither  clear-­‐‑cut  nor  fixed,  but  rather  blurred  and  unstable,  subjected  
as  they  are  to  constant  cultural  re-­‐‑negotiations.  
If   we   look   at   the   way  Western   culture   has   constructed   the   category  
‘living  dead’  through  this  prototype-­‐‑based  metaphor,  it  is  clear  that  its  center  
is   inhabited  by   three  prototypical  members:   the  ghost,   the  vampire   and   the  
zombie.  Each  one  of  these  figures  possesses  a  detailed  cultural  identikit  with  
precisely   defined   traits.   They   belong   to   a   more   or   less   recent   tradition   in  
literature,   cinema,   and   the   visual   arts,   which   makes   them   immediately  
recognizable.  Finally,  they  have  become  immensely  successful  in  every  form  of  
fiction  over  the  last  decades.  As  a  consequence,  they  have  also  become  widely  
studied  by  academics  in  a  wide  range  of  fields.  
A  number  of  somewhat  ‘minor’  figures  can  be  considered  to  inhabit  the  
center   as  well:   the  mummy,   the  ghoul,   the  white   lady.   They  may   not   be   as  





precise  set  of  traits  and  can  be  traced  back  to  well-­‐‑known  traditions,  which  are  
the  criteria  that  define  prototypical  membership  in  our  case.  
If  recognizing  the  center  of  the  category  ‘living  dead’  is  almost  intuitive,  
any  attempt  to  define  its  periphery  proves  to  be  far  less  immediate:  the  center  
is  so  intensely  active  that  it  seems  to  occupy  the  whole  space  of  the  category,  
thus  making  it  difficult  to  even  conceptualize  a  periphery.  
I  would   argue   that   this   periphery   can   be   constructed   by  moving   the  
focus  of  our  attention  towards  a  number  of  isolated  and  (seemingly)  unrelated  
figures  that  stud  the  speculative  fiction  landscape  of  the  last  150  years.  They  
undeniably  have  something   to  do  with   the   living  dead,  but  do  not  quite   fit   the  
current  cultural  mapping  of  this  category,  thus  forcing  us  to  reconsider,  from  
a  much  wider  perspective,  how  intermediate  states  between  life  and  death  can  
be  represented  in  fiction.  
If  considered  individually,  each  one  of  these  texts  could  be  viewed  as  a  
sort  of  quirky  exception,  a  bizarre  exercise  in  style,  an  isolated  deviation  from  
the   ‘normal’   conceptualization   of   the   undead.   But,   in   doing   so,   we   would  
simply  define  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  central  figures  of  the  category.  
This  would  implicitly  deny  any  strong  cultural  relevance  and  significance  to  
its  unique  peculiarities:  they  would  be  seen  as  fortuitous  and  forgettable  traits,  
too   isolated   to   be  worthy   of   telling   us   something   important   about   how   the  
polarity  ‘life  vs  death’  is  structured  in  contemporary  culture.  On  the  contrary,  
I  propose   to  gather   these   isolated   texts   together   into  one  single   corpus  and   to  
define  them  in  a  way  that  dispenses  with  the  ghost-­‐‑vampire-­‐‑zombie  paradigm  





category  and  become  fully-­‐‑fledged  members  of  a  new  category:  the  ‘residual  
states  between   life   and  death’,   or   ‘the   residual  undead’   (shortened   to   ‘r.u.’).  
This  category  can  be  used  to  identify  liminal  characters,  worlds  and  contexts  
whose  features  are  original  and  possibly  unique  and  do  not  belong  to  any  well-­‐‑
known  cultural  tradition.  
But  how  can  we  theoretically  deal  with  a  category  whose  members  are  
the  scattered  leftovers  of  another  category?  
We  could  answer   this  question  by  describing   the  category   ‘r.s.’   in   the  
light  of  the  notion  of  ‘otherness’,  as  defined  by  George  Lakoff  in  his  1987  essay  
Women,   Fire   and   Dangerous   Things,   which   represents   the   most   successful  
attempt  to  date  to  systematically  describe  the  mechanisms  of  human  cognition  
according  to  Rosch’s  prototype  theory.    
From  the  perspective  outlined  in  the  previous  paragraph,  the  category  
‘r.s.’  appears  to  be  defined  in  exclusively  negative  terms:  its  members  are  those  
objects  which  do  not   fit   any  other   category   for   the  description  of   the   living  
dead.  It   is   interesting  to  note  that  the  same  kind  of  ‘negative  definition’  of  a  
category  can  be  found  in  what  is  probably  the  most  extraordinary  literary  text  
dealing  with  the  speculative  re-­‐‑elaboration  of  taxonomy:  the  classification  of  
the  animal  kingdom  according  to  the  Emporio  celestial  de  conocimientos  benévolos,  
an   ancient   Chinese   encyclopedia   described   by   J.L.   Borges   in  The   Analytical  
Language  of  John  Wilkins:  
En  sus  remotas  páginas  está  escrito  que  los  animales  se  dividen  
en   (a)   pertenecientes   al   Emperador,   (b)   embalsamados,   (c)  
amaestrados,   (d)   lechones,   (e)   sirenas,   (f)   fabulosos,   (g)   perros  
sueltos,  (h)  incluidos  en  esta  clasificación,  (i)  que  se  agitan  como  





pelo  de  camello,  (l)  etcétera,  (m)  que  acaban  de  romper  el  jarrón,  
(n)   que   de   lejos   parecen   moscas   (Borges   [1952]   1966,   708,  
emphasis  mine)6.  
With   a  move   that   clearly   reminds   Foucault’s   premise   to  The  Order   of  
Things,   the   chapter   that   gives   Lakoff’s   book  his   curious   title   opens  with   an  
analysis  of  this  quote.  Like  Foucault,  Lakoff  focuses  on  our  inability  to  think  
Borges’   fantastic   taxonomy7,   but  he  does   so  by   relating   such   inability   to   the  
actual  hermeneutic  practices  of  linguists  and  anthropologists:  
Part  of  what  makes  this  passage  art,  rather  than  mere  fantasy,  is  
that  it  comes  close  to  the  impression  a  Western  reader  gets  when  
reading  descriptions  of  nonwestern  languages  and  cultures.  The  
fact   is   that  people   around   the  world   categorize   things   in  ways  
that  both  boggle  the  Western  mind  and  stump  Western  linguists  
and   anthropologists.   More   often   than   not,   the   linguist   or  
anthropologist  just  throws  up  his  hands  and  resorts  to  giving  a  
list—a  list  that  one  would  not  be  surprised  to  find  in  the  writing  
of  Borges  (Lakoff  1987,  92).  
                                                                                              
  
6  In  its  distant  pages  it  is  written  that  animals  are  divided  into  (a)  those  
that  belong  to  the  emperor;  (b)  embalmed  ones;  (c)  those  that  are  trained;  (d)  
suckling  pigs;  (e)  mermaids;  (f)  fabulous  ones;  (g)  stray  dogs;  (h)  those  that  are  
included   in   this   classification;   (i)   those   that   tremble   as   if   they  were  mad;   (j)  
innumerable   ones;   (k)   those   drawn  with   a   very   fine   camel'ʹs-­‐‑hair   brush;   (l)  
etcetera;   (m)   those   that   have   just   broken   the   flower   vase;   (n)   those   that   at   a  
distance  resemble  flies  .  
7  «Dans  l’émerveillement  de  cette  taxinomie,  ce  qu’on  rejoint  d’un  bond,  
ce  qui,  à  la  faveur  de  l’apologue,  nous  est  indiqué  comme  le  charme  exotique  
d’une  autre  pensée,  c’est  la  limite  de  la  notre:  l’impossibilité  nue  de  penser  cela»  





This  analysis,   in  fact,   introduces  Lakoff’s  discussion  of   the   traditional  
classification  of  objects  in  Dyirbal  –  an  aboriginal   language  of  Australia  –  as  
described  by  linguist  Robert  M.W.  Dixon.  In  Dyirbal,  every  noun  must  always  
be  preceded  by  a  variant  of  one  of  four  words:  ‘bayi’,  ‘balan’,  ‘balam’,  ‘bala’.  
Dixon   uncovers   the   categorization   system   underlying   this   syntactic  
distribution  by  observing  that  
speakers  do  not  learn  category  members  one  by  one,  but  operate  
in  terms  of  some  general  principles.  […]  Dixon’s  proposed  basic  
schema  is  this:  
I.  Bayi:  (human)  males;  animals  
II.  Balan:  (human)  females;  water;  fire;  fighting  
III.  Balam:  nonflesh  food  
IV.  Bala:  everything  not  in  the  other  classes  (Lakoff  1987,  93).  
After   a   detailed   and   compelling   analysis   of   Dixon’s   schema,   Lakoff  
finally   shows   how   this   «superb   example   of   how   human   cognition   works»  
(1987,  95)  allows  us  to  identify  and  recapitulate  the  general  principles  at  work  
in  human  categorization  –   the  key  principle  being,  as  said  before,  centrality.  
Among  these  principles,  Lakoff  includes  that  of  ‘otherness’,  with  reference  to  
the   point   ‘(l)   etcetera’   in   Borges’   taxonomy:   «Borges   was   right   about   this.  
Conceptual  systems  can  have  an  ‘everything  else’  category.  It,  of  course,  does  
not  have  central  members,  chaining  etc.»  (1987,  96).  
Given   this  account  of  human  categorization,  the  category   ‘r.s.’   can  be  
described  precisely  as  an  ‘everything  else’  category  that  follows  the  conceptual  
logic   of   otherness.   Thus,   Lakoff’s   analysis   allows   us   to   formalize   the  
construction  of  a  «residual  category»  (Bowker  and  Star  1999,  11)  according  to  





more   importantly,   it   allows   us   to  make   a   key   feature   of   residual   categories  
explicit:  by  their  very  nature,  they  cannot  possess  an  internal  structure  based  
on  typicality  differences.  In  this  sense,  residual  categories  are  exceptional  and  
fundamentally  different  from  any  other  category.  
I  will  now  briefly  explore   the  main   implications   for   the  study  of   ‘r.s.’  
deriving  from  this  structural  absence  of  prototypes.  
As  I  have  pointed  out,  the  figures  at  the  center  of  the  category  ‘living  
dead’  are  immensely  famous  and  defined  by  recurrent  sets  of  traits.  Whenever  
we  encounter,  for  example,  a  character  with  long  canines  that  feeds  on  human  
blood,  we  immediately  identify  this  character  as  a  vampire.  On  the  contrary,  
r.s.   completely   lack   both   structural   coherence   and   cultural   renown.   While  
every   individual   occurrence   of   the   semiotic   object   ‘Dracula’   can   be  
automatically   subsumed   under   the   prototype   ‘vampire’,   the   same   does   not  
apply   to   the   individual   occurrence   of   the   object   ‘Mr.   Valdemar’.   It   has   no  
‘figure’   to  which   it   can  be  referred,  because   there   seem   to  be  no  prototypes  
framing  our  cultural  construction  of  Mr.  Valdemar.  
This  observation  may  be  relevant  not  only  to  the  study  of  categories  but  
also,  on  a  broader  perspective,  to  Lotman’s  culturology,  which  is  axed  on  an  
analogous   ‘center   vs.   periphery’   opposition.   In   particular,   it   may   help   to  
elaborate  on  Lotman’s  well-­‐‑known  idea  that  the  periphery  of  a  culture  lacks  
order  and  structure:    
the   entire   system   for   preserving   and   communicating   human  
experience  is  constructed  as  a  concentric  system  in  the  center  of  
which  are  located  the  most  obvious  and  logical  structures,  that  is,  
the   most   structural   ones.   Nearer   to   the   periphery   are   found  





proved,   but   which,   being   included   in   general   sign-­‐‑
communicational   situations,   function   as   structures   (Lotman   and  
Uspensky  1978,  213).  
The   lack   of   structuredness   consists   precisely   in   the   impossibility   to  
intuitively  ‘extract’  traits  from  a  category  member:  while  one  can  easily  do  so  
for   a   vampire   (‘pale’,   ‘with   long   canines’,   ‘haematophagous’   etc.),   the   same  
thing  cannot  be  done  for  a  r.s.  
More   importantly,   recognizing   a   central   member   of   the   category  
generates   precise   expectations   in   readers   and   audiences:  we   all   know  quite  
well  what  kind  of  aesthetic  experience  we  can  expect  from  a  zombie  movie  or  
a   ghost   story.   In   fact,   we   know   it   so   well   that   our   expectations   can   be  
intentionally  transgressed  in  order  to  create  new  kinds  of  texts,  like  a  zombie  
love   story   or   a   novel   about   a   vegan   vampire,   whose   aesthetic   effect   relies  
precisely  on  the  contrast  between  our  expectations  and  the  actual  traits  given  
to   the   ‘transgressive’  character.  Because  of   these   figures’  constant,  pervasive  
and  highly  structured  presence   in  contemporary   fiction,   the  horror  and  fear  
they  inspire  have  crystallized  into  recurrent  and  predictable  patterns.  We  have  
learnt  to  associate  zombies  with  a  precise  quality  of  fear,  and  know  exactly  how  
the   fear   of   zombies   is  different   from   the   fear   of   ghosts   or   vampires.   In   this  
sense,   by   providing   us  with  well-­‐‑defined   patterns   of   experience,   the   living  
dead  have  become  paradoxically  reassuring  and  ultimately  harmless.  On  the  
other   hand,   there   are   no   rigid   sets   of   expectations   that   guide   our   textual  
experience  of  r.s.  This  allows  them  to  inspire  fears,  anxieties  and  speculative  





1.1.2   From the Chinese encyclopedia to nonce taxonomy 
  The   creation   of   the   category   ‘r.s.’   as   emancipated   from   the   ghost-­‐‑
vampire-­‐‑zombie   paradigm   represents   an   attempt   to   reshape   our  
understanding   of   a   set   of   fictional   objects   through   the   restructuring   of   the  
categorization  processes  by  which   these  objects  become  part  of  a   taxonomy.  
Up  to  this  point,  I  have  analyzed  these  processes  mainly  from  a  broad,  socio-­‐‑
cultural   perspective:   Wittgenstein,   Rosch   and   Lakoff   provide   us   with  
invaluable  hermeneutic  tools  for  describing  how  categories  shape  every  aspect  
of  our  thinking  and  how  we  act  through  categories.  In  the  second  part  of  this  
study,   I   would   like   to   focus   on   categorization   processes   by   adopting   the  
opposite  perspective:  how  can  we  actively  and  consciously  contribute   to   the  
construction  of  conceptual  systems?  Through  which  strategies  can  we  act  on  
categories?  This  is  where  queer   theory  comes   in,  opening  up  a   fundamental  
space  of  mediation,  created  by  the  tension  between  what  categories  do  to  us  
and  what  we  do  to  categories.  
The   hermeneutic   strategy   that   led   to   the   construction   of   ‘r.s.’   as   a  
category  was  pursued  in  order  to  account  for  the  wide  variety  of  texts  that  are  
‘somehow  related’  to  the  notion  of  ‘living  dead’  but  are  rendered  invisible  by  
the   current   configuration   of   this   same   notion.   In   the   very   first   pages   of  
Epistemology   of   the   Closet,   Eve   Sedgwick   seems   to   express   a   structurally  
analogous   desire   –  with   a   broader   perspective   and  with   different   aims   –   to  
account  for  the  almost  inexhaustible  variety  of  identity  traits  that  make  each  
person  unique:  





It   is  astonishing  how  few  respectable  conceptual  tools  we  have  
for   dealing   with   this   self-­‐‑evident   fact.   A   tiny   number   of  
inconceivably   coarse   axes   of   categorization   have   been  
painstakingly  inscribed  in  current  critical  and  political  thought:  
gender,   race,   class,   nationality,   sexual   orientation   are   pretty  
much   the   available   distinctions.   They,   with   the   associated  
demonstrations   of   the   mechanisms   by   which   they   are  
constructed   and   reproduced,   are   indispensable,   and   they  may  
indeed   override   all   or   some   other   forms   of   difference   and  
similarity.  But  the  sister  or  brother,  the  best  friend,  the  classmate,  
the  parent,  the  child,  the  lover,  the  ex-­‐‑:  our  families,   loves,  and  
enmities  alike,  not  to  mention  the  strange  relations  of  our  work,  
play,  and  activism,  prove  that  even  people  who  share  all  or  most  
of   our   own   positionings   along   these   crude   axes   may   still   be  
different  enough  from  us,  and  from  each  other,  to  seem  like  all  
but  different  species  (Sedgwick  1990,  22).  
According   to   Sedgwick,   the   response   to   the   rigidity   of   our   axes   of  
categorization  is  to  be  found  in  what  she  calls  ‘nonce  taxonomy’:    
probably   everybody   who   survives   at   all   has   reasonably   rich,  
unsystematic  resources  of  nonce  taxonomy  for  mapping  out  the  
possibilities,   dangers,   and   stimulations   of   their   human   social  
landscape.   […]   The   writing   of   a   Proust   or   a   James   would   be  
exemplary  here:  projects  precisely  of  nonce  taxonomy,  of  making  
and  unmaking  and  remaking  and  redissolution  of  hundreds  of  
old  and  new  categorical   imaginings   concerning  all   the  kinds   it  
may  take  to  make  up  a  world  (23).  
Sedgwick  posits  nonce  taxonomy  as  a  means  to  remedy  both  the  scarcity  
and   the   coarseness   of   social   categories   which   can   be   used   to   describe   the  
individual   in   our   culture   (“A   tiny   number   of   inconceivably   coarse   axes   of  
categorization   have   been   painstakingly   inscribed   in   current   critical   and  





twofold  aim:  one  the  one  hand,  the  creation  of  new  axes  of  categorization;  on  
the  other  hand,  the  multiplication  of  the  number  of  possible  positionings  along  
a  given  axis  of  categorization.  
When  Sedgwick  provides  an  example  of  nonce  taxonomy,  however,  she  
does  so  with  reference  to  “the  particular  area  of  sexuality”  (24),  which  results  
in   a   long   enumeration   of   specifications   of   people’s   sexual   preferences.  This  
strategy  seems  to  pursue  the  second  aim  much  more  than  the  first  one:  in  fact,  
if   sexuality   “has   been  made   expressive   of   the   essence   of   both   identity   and  
knowledge”   (26)   in   which   sense   could   it   be   considered   a   new   axis   of  
categorization?8  Or  rather:  even  if  we  consider  it  as  such,  what  matters  most  
here  is  that  Sedgwick’s  nonce  taxonomy  proposes  new  categorizations  while  
firmly   remaining   within   the   parameters   that   our   culture   already   considers  
important  –  even  fundamental  –  for  the  construction  of  personal  identity.  
In   order   to   try   to   escape   from   these   cultural   parameters,   Carmen  
Dell’Aversano9  proposes  to  rethink  nonce  taxonomy  from  a  radical  perspective  
by  shifting  the  focus  of  our  attention  from  what  the  culture  considers  important  
to  what  the  individual  considers  important  for  the  definition  of  her/his  identity.  
                                                                                              
  
8  Of  course,  to  ask  this  question  does  not  in  any  way  imply  undervaluing  
the   fundamental   relevance   of   Sedgwick’s   claim   that   “to   alienate   […]   from  
anyone  on  any  theoretical  ground  the  authority  to  describe  and  name  their  own  
sexual  desire  […]  may  represent  the  most  intimate  violence  possible”  (26).  
9  Dell’Aversano  studied  Sedgwick’s  treatment  of  nonce  taxonomy  and  
reconsidered   the   definition   of   this   concept   in   a   series   of   lectures   on   queer  






From   this   perspective,   a   nonce   taxonomy   can   be   defined   as   an   original  
arrangement  of  objects  or  categories,  created  by  a  single  person  on  the  basis  of  
absolutely   idiosyncratic   criteria   that   are   indicative   of   this   person’s   unique,  
eccentric  and  quaint  way  of  making  sense  of  the  world.    
In   this   sense,   the   «rich,   unsystematic   resources   of   nonce   taxonomy»  
about  which  Sedgwick  (23)  speaks  are  those  resources  that  allow  us  to  conceive  
of  and  express  idiosyncratic  identity  parameters  that  cannot  be  subsumed  into  
any  pre-­‐‑established  axis  of   categorization.   In  other  words,   this  definition  of  
nonce   taxonomy   promotes   the   re-­‐‑segmentation   of   reality   according   to  
parameters  that  become  particularly  meaningful  –  from  a  philosophical  point  
of   view   in   general   and   for   queer   theory   in   particular   –   when   they   are  
considered  highly  relevant   for   the   individual  but  not   for   the  culture.  Nonce  
taxonomy  thus  becomes  a  queer  hermeneutic  tool  catalyzing  the  never-­‐‑ending  
proliferation  of  novel  categories  and  categorization  strategies.  The  tool  through  
which  one  becomes  able  to  assert  and  exercise  the  right  to  compile  one’s  own  
Chinese  encyclopedia.  
Dell’Aversano,   however,   observes   that   the   application   of   this   radical  
definition   inevitably  collides  with   the   fact   that  nonce   taxonomies  cannot,  by  
their  very  nature,  become  part  of  social  interactions.  If  the  cultural  construction  
of   normal   social   intercourse   is   based   on   shared   categorizations   (Sacks   1985),  
then   there   is   no   place   in   it   for   the   expression   of   absolutely   idiosyncratic  
parameters.  From  this  point  of  view,  Dell’Aversano  concludes,  the  process  of  





nonce   taxonomies   and,   sometimes,   of   one’s   very   ability   to   conceptualize   a  
nonce  taxonomy.  
1.1.3   From nonce taxonomy to queer comparative literature 
The  discussion  of  the  notion  of  nonce  taxonomy  has  shown  how  queer  
theory   can   open   up   a   hermeneutic   space   for   mediating   between   what  
categories  do  to  us  and  what  we  do  to  categories.  More  specifically,  the  analysis  
of   the   definitions   of   nonce   taxonomy,   provided   by   Sedgwick   and  
Dell’Aversano,  has  outlined  two  models  suggesting  how  one  should  position  
oneself   and   how   one   should   act   inside   this   space.   At   the   same   time,   my  
argument   has   moved   from   the   study   of   categorization   processes   to   that   of  
taxonomic   processes,   that   is,   from   examining   how   objects   can   be   gathered  
together  in  order  to  become  members  of  a  category,  to  examining  how  one  can  
construct  relationships  between  categories  in  order  to  create  a  taxonomy.  Thus,  
we  can  now  look  at  ‘prototypical  living  dead’  and  ‘residual  undead’  as  the  two  
sub-­‐‑categories  whose  links  and  relationships  structure  the  internal  taxonomy  
of  the  category  ‘living  dead’.  
More  precisely,  I  propose  to  interpret  the  construction  of  this  residual  
category  and  the  subsequent  restructuring  of  the  taxonomy  of  the  living  dead,  
drawing  on  reflections  by  both  Sedgwick  and  Dell’Aversano,  as  an  attempt  to  
create  a  nonce  taxonomy  that  mediates  between  the  attention  to  personal  (and  
textual)  idiosyncrasies  and  the  necessity  to  share  the  results  of  one’s  research  
with  the  members  of  the  academic  community.    
This  parallel  allows  me  to  conclude  my  argument  by  criss-­‐‑crossing  the  





hand,   nonce   taxonomy   can   be   analyzed   from   the   perspective   of   the  
hermeneutic   strategy   that   led   to   the   construction  of   the   category   ‘r.s.’;  more  
importantly,  on  the  other  hand,  the  invisible  processes  of  categorization  that  
are   normally   at  work   in   comparative   studies   can  be   queered   in   the   light   of  
nonce   taxonomy.  This   intersection  pinpoints  new  strategies  and  patterns  we  
may   follow   while   we   move   in   the   hermeneutic   space   that   mediates   the  
interactions  between  the  researcher  and  a  given  set  of  categories.  
With   regard   to   the   first   point,   prototype   theory   shows   that:   a)   the  
‘invaluably   rich,  unsystematic   resources  of  nonce   taxonomy’   conceptualized  
by  Sedgwick  can  be  found  at  the  peripheries  of  concepts10;  b)  ‘everything  else’  
categories  can  represent  potentially  enormous  reservoirs  of  nonce  taxonomic  
energies   whose   importance   is   often   downplayed   in   critical   analysis;   c)   by  
avoiding   the   adoption   of   a   ‘centralist’   model   for   the   interpretation   of   non-­‐‑
prototypical   phenomena   and   focusing   on   the   relationships   that   non-­‐‑
prototypical  members  entertain  the  one  with  the  other,  a  chaotic  body  of  quirky  
                                                                                              
  
10   Dell’Aversano   (2017,   124)   proposes   a   parallel   modelization   of   this  
argument  from  the  perspective  of  Lotman’s  culturology.  In  order  to  do  so,  she  
draws  on  Freud’s  account  of  psychoanalysis  as  a  discipline  that  deals  with  the  
observation   of   residual   phenomena:   «It   is   true   that   psycho-­‐‑analysis   cannot  
boast   that   it  has  never  concerned   itself  with  trivialities.  On   the  contrary,   the  
material  for  its  observations  is  usually  provided  by  the  inconsiderable  events  
which  have  been  put  aside  by  the  other  sciences  as  being  too  unimportant  -­‐‑  the  
dregs,  one  might  say,  of  the  world  of  phenomena.  But  are  you  not  making  a  
confusion   in   your   criticism   between   the   vastness   of   the   problems   and   the  





textual  objects  can  challenge  common  categorizations  and  possibly  give  birth  
to  a  nonce  taxonomy.  
Regarding  the  second  point,  the  notion  that  the  systematic  use  of  nonce  
taxonomy  could  result  in  the  proliferation  of  new  categorizations  can  easily  be  
applied  to  the  practice  of  comparative  studies.  This  field  could  be  queered,  for  
example,   by   adopting   nonce   taxonomy   when   dealing   with   thematic  
categorization,  which  would  in  turn  result  in  an  exciting  proliferation  of  new  
themes.   This   possibility   is   all   the   more   important   if   one   considers   that   the  
research   field   of   thematics   is   constructed   in   such   a   way   as   to   leave   nonce  
taxonomic  energies  normally  inactive.  When  working  on   topics,   themes  and  
motives,   the   need   to   be   aware   of   the   possible  ways   in   which   idiosyncratic  
corpora  could  be  created  is  rarely  felt.  This  depends  on  the  fact  that,  normally,  
themes  are  not  considered  as  something  that  needs  to  be  constructed  from  scratch  
by  the  researcher;  rather,  they  are  already  available  in  the  researcher’s  semiotic  
encyclopedia   (‘the   forest’,   ‘the  mirror’,   ‘the   city’,   ‘the   zombie’,   ‘magic’,   ‘the  
teacher’,  ‘war’)  and  need  only  to  be  recognized  in  a  text.  On  the  contrary,  there  
is   no   a   priori   agreement   between   the   reader   and  me   on  what   a   ‘r.s.’   is   and  
‘where’  it  can  be  found,  while  we  unquestionably  already  agree,  for  example,  
on  what  a  zombie  or  a  mummy  is.  
These  observations,  in  conclusion,  link  research  practice  in  comparative  
studies   to   Dell’Aversano’s   idea   of   education   as   suppression   of   one’s   nonce  
taxonomies.  I  have  the  impression  that  they  may  intersect  in  the  almost  morbid  
fear  of  ‘going  off  topic’,  inculcated  in  students  during  elementary  school  and  





exploit  the  hermeneutic  potential  of  a  nonce  taxonomy,  one  must  precisely  take  
the  risk  of  going  off  topic.  In  order  to  re-­‐‑draw  the  geography  of  a  thematic  field,  
maybe  one  must  re-­‐‑learn  how  to  go  off  topic  and  how  to  trust  one’s  own  quirky  
sense   of   family   resemblances.   Otherwise,   if   we   devalue   our   own   ability   to  
create  new  categories  and   taxonomies,  we  risk  devaluing   the  most  beautiful  
and   extraordinary   feature   of   the   aesthetic   experience,   in   general,   and   of  
speculative  fiction  in  particular:  its  capacity  to  re-­‐‑shape  the  construction  of  our  
world  through  the  creation  of  objects,  categories  and  ontologies  that  we  will  
never  be  able  to  experience  in  our  own  reality.  Its  capacity  to  endlessly  create  
and  re-­‐‑create  Chinese  encyclopedias  of  the  world.  
1.2   J.R.R. Tolkien’s On Fairy-stories  and the pragmatics of 
fantastic fiction  
In  the  previous  section  I  tried  to  answer  the  question:  how  can  residual  states  
be  defined?  This  led  me  to  investigate  how  r.s.  can  be  theoretically  modelized  
by  elaborating  on  the  notion  of  family  resemblance  and  sketch  a  proposal  for  a  
nonce   taxonomic   approach   to   comparative   studies.  Now   that   r.s.   have  been  
placed  within  a  system  of  relations  between  categories  and  taxonomic  systems,  
it  is  time  to  ask:  how  does  the  aesthetic  experience  of  a  r.s.  narrative  work?  And  
what  does  render  it  worthy  of  critical  attention?    
Such  questions   are   clearly   rooted   in   a   reader-­‐‑response-­‐‑oriented  approach   to  
aesthetic  experiences  and,  more  precisely,  in  the  works  of  Wolfgang  Iser  ([1976]  
1978)  and  Stanley  Fish  (1980).  In  order  to  answer  them,  I  propose  to  modelize  





fiction.  I  will  not  do  so  by  drawing  on  some  of  the  canonical  texts  on  the  theory  
of   fantastic   fiction   that   I   have   discussed   in   the   introduction,   but   rather   by  
looking   at   one   of   the   texts   which   catalyzed   the   blossoming   of   theoretical  
speculation  over  the  nature  of  fantasy  fiction  during  the  second  half  of  the  XX  
century.  More  specifically,   this  section  will  have  as   its  main   focus   John  R.R.  
Tolkien’s  essay  On  Fairy-­‐‑Stories.  
  
Tolkien’s  reflection  on  the  pragmatics  and  meaning  of  fantasy  begins  in  
1939,  when  he  is  invited  to  deliver  the  Andrew  Lang  Lecture  at  the  University  
of  St.  Andrews,  and  finds  a  definitive  form  some  four  years  later  in  the  50-­‐‑page  
essay  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories.  After  many  reprints  in  several  collections  of  Tolkien’s  
short  works,   in  2008  leading  Tolkien  scholars  Verlyn  Flieger  and  Douglas  A.  
Anderson   finally   provided   an   excellent   reference   edition   for   the   essay   by  
including  its  avant-­‐‑textes  and  an  extensive  commentary  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008).  
Even   if   its   title  seems   to  place   this  work   in   the   line  of  analogous   theoretical  
speculations   on   fairytales   by   John   Ruskin   (Fairy   Stories,   1968)   and   G.K.  
Chesterton   (Fairy  Tales,  1908),  Tolkien  gives   to   the   term   ‘fairy-­‐‑story’  a  much  
wider   meaning   than   one   might   expect.   Thus,   his   reflection   on   fairy-­‐‑stories  
represents  not  only  a  contribution   to   the  hermeneutics  of  a  specific  genre  of  
fiction   commonly—and,   in   Tolkien’s   opinion,   wrongly—associated   with  
children’s   literature,   but   a   more   general   investigation   of   the   theory   and  
aesthetics   of   fantastic   fiction.   Tolkien   posits   here   the   concept   of   ‘secondary  
world’:  a  fictional  world  distinct  and  separate  from  the  ‘primary  world’,  that  





of  the  very  first  attempts  at  structuring  a  theory  of  literature  around  the  idea  
of  ‘world’,  something  that  we  may  tend  to  perceive  as  unoriginal  today,  after  
the   fundamental   contributions  of   such   literary   theorists   as  Pavel   (1986)   and  
Doležel  (1998).  The  concept  of  ‘secondary  world’  depends,  in  turn,  upon  that  
of   ‘sub-­‐‑creation’,  which  describes  both  the  act  of  creating  a  secondary  world  
and  the  human  faculty  allowing  such  a  creation.  As  a  catholic,  Tolkien  believes  
that  only  God  can  truly  create,  that  is,  create  ex  nihilo  and  infuse  life  in  what  is  
created;  however,  humans  can  reproduce  the  divine  act  of  creation  on  a  lesser  
scale,  since  they  are  made  in  the  image  of  God.    
On  Fairy-­‐‑stories   has   been  widely   researched   in   the   context   of   Tolkien  
studies,  even  if  the  authoritative  opinions  of  Humphrey  Carpenter,  Tolkien’s  
biographer,   according   to  whom   the   essay   «makes   too  many   [points]   for   an  
entirely   cogent   argument»   (Carpenter   1977,   191;   quoted   in   Flieger   and  
Anderson  2008,  9)  and  Tom  Shippey,  who  criticized  the  essay  for  its  lack  of  a  
strong   argumentative   kernel   ([1983]   2003,   49),   have   often   prevented  
researchers   from   fully   exploring   its   complex,   plural   and   fundamentally  
unresolved   nature,   in   an   attempt   to   provide   more   coherent   and   unifying  
interpretations   of   the   essay.   In   the   introduction   to   the   essay’s   2008   edition,  
Flieger  and  Anderson  consider  it  an  ideal  ‘theoretical  compass’  to  understand  
the   transition  between   the  poetics  and  style  of  The  Hobbit   (first  published   in  
1937,  two  years  before  the  Andrew  Lang  Lecture)  and  those,  more  complex  and  
self-­‐‑aware,  of  The  Lord  of  the  Rings  (1954).  Its  value  as  a  work  of  literary  theory,  
however,  is  not  underestimated,  and  the  editors  define  the  essay  as  part  of  a  





«It   [On  Fairy-­‐‑stories]   belongs   in   the   same   line   as  Aristotle’s  Poetics,   Sidney’s  
Defence  of  Poesey,  Wordsworth’s  Preface   to   the  Lyrical  Ballads,  Coleridge’s  on  
Imagination  in  Biographia  Literaria,  and  T.S.  Eliot’s  essay  on  “Tradition  and  the  
Individual  Talent”  in  The  Sacred  Wood»  (Flieger  and  Anderson  2008,  15).  The  
majority  of  studies  on  Tolkien’s  essay  have  tended  to  focus  mainly  on  two  areas  
of   investigation:   on   the   one   hand,   following   the   pioneering   contribution   by  
Bergman  (1977),  the  essay’s  sources  have  been  scrupulously  charted11;  on  the  
other,   an   increasing   amount   of   attention   is   being   paid   to   the   philosophical  
background  from  which  Tolkien’s  literary  theory  emerges  and,  more  precisely,  
to  its  theological  and  neo-­‐‑platonic  implications12.  The  latter  trend  of  research  
has  focused  in  particular  on  another  original  concept  posited  by  Tolkien,  that  
of   ‘eucatastrophe’,  which  allows  him,  in   the  final  pages  of   the  essay,   to   link  
within  the  same  argument  two  of  his  most  pressing  concerns:  the  theory  of  a  
specific  kind  of  fantastic  fiction  and  theology.  Through  the  eucatastrophe,  what  
we   traditionally   know   as   ‘happy   ending’   is   transformed   from   a   simple  
narrative  device  into  the  core  of  what  may  be  called  Tolkien’s  ‘metaphysics  of  
literature’.  In  its  purely  narratological,  non-­‐‑theological  meaning,  the  term  has  
also  been  incorporated  in   John  Clute’s  classic  definition  of  Fantasy   from  the  
                                                                                              
  
11  The  other  notable  contributions  to  this  area  of  scholarship  will  be  cited  
at  different  points  during  the  analysis.  
12   See,   among   others,   Rose   (1982),   Reilly   ([1971]   2006),   the   essays  





Encyclopedia   of   Fantasy   (the   all-­‐‑uppercase   lettering   indicates  others   entries   in  
the  Encyclopedia):  
A  fantasy  text  may  be  described  as  the  story  of  an  earned  passage  
from   BONDAGE—via   a   central   RECOGNITION   of   what   has  
been  revealed  and  of  what  is  about  to  happen,  and  which  may  
involve  a  profound  METAMORPHOSIS  of  protagonist  or  world  
(or   both)—into   the   EUCATASTROPHE,  where  marriages  may  
occur,  just  governance  fertilize  the  barren  LAND,  and  there  is  a  
HEALlNG.  
In   the   wider   field   of   literary   theory,   On   Fairy-­‐‑stories   has   not   achieved  
recognition  until  recent  times—with  the  notable  exception  of  the  1967  T.S.  Eliot  
Memorial  Lectures  given  by  Tolkien’s  friend  W.H.  Auden,  which  he  entitled  
Secondary  Worlds.  The  reason  may  be  seen   in   the   fact   that  Tolkien  chooses  a  
marginalized  genre  of  fiction  as  his  subject.  Furthermore,  his  dislike  for  most  
works  of   fiction  written   in   the  English   language  after  Chaucer,  his  eccentric  
interpretation   of   the   canon   of   English   literature   and   his   badly   concealed  
hostility  towards  Shakespeare13  may  have  certainly  contributed  to  the  essay’s  
marginalization.  Today,  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories  is  known  mainly  to  scholars  working  
on   the   notion   of   fictional  world,   and   subcreation   has   become   the   keyword  
which   animates   the   researches   of  Mark   J.  Wolf,   which   recently   lead   to   the  
                                                                                              
  
13   Even   if   Tolkien   «manages   to   avoid   any   real   discussion   of  
Shakespeare’s   most   extended   excursion   into   the   domain   of   fairies,   A  
Midsummer  Night’s  Dream  […]  There  remains  an  unspoken  but  strong  sense  
in  Tolkien’s  essay  that  Shakespeare’s  delinquency,  partly  erotic,  in  the  domain  
of  Faërie  has   reduced   the  possibilities  of   fantasy   to  mere  pantomime,   in   the  





publication  of  two  authoritative  essay  collections:  Revisiting  Imaginary  Worlds:  
A   Subcreation   Studies   Anthology   (Wolf   2016)   and   the  Routledge   Companion   to  
Imaginary  Worlds   (Wolf  2018).  A  number  of   famous  passages   from  On  Fairy-­‐‑
stories  are  quoted  and  briefly  discussed  in  Wolf’s  first  book  on  the  theory  and  
history  of  secondary  worlds,  published  in  2012,  where  subcreation  is  defined  
as  follows:  
Tolkien  termed  the  making  of  a  secondary  world  “subcreation”  
[…]   since   human   beings   are   limited   to   using   the   pre-­‐‑existing  
concepts  found  in  God’s  creation,  finding  new  combinations  of  
them  that  explore   the  realm  of  possibilities,  many  of  which  do  
not  exist  in  the  Primary  World.  Thus  A  “subcreator”  is  a  specific  
kind  of  author,  one  who  very  deliberately  builds  an  imaginary  
world,  and  does  so  for  reasons  beyond  that  of  merely  providing  
a  backdrop  for  a  story»  (Wolf  2012,  Kindle  loc.  720-­‐‑722).  
Wolf’s   approach   to   the   study   of  worldbuilding  may   be  more   detailed   than  
Tolkien’s,   but   the   underlying   structure   of   Tolkien’s   approach   remains  
unchanged.  The  field  of  subcreation  studies  that  Wolf  inaugurates  does  not  put  
into  question  the  theoretical  premises  posited  by  Tolkien14,  which,  as  I  will  try  
to  show,  present  more  than  one  limit  to  the  eye  of  the  contemporary  literary  
theorist.   My   aim   here,   however,   is   not   to   compare   Tolkien   to   Wolf,   and   I  
consider  the  study  of  the  former’s  theory  a  good  opportunity  for  assembling  a  
                                                                                              
  
14  From  this  perspective,  Wolf’s  research  can  be  seen  as  opposite  to  that  
of  Farah  Mendlesohn,  whose  aim  in  Rhetorics  of  Fantasy  is  precisely  the  creation  
of   a   new   framework   for   the   study   of   fantasy   on   the   basis   of   the   kinds   of  






theory  of  fantastic  fiction  not  only  on  the  basis  of  analogy  and  continuity,  but  
by  contrast.  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories  can  be  placed  at  the  center  of  a  network  of  ideas  
and   intuitions   that   lead   to   several   branches   of   literary   theory   and   the  
contemporary  study  of  fantastic  fiction,  spanning  from  the  theory  of  possible  
worlds   to   the   relationship   between   virtual   worlds   and   the   so-­‐‑called   ‘re-­‐‑
enchantment  of  the  West’  (Partridge  2004;  Saler  2012).  This  is  the  reason  why  
it  could  represent  a  good  starting  point  for  the  elaboration  of  my  theoretical  
approach  to  the  study  of  the  residual  undead.  I  will  examine  Tolkien’s  essay  in  
the   light   of   contemporary   literary   theory,   highlighting  what   he   anticipated  
rather   than  what  he   inherited   from  pre-­‐‑existent   traditions—I  will,   however,  
quote  from  Tolkien’s  sources  in  order  to  provide  the  necessary  context  for  the  
analysis,  drawing   on   the   rather   ample   literature   on   this   subject15.   From   this  
perspective,  the  exploration  of  the  notion  of  ‘secondary  world’  will  represent  
an  opportunity  to  contribute  to  an  archaeology  of  the  concept  of  fictional  world  
by  analyzing  Tolkien’s  formulation  in  the  light  of  the  wider  theoretical  context  
                                                                                              
  
15  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  the  analyses  that  follow  will  focus  exclusively  
on  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories  and  will  not  take  into  account  the  other  fictional  and  non-­‐‑
fictional  texts  in  which  Tolkien  elaborated  his  literary  theory:  the  essay  Beowulf:  
the  Monster  and  the  Critics  (derived  from  a  lecture  given  in  1936  and  published  
in  1937),  the  poem  Mythopoeia  (quoted  in  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories  but  published  for  the  
first  time  only  in  1988),  the  short  stories  Leaf  by  Niggle  (written  in  1938-­‐‑1939  and  
published   in   1945)   and  Smith   of  Wootton  Major   (first   published   in   1967),   the  
creation  myth  that  constitutes  the  first  section  of  The  Silmarillion  (a  collection  of  







from  which  it  emerges  in  the  essay.  The  aim  of  such  an  analysis  is  not  to  give  a  
definition  nor   to  propose   a   comprehensive   theory  of   fantastic   fiction,  but   to  
highlight   some   of   the   characteristics   and   potentials   in   the   pragmatics   of  
fantastic  fiction  that  r.s.  narratives  unleash  with  particular  energy.  Coherently  
with  my  reader-­‐‑oriented  approach,  I’m  not  interested  in  what  fantastic  fiction  
is  but  rather  in  what  fantastic  fiction  does.  More  precisely,  I’m  interested  in  the  
questions:  what  does  fantastic  fiction  as  exemplified  by  the  texts  of  the  corpus  do  
best?  What   is   the  key  pragmatics  underlying   r.s.   narratives?   I  would   like   to  
show   that   the   answer   to   these  questions  necessarily   intersects   the   theory  of  
fantastic   fiction,   and   that   the   key   pragmatics   governing   the   aesthetic  
experience   of   r.s.   narratives   construct   fantastic   fiction   as   a   ‘laboratory’   for  
experimenting  with  new  and  alternative  ontologies.  On  Fairy-­‐‑Stories  could  also  
be  put  in  relation  with  the  theoretical  reflection  on  the  categorization  processes  
that  were   the   subject   of   the  previous   section,   since  one  of   the  most   relevant  
aims  of  the  essay  is  that  of  shifting  the  position  of  fairy-­‐‑stories  in  the  cultural  
system   from   the   periphery—in   which   they   are   considered   as   the   residual  
particles   of   the   literary   system   and   thus   relegated   outside   the   domain   of  
adulthood—to   the   center.   In  more   general   terms,   Tolkien’s   essay   is   deeply  
interested   in   shifting   and  deconstructing   such   cultural   polarities   as   ‘adult’-­‐‑
‘child’   and   ‘object   of   academic   study’-­‐‑‘object   of   aesthetic   experience’.   As  
regards  the  former  polarity,  in  particular,  I  will  show  how  Tolkien  faces  and  
dismisses   in   the   early   1940s   a   number   of   cultural   constructs   aimed   at  





intellectual   stance   that   seems   to   anticipate   certain   aspects   of   contemporary  
deconstructionism.  
1.2.1   Faerie as place, Faerie as language 
The  reason  why  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories   can  be  considered  not  simply  an  essay  on  a  
narrow   genre   of   the   fantastic   but   rather   a  work   dealing  with   the   theory   of  
fantastic   fiction   resides   in   the   peculiar   definition   given   by   Tolkien   to   the  
concept  of  ‘fairy-­‐‑story’:  
For  the  moment  I  will  say  only  this:  a  “fairy-­‐‑story”  is  one  which  
touches  on  or  uses  Faerie,  whatever  its  own  main  purpose  may  
be:  satire,  adventure,  morality,  fantasy.  Faerie  itself  may  perhaps  
most  nearly  be  translated  by  Magic—but  it  is  magic  of  a  peculiar  
mood  and  power  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  12).  
This  apparently  clear-­‐‑cut  definition  is  rendered  rather  problematic  by  the  fact  
that  Tolkien   employs   the   term  Faërie,   for  which  he  deliberately   adopts   and  
archaizing  orthography16,  by  assigning  to  it  at  least  three  different  meanings:  
                                                                                              
  
16  «During  the  development  of  his  mythology,  Tolkien  came  to  reject  the  
modern  English  word  fairy,  with  its  connotations  of  delicacy  and  prettiness,  in  
favor  of  the  more  archaic  spelling  faërie  and  its  deeper,  darker  implications.  
This  older  orthography  is  formed  by  the  addition  of  the  suffix  erie/ery  to  the  
Old   French   noun   fay/fae   (fairy).   Spelled   thus,   fae¨rie   does   not   refer   to   a  
supernatural   creature   but   to   a   supernatural   activity   (the   act   of   enchanting)  
and/or  condition  (the  state  of  being  enchanted)»  (Flieger  2007,  184).  In  History  
in   English   Words,   an   essay   by   linguist   and   fellow   Inkling   Owen   Barfield,  
Tolkien  could  find  a  discussion  of  the  word  Faery:  «Barfield  claims  that  this  
word   expired   in   the   time   of  Milton   but  was   “resurrected   in   the   nineteenth  





He  used  it  [the  term  “Faerie”]  to  mean  the  Otherworld  beyond  
the  five  senses—a  parallel  reality  tangential  in  time  and  space  to  
the   ordinary   world;   he   used   it   to   mean   the   practice   of  
enchantment  or  magic,  especially  through  the  use  of  words,  for  
example  spells  or  charms;  and  he  used  it  to  mean  the  altered  state  
brought  about  by  such  practice  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  85).  
Distinguishing  between   the  different  meanings  of  Faërie  is  not  always  easy.  
For  the  purposes  of  this  study,  I  will  focus  on  two  of  them.    
In  the  first  section  of  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories,  Faërie  is  conceived  of  as  a  place  or  
a  dimension  of  being  that  runs  parallel  to  our  own,  a  magical  world  that  is  not  
ontologically   homogeneous   to   ours.  At   the   very   start   of   the   essay,   Faërie   is  
(metaphorically?  The  presence  of   the  question  mark  will   be  made   clear   in   a  
moment)  described  as  an  actual  place:  «Faerie  is  a  perilous  land,  and  in  it  are  
pitfalls  for  the  unwary  and  dungeons  for  the  overbold.  […]  The  realm  of  fairy-­‐‑
story  is  wide  and  deep  and  high  and  filled  with  many  things»  (27).  A  few  pages  
later,  Tolkien  gives  the  famous  definition  of  Faërie  as  «the  Perilous  Realm»  (32).  
The   most   immediate   consequence   of   this   construction   of   Faërie   as   a  
place/realm  is  the  spatialization  of  the  aesthetic  experience  that  derives  from  
the  Fairy-­‐‑story:   it   consists   in   entering  another  world17.   Such  a  definition  may  
                                                                                              
  
or  state  of  being,  almost   ‘the  whole  supernatural  element   in  romance.’”»   (K.  
Johnson  2007,  29;  quotations  from  Barfield  1926,  196).  Johnson’s  chapter  also  
explores,  in  more  general  terms,  Barfield’s  influence  on  Tolkien.  
  
17  According  to  Flieger  (1997),  the  journey  to  another  world  is  the  most  
distinctive  act  characterizing  Tolkien’s  «far-­‐‑traveled  characters»:  «however  the  





seem   to   conform   to   the   ‘standard’   description   of   Fairyland   that   is   well  
established   in  German   folklore   and   is   synthetized   in   the   entry   ‘Faërie’   from  
Clute’s  Encyclopedia:    
Faerie,   or   Faërie,   is   the   land   of   the   Fairies,   or   fairyland.   It   is  
therefore  an  Otherworld  perhaps  linked  to  ours,  though  access  is  
seldom  physical  in  the  normal  sense.  […]  The  very  elusiveness  of  
Faerie  has  been  compared  to  that  of  the  pot  of  gold  at  the  end  of  
the   rainbow,   and   thus   fairyland  may   be   perceived   as   over   the  
rainbow,  the  equivalent  of  L.  Frank  Baum'ʹs  land  of  Oz  (Ashley  
1997).  
The  question,  however,  is  much  more  complex.  Tolkien’s  Faërie,  as  described  
at   the   beginning   of   the   essay,   is   wholly   alien   to   humans   in   that   it   is  
‘impermeable’  to  language:  «Faerie  cannot  be  caught  in  a  net  of  words;  for  it  is  
one   of   its   qualities   to   be   indescribable,   though   not   imperceptible»   (Tolkien  
[1947]  2008,  32).  The  only  thing  humans  can  do,  is  catching  fugitive  glimpses  
of   this  world   than   can   never   be   shared  with   others.   This  description   is   not  
                                                                                              
  
work  he  occurs,  the  destination  of  every  […]  traveler  is  always  some  version  of  
another  world,  whether  it  lies  beyond  Bree  or  in  Númenor  or  in  the  Uttermost  
West.  Writ  large,  the  destination  is  Faërie,  the  world  for  which  Tolkien  longed  
all  his  life,  the  realm  of  imagination  in  which  his  vital  creative  life  was  lived.  
Whoever  he  is,  the  traveler  is  one  who  not  only  travels  far  but  who—in  one  
way  or  another—travels  away  from  the  world  of  ordinary  humanity,  the  land  






devoid  of  mystical  implications:  in  a  number  of  passages,  Faërie  appears  to  be  
described  as  a  real  dimension,  actually  existing  in  a  strong  ontological  sense18.    
                                                                                              
  
18   Milburn   (2010,   57–58)   and   Flieger   (2017,   23–25)   note   how   this  
‘metaphysical’  view  of  Faërie  is  much  stronger  in  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories’  avant-­‐‑textes,  
where  Tolkien  posits  a  more  radical  view  of  the  ontology  of  this  otherworld.  
The  essay’s  preparatory  materials  demonstrates  that  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories’  final  draft  
proposes   a   compromise-­‐‑version   of   the   Tolkenian   philosophy   of   Faërie,   a  
version  from  which  the  more  radical  and  subversive  elements  were  removed  
or  hidden.  These  aspects,  however,  clearly  emerge  in  Tolkien’s  more  private  
writings,   like   the   essay   that   complements   his   short   story   Smith   of   Wootton  
Major,  which  was  never  meant  for  publication.  Flieger’s  definition  of  Faërie  for  
the  Tolkien  Encyclopedia  accounts  for  the  complexity  of  the  philosophy  of  Faërie  
as   follows:   «[In   On   Fairy-­‐‑Stories]   Faerie   is   an   effect,   an   altered   state   of  
consciousness   brought   about   by   the   manipulation   of   language.   In   Smith   of  
Wooton  Major,  he  [Tolkien]  took  what  was  for  a  man  of  the  rational  twentieth  
century  the  far  riskier  position  that  Faerie  could  be  an  actuality».  An  actuality  
in  which  «the   real   and  Faery  worlds   are  presented  not   as  different   states  of  
mind  but  as  explicit  and  definable  parallel  planes  of  existence.  The  model  here  
was  the  Otherworld  of  Celtic  myth  and  folktale,  called  by  the  Welsh  Annvwyn,  
by  the  Irish  Tır-­‐‑na-­‐‑nog,  the  Land  of  the  Ever-­‐‑young,  traditionally  conceived  as  
actual   alternate   space   into  which   unwary  mortals  may   stray»   (Flieger   2007,  





In  this  first  section  of  the  essay,  Tolkien’s  interpretation  of  fairy-­‐‑stories  
is   rather  clear,  almost  unequivocal:   they  are  our   imperfect  door   to  Faërie,   to  
this   marvelous,   fantastic   dimension   that   lies   beyond   human   language.   The  
prototypical   Fairy-­‐‑stories   are   those   inherited   by   Indo-­‐‑European   folklore,  
together  with  the  great  Germanic  sagas  and  the  narratives  from  the  Arthurian  
cycle.  
However,   this   interpretation   of   the   pragmatics   of   the   fairy-­‐‑story   is  
rendered   more   complex   in   the   second   section   of   the   essay,   where   Faërie  
                                                                                              
  
him  to  postulate  that  fact  and  fiction  are  ultimately  undistinguishable:  «It  is  a  
great   error   to   suppose   that   true   (historical)   stories   and   untrue   stories  
(‘fantasies’)   can   be   distinguished   in   any   such   a   way.   Real   (primarily   real)  
events   may   possess   (must   always   possess   if   we   can   discern   it)   mystical  
significance   and   allegory.   Unreal   ends   may   possess   as   much   plain   logical  
likelihood  and  [some?]  factual  sequence  of  cause  and  effect  as  history»  (Tolkien  
[1947]  2008,  296).  Shank  (2013,  158)  rightly  remarks  that,  from  the  perspective  
highlighted   in   this   passage,   even   the   distinction   between   Primary   and  
Secondary  World  can  ultimately  be  considered  a  compromise  formation,  and  
the  fundamental  philosophical  function  of  the  eucatastrophe  lies  in  the  fact  that  
it   «rends   indeed   the   very   web   of   story,   and   lets   a   gleam   come   through»  
(Tolkien   [1947]   2008),   thus   making   the   distinction   between   Primary   and  







progressively  comes  to  refer  to  the  magical  power  of  language.  It  is  here  that  
the  heart  of  the  Tolkenian  theory  of  fantastic  fiction  resides:  
But   how   powerful,   how   stimulating   to   the   very   faculty   that  
produced   it,   was   the   invention   of   the   adjective:   no   spell   or  
incantation  in  Faerie  is  more  potent.  And  that  is  not  surprising:  
such   incantations   might   indeed   be   said   to   be   only   another   view   of  
adjectives,   a   part   of   speech   in   a  mythical   grammar.   The  mind   that  
thought  of  light,  heavy,  grey,  yellow,  still,  swift,  also  conceived  
of  magic  that  would  make  heavy  things  light  and  able  to  fly,  turn  
grey  lead  into  yellow  gold,  and  the  still  rock  into  a  swift  water.  
[…]  We  may  put  a  deadly  green  upon  a  man'ʹs  face  and  produce  
a  horror;  we  may  make  the  rare  and  terrible  blue  moon  to  shine;  
or  we  may  cause  woods  to  spring  with  silver  leaves  and  rams  to  
wear   fleeces  of  gold,  and  put  hot   fire   into   the  belly  of   the  cold  
worm.  But  in  such  “fantasy,”  as  it  is  called,  new  form  is  made;  Faerie  
begins;  Man  becomes  a  sub-­‐‑creator  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  41).  
Seeman  (1996)  comments  on  this  passage  by  affirming  that  here  Tolkien  «is  in  
fact  overhauling  the  entire  framework  of  Romantic  sensibilities  by  privileging  
fantasy  as   the  very  paradigm  of  all  art»  and  that  «[t]he  keynote  of  Tolkien’s  
revisionist   view  pivots   on   his   refusal   to   assent   to   the   depreciative   usage   of  
“fantasy”»   (77).   But   besides   remarking   this   (by   no   means   irrelevant)  
reconstruction   of   the   hierarchy   between   the   faculties   of   imagination   and  
fantasy,   I   would   like   to   analyze   Tolkien’s   argument   in   order   to   give   a  
description  of  how  subcreation  works  at  its  most  elemental  level.  
In   order   to   become   a   sub-­‐‑creator,   humans   need  magic,   or   at   least   an  
«enchanter’s   power».  What   Tolkien   calls   «Magic»   is,   in   turn,   the   ability   of  
extracting  a  characteristic  from  a  portion  of  the  material  world  (that  is  to  say,  





adjective  to  a  different  object  that  does  not  ‘possess’  it.  Here  lies  the  fundament  
of   the   relation   between   language   and  magic   that   Tolkien   constructs   in   the  
second  section  of  his  essay:  magic  is  a  linguistic  faculty  whose  function  is  that  
of   catalyzing   the   recombinations   of   nous-­‐‑adjective   couples.   Therefore,   sub-­‐‑
creation   is   not   primarily   linked   to   Tolkien’s   large-­‐‑scale   worldbuilding,   but  
rather  to  a  much  more  elementary  and  fundamental  faculty:  that  of  rearranging  
noun  and  adjectives,  through  an  act  of  linguistic  magic,  with  the  aim  of  creating  
something  that  didn’t  exist  before   («new  form  is  made»),  and  that  didn’t  exist  
because  it  refers  to  a  noun-­‐‑adjective  couple  that  is  impossible  in  this  world.  This  
is  the  conceptual  heart  of  Tolkien’s  sub-­‐‑creation  and  his  vision  of  Faerie:  before  
being   a   place   or   a   dimension,   before   referring   to   the   power   of   enchanting  
people,  Faerie  represents  the  power  to  give  shape  and  life  to  an  impossible  area  
of   language.   And   fantastic   fiction   represents   the   means   through   which   we  
become  able  to  explore  it19.  
                                                                                              
  
19  Medcalf  (1999)  and  Flieger  (2002)  have  rightly  argued  that  Tolkien’s  
philosophy  of  language  is  indebted—once  again—to  Owen  Barfield’s,  which  
Phelpstead  (2014)  summarizes  as  follows:  «Building  on  earlier  accounts  of  the  
connections  between  myth  and  language,  Barfield  argues  in  his  Poetic  Diction  
(originally   published   in   1928)   that   the   historical   separation   of   literal   and  
metaphorical  meanings  of  words  divided  what  had  been  an  original  semantic  
unity:  words  had  originally  themselves  been  mini-­‐‑myths,  embodying  a  view  
of   reality   in  which   experienced   phenomena  were   at   one   and   the   same   time  
physical   and   spiritual   (Barfield   1988,   77–92).   […]  His   [Tolkien’s]   sense   that  
myth  conveyed  truths  will  have  been  reinforced  by  Barfield’s  hypothesis  of  an  
age  when  concrete  and  abstract  meanings  had  not  yet  been  differentiated  and  





If  we  now  widen  Tolkien’s  perspective  from  noun-­‐‑adjective  couples  to  
concept  couples,  we  may  ask  ourselves:  what  is  the  realm  of  the  living  dead,  if  
not  an  area  of  the  cultural  imagination  that  originates  from  the  contradictory  
combination  of  two  mutually-­‐‑exclusive  concepts?  And  what  are  the  residual  
undead,  if  not  the  oddest,  less  probable  and  predictable  concretizations  of  this  
combination?   From   this   perspective,   the   history   of   the   residual   undead  
coincides  with  the  history  of  how  the  North  Atlantic  culture  has  progressively  
explored  through  language  and  narrative  the  conceptual  void  that  was  opened,  
at  the  half  of  the  18th  century,  by  the  possibility  of  conceiving  of  intermediate  
states  between  life  and  death.    
  
1.2.2   Interlude: «only reality is real» 
Before  moving  on  to  the  study  of  the  other  main  elements  of  On  Fairy-­‐‑
stories,   I  would  like  to  stop  for  a  moment  and  begin  to  pinpoint  some  of  the  
cultural   constructs   that   condemn   the   experience   of   fantastic   fiction  which   I  
mentioned   earlier.   To   see   how   they   are   still   alive   and  well   today,   one   only  
needs  to  watch  Steven  Spielberg’s  latest  film,  Ready  Player  One  (2018).  A  brief  
analysis  of  the  film  will  posit  two  fundamental  starting  points  for  reflecting  on  
the   theory  and   the  pragmatics  of   fantastic   fiction  when  put   in  contrast  with  
Tolkien’s   literary   theory.  The  narrative   is   set   in   a  near   future  with  dystopic  
elements:  the  Earth  has  been  devastated  and  humanity  is  on  the  edge  of  self-­‐‑







destruction.  However,   a   system   that   allows   an   almost   total   immersion   in   a  
virtual  reality  world  has  been  invented.  This  world  is  aptly  called  Oasis,  and  
the  vast  majority  of  the  human  population  spends  most  of  its  time  here  rather  
than  in  the  real  world.  James  Halliday,  the  creator  of  the  Oasis,  is  dead,  but  he  
has  left  the  Oasis’s  users  with  a  game:  the  person  that  will  succeed  in  advancing  
through  a  series  of  three  challenges  will  be  the  new  legal  owner  of  the  Oasis  
and  will   be   able   to  do   anything   she   pleases  with   it—even  destroy   it.  Wade  
Watts  (avatar  name  in  the  Oasis:  Parzival),  the  male  protagonist,  is  a  teenager  
living  in  the  slums  of  Columbus,  Ohio.  With  the  help  of  female  co-­‐‑protagonist  
Samantha  Cook  (avatar  name:  Art3mis),  and  a  small  group  of  friends,  Parzival  
completes  the  three  challenges  by  exploring  Halliday’s  past  and  particularly  
his   life   regrets.  During   the   course   of   the   narrative,   the   creator   of   the  Oasis  
clearly  emerges  as  a  stereotypical  figure  of  the  nerd:  he  does  not  conform  to  
the  mainstream  standards  of  male  beauty,  acts  awkwardly  in  social  situations  
and  appears  to  be  constantly  immersed  in  a  world  of  his  own.  At  one  point,  we  
discover  that  one  of  the  things  Halliday  regrets  the  most  is  the  fact  that  he  never  
kissed  the  woman  he  loved.  At  the  end  of  the  film,  Parzival  meets  Halliday—
or  rather,  his  avatar—after  completing   the  challenge.  Halliday  congratulates  
him  and  awards  him  the  ‘Golden  Egg’  that  will  make  him  the  new  owner  of  
the  Oasis.  This  encounter  takes  places  in  a  virtual  reconstruction  of  the  room  
Halliday  had  as  a  child.  While  looking  for  the  ‘Golden  Egg’  that  got  lost  in  this  
messy   space,   Halliday   confesses   to   Parzival   his   deepest   and   most   private  
thoughts:  
[Hallyday:]  «I  created  the  Oasis    because  I  never  felt  at  home  in  





there.  I  was  afraid  for  all  my  life.  Right  up  until  the  day  I  knew  
my  life  was  ending.  Now  that,  that  was  when  I  realized  that,  as  
terrifying  and  painful  as  reality  can  be,  it’s  also  the  only  place  that  
you   can   get   a   decent   meal.   Because   reality…   Is   real.   You  
understand  what  I’m  saying?»  (02h01m-­‐‑02h03m)  
With  these  words,  the  creator  of  the  Oasis  himself  describes  the  practice  
of   worldbuilding,   that   is,   the   construction   of   an   imaginary   world,   as   a  
regressive  practice,  a  childish  act  performed  by  an  heterosexual  adult  male  as  
a  reaction  to  his  inability  to  perform  standard,  prosocial,  adult  masculinity  («I  
was  afraid  all  my  life»)—in  other  words,  to  his  inability  to  flirt  with  women.  
Imaginary  worlds   have   no   relevance   to   the   success   of   such   a   performance,  
because  the  only  plane  of  existence  in  which  performance  is  meaningful  is  the  
real  world.  Why?  Because  «only  reality  is  real»,  that  is,  only  the  real  world  is  
the   field   of   experience   in   which   an   adult,   prosocial   male   can   perform   his  
normality.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  film’s  final  scene,  which  shows  a  moment  
of  physical  intimacy  between  Wade  and  Samantha  (there  is  no  place  for  avatars  
now),  who  have  obviously   fallen   in   love  with   each  other.  At   the   end  of   the  
scene,  Wade’s  off-­‐‑screen  voice  says:  «People  need  to  spend  more  time  in  the  
real  world,   because,   like  Halliday   said,   reality   is   the   only   thing   that’s   real»  
(02h09m).  Fade  to  black.  The  credits  roll.  Here  the  idea  that  ‘only  reality  is  real’  
is  clearly  and  unequivocally  associated  with  the  standard  performance  of  adult  
male  prosociality  that  Halliday  was  incapable  of  providing.  Over  the  course  of  
my  analysis,   I  will   show  how  Tolkien  opposes   this   same   set   of  discrediting  
constructs,  which  revolve  around  two  simple  statements:  ‘only  reality  is  real’  





fundamental  to  the  theory  of  fantastic  fiction  that  Tolkien  proposes  and  that  
can  contribute  to  illuminate  the  aesthetic  relevance  of  r.s.  narratives.      
1.2.3   Believing in secondary worlds: a pluralist approach 
A  few  pages  after  defining  the  practice  of  sub-­‐‑creation—or  rather,  its  origins—
as   the   construction   of   an   impossible   area   of   language,   Tolkien  moves   on   to  
introduce  the  notion  of  secondary  world.  He  does  so  in  terms  that  are  radically  
modern:  
Children  are  capable,  of  course,  of  literary  belief,  when  the  story-­‐‑
maker'ʹs  art  is  good  enough  to  produce  it.  That  state  of  mind  has  
been  called  “willing  suspension  of  disbelief.”  But   this  does  not  
seem   to  me   a   good   description   of  what   happens.  What   really  
happens   is   that   the   story-­‐‑maker   proves   a   successful   “sub-­‐‑
creator.”  He  makes   a   Secondary  World  which   your  mind   can  
enter.  Inside  it,  what  he  relates  is  “true”:  it  accords  with  the  laws  
of  that  world.  You  therefore  believe  it,  while  you  are,  as  it  were,  
inside.   The   moment   disbelief   arises,   the   spell   is   broken;   the  
magic,  or  rather  art,  has  failed  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  52).  
In   Marie-­‐‑Laure   Ryan’s   recent   genealogy   of   the   notion   of   world   in  
literary  theory—included  in  the  subcreation  studies  anthology  edited  by  Mark  
J.   Wolf—David   Lewis’   Truth   in   Fiction   (1978)   occupies   a   key   position   as   a  
pioneering  work:    
Lewis’   account   [of   the   truth   conditions   of   statements   about  
fiction]  broke  ground   in   two  ways:   first,   it   allowed   statements  
about   fiction   to   be   true   or   false,  whereas   one-­‐‑world   logicians,  
such   as   Bertrand   Russell   and   Gottlob   Frege,   regarded   all  
statements  about  non-­‐‑existing  entities  (read:  entities  non  existing  
in  our  world)  to  be  false  or  indeterminate;  second,  it  associated  





self-­‐‑evident  now  that  the  concept  of  “world”  is  largely  taken  for  
granted,  but  it  was  groundbreaking  at  a   time  when  fictionality  
was   either   ignored,   or   defined,   by   John   Searle,   in   purely  
illocutionary  terms  (i.e.,  as  a  suspension  of  the  rules  governing  
speech  acts)  (Ryan,  Marie-­‐‑Laure  2016,  8).  
Although   Tolkien’s   description   of   the  mechanisms   of   belief   in   a   secondary  
world  is  not  formalized  in  rigorous  logical  terms,  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories  clearly  faces  
this   same   issue   in   terms   that   anticipate  Lewis’   article  by  almost   forty  years.  
According  to  Tolkien,  a  statement  about  a  fictional  world  is  true  for  that  world20,  
and  the  criteria  that  govern  truth  in  our  Primary  World  cannot  interfere  with  
the  evaluation  of  the  truth  conditions  of  the  statement  itself21.  
                                                                                              
  
20  Tolkien  will  restate   this  position  in   the  essay’s  epilogue,   just  before  
introducing  his  concept  of  eucatastrophe:  «It  is  not  only  a  “consolation”  for  the  
sorrow  of  this  world,  but  a  satisfaction,  and  an  answer  to  that  question,  “Is  it  
true?”  The  answer  to  this  question  that  I  gave  at  first  was  (quite  rightly):  “If  
you   have   built   your   little  world  well,   yes:   it   is   true   in   that  world.”   That   is  
enough  for  the  artist  (or  the  artist  part  of  the  artist)»  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  77).  
21  Tolkien’s  adoption  of  the  notion  of  world  in  his  literary  theory  can  be  
traced   back   to   the   reflections   on   the   fantastic   imagination   by   George  
Macdonald,  who  had  a  major  influence  on  both  Tolkien  and  his  friend  C.S.S.  
Lewis   and   is   today   recognized   as   one   of   the   very   first   authors   of   fantasy  
literature   in   the  modern   sense  of   the  expression:   «The  natural  world  has   its  
laws,   and  no  man  must   interfere  with   them  in   the  way  of  presentment   any  
more  than  in  the  way  of  use;  but  they  themselves  may  suggest  laws  of  other  
kinds,  and  man  may,  if  he  pleases,  invent  a  little  world  of  his  own,  with  its  own  
laws;  for  there  is  that  in  him  which  delights  in  calling  up  new  forms-­‐‑-­‐‑which  is  
the   nearest,   perhaps,   he   can   come   to   creation.   When   such   forms   are   new  
embodiments  of  old  truths,  we  call  them  products  of  the  Imagination;  when  
they  are  mere  inventions,  however  lovely,  I  should  call  them  the  work  of  the  





But  what  is  even  more  important  for  the  present  analysis  is  the  fact  that  
the  discussion  of  the  notion  of  secondary  world  occurs  within  the  context  of  a  
radical   critique   of   the   suspension   of   disbelief   as   a   theoretical   strategy   for  
making  sense  of   the  aesthetic  experience22.   In  Tolkien’s  opinion,  suspending  
one’s   own   of   incredulity  would  mean   experiencing   fiction   according   to   the  
                                                                                              
  
[1890]   2004,   65).   Macdonald’s   idea   of   «calling   up   new   form»   could   have  
probably  been  echoed  by  Tolkien  in  the  passage  that  was  analyzed  in  the  above  
section:  «But  in  such  “fantasy,”  as  it  is  called,  new  form  is  made»  (Tolkien  [1947]  
2008,  41).  
22   Pask   (2013)   examines   Tolkien’s   interpretation   of   the   willing  
suspension  of  disbelief  by  drawing  on  Nelson  (1973)  and  looking  as  far  back  as  
the   Renaissance:   «Tolkien’s   ambition   here   is   not   merely   to   quibble   with  
Coleridge,  but  to  overturn  an  attitude  toward  fiction  that  lies  behind  Coleridge,  
including  almost  the  entire  literary  edifice  of  the  fairy  way  of  writing,  which  
always  depended  on  a  form  of  suspended  disbelief  and  thus  disenchantment.  
As  William  Nelson  has  argued,  Renaissance  writers  had  already  adumbrated  
the  essentials  of  Coleridge’s  suspension  of  disbelief.  […]  It  is  easy  to  see  why  
Tolkien’s  personal  canon  of  English  literature  ended  with  Chaucer.  Despite  his  
own  literary  tastes,  however,  Tolkien  might  be  better  understood  as  in  some  
respects  essentially  modern  in  his  approach  to  fiction.  His  own  fiction  attempts  
to  elicit—and,  unusually,  often  gains—the  “total  immersion”  of  the  reader  in  
the  reality  of  the  fictive  world,  which  Nelson  argues  is  characteristic  of  modern  
fictions»  (129).  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  field  of  subcreation  studies,  Konzack  
(2018)   deals   with   the   question   in   terms   that   fail   to   capture   its   deepest  
implications:   «Tolkien   rejects   the   idea   of   willing   suspension   of   disbelief  
because  a  convincing  fantasy  is  built  on  belief—not  in  the  sense  that  the  reader  
actually  believes  in  the  fantasy  as  deception,  but  as  a  way  to  understand  that  
any  subcreation  should  be  able  to  explain  the  motives,  actions,  and  events  in  
the  story  based  on  reason  and  logical  causation.  Willing  suspension  of  disbelief  
leads  to  lazy  storytelling  […]  willing  suspension  of  disbelief  is  regarded  as  a  





norms  dictated  by  those  who  believe,  like  the  protagonist  of  Ready  Player  One,  
that  «only  reality  is  real»,  since  such  a  strategy  acknowledges  the  existence  of  
only  a  single  reality  and  only  a  single  set  of  criteria  for  the  determination  of  
truth  that  are  shaped  by  the  rules  of  this  one  reality.  According  to  this  position,  
if  we  want  to  believe  in  another  reality,  we  are  obliged  so  suspend  our  only  set  
of   truth   criteria.   On   the   contrary,   Tolkien   embraces   a   resolutely   pluralistic  
approach  to  the  paradigms  that  define  reality:  if  we  want  to  believe  in  another  
reality,  we  don’t  have  to  suspend  our  disbelief,  but  to  ‘switch’  to  another  mode  
of  belief.  Once  again,  modal  logic  will   come  to  an  analogous  conclusion  only  
forty  years  after  Tolkien’s  Andrew  Lang  Lecture.  
From  this  perspective,  it  is  highly  relevant  that  the  literary  history  of  the  
residual  undead  begins  with  a  hoax,  that  is,  with  a  narrative  that  purposefully  
blurs  the  line  between  medical  record  and  horror  fiction,  turning  the  willing  
suspension  of  disbelief  upside  down:  Poe’s  Valdemar.    
  
Despite  being  revolutionary  in  many  respects,  Tolkien’s  theory  of  subcreation  
does  have   its   limits.   Interestingly,   these   are  as  much   relevant   to   a   theory  of  






The  first   limits,  accurately  pinpointed  by  Brian  Attebery,  concerns  the  
possibility   of   conceiving   of   fantasy   in   media   other   than   literature,   which  
Tolkien  himself  strongly  denied23:  
If  we  say  fantasy  is  a  function  of  language,  what  about  unspoken  
or  unwritten  fantasies,  as  when  a  caveman  draws  a  stag  pierced  
by   his   spear   or   when   Réne   Magritte   paints   a   locomotive  
emerging   from   the   back  wall   of   a   fireplace?   Both   of   these   are  
fantastic,  in  some  sense.  The  former  represents  one  common  use  
of  the  term  fantasy:  to  designate  something  desired  that,  though  
it   has   not   happened,   we   have   no   reason   to   believe   could   not  
happen.  The  latter  is  more  like  literary  fantasy,  in  that  it  portrays  
a  juxtaposition  that  we  perceive  as  impossible»  (Attebery  [1992]  
2004,  297).  
As   I  have  already  partially  shown  before,   I  will   try   to  avoid  such  a   limit  by  
interpreting   the   fantastic   not   as   a   function   of   language  but   as   a   function   of  
concepts,  in  an  attempt  to  create  a  more  open  framework  for  the  study  of  r.s.  
in  both  literature  and  cinema.  
                                                                                              
  
23  «In  human  art  Fantasy  is  a  thing  best  left  to  words,  to  true  literature.  
In   painting,   for   instance,   the   visible   presentation   of   the   fantastic   image   is  
technically  too  easy;  the  hand  tends  to  outrun  the  mind,  even  to  overthrow  it.  
Silliness  or  morbidity  are  frequent  results.  It  is  a  misfortune  that  Drama,  an  art  
fundamentally  distinct   from  Literature,   should   so   commonly   be   considered  
together  with  it,  or  as  a  branch  of  it.  Among  these  misfortunes  we  may  reckon  
the  depreciation  of  Fantasy.  […]  Fantasy,  even  of  the  simplest  kind,  hardly  ever  
succeeds  in  Drama,  when  that  is  presented  as  it  should  be,  visibly  and  audibly  
acted.  Fantastic  forms  are  not  to  be  counterfeited.  Men  dressed  up  as  talking  
animals  may  achieve  buffoonery  or  mimicry,  but  they  do  not  achieve  Fantasy»  





The  second  issue  that  I  am  about  to  raise  is  not  usually  seen  as  a  limit  of  
Tolkien’s  theory  of  fairy-­‐‑story  but  rather  as  one  of  its  most  fundamental  cores,  
the  notion  of  ‘inner  consistency  of  reality’:  
Anyone   inheriting   the   fantastic  device  of  human   language   can  
say  “the  green  sun”.  Many  can  then  imagine  or  picture  it.  But  that  
is  not  enough  -­‐‑  though  it  may  already  be  a  more  potent  thing  than  
many  a  “thumbnail   sketch”  or  “transcript  of   life”   that   receives  
literary   praise.   To   make   a   Secondary  World   inside  which   the  
green  sun  will  be  credible,  commanding  Secondary  Belief,  will  
probably  require  labour  and  thought,  and  will  certainly  demand  
a  special  skill,  a  kind  of  elvish  craft.  Few  attempt  such  difficult  
tasks.   But   when   they   are   attempted   and   in   any   degree  
accomplished  then  we  have  a  rare  achievement  of  Art  (Tolkien  
[1947]  2008,  61).  
By  acting  as  a  bridge  between  subcreation  and  large-­‐‑scale  worldbuilding,  this  
principle   of   inner   consistency   demonstrates   how      Tolkien   aesthetics   of  
literature  subordinate  the  linguistic  experimentation  that  constitute  the  basic  
process  of  subcreation  to  the  construction  of  complexity  according  to  criteria  
of  coherence,  order,    and  absence  of  contradiction24.  
                                                                                              
  
24  Once  again,  George  MacDonald  anticipated  this  issue  in  The  Fantastic  
Imagination:  «His  [the  poet’s]  world  once  invented,  the  highest  law  that  comes  
next  into  play  is,  that  there  shall  be  harmony  between  the  laws  by  which  the  
new  world  has  begun  to  exist;  and  in  the  process  of  his  creation,  the  inventor  
must  hold  by  those  laws.  The  moment  he  forgets  one  of  them,  he  makes  the  
story,   by   its   own   postulates,   incredible.   To   be   able   to   live   a  moment   in   an  
imagined  world,  we  must  see  the  laws  of  its  existence  obeyed.  Those  broken,  





In   the   field   of   subcreation   studies   and   in   the   theory   of   transmedia  
storytelling,   this   principle   is   regarded   as   the   key   element   determining   the  
aesthetic  effect  of   the  world  itself,  as   it   regulates   the   internal  coherence  of  a  
secondary  world.  For  Mark  J.  Wolf,  achieving  inner  consistency  represents  one  
of  the  three  major  tasks  to  face  when  designing  imaginary  worlds:  
As   I   have   argued   elsewhere   [(Wolf   2012)]   worlds   can   be  
evaluated   according   to   the   degree   of   invention,   completeness,  
and   consistency   in   a   given   world,   and   all   three   are   also   an  
important  part  of  world  design.  […]  Consistency  is  the  extent  to  
which  the  elements  within  a  world  design  agree  with  each  other  
without  contradiction,  so  that  everything  about  a  world  and  its  
design  is  logically  and  aesthetically  pleasing  (Wolf  2018,  71–72).  
For  the  purposes  of  my  analysis,  I  would  propose  to  turn  this  principle  upside  
down,  on  the  basis  of  a  penetrating  observation  made  by  Jonathan  McIntosh  
(2018)   in   his   monography   on   the   influence   of   Thomism   in   Tolkien’s  
philosophy:   «[i]n   using   the   consistency   of   this   world   as   a   measure   of   any  
possible  sub-­‐‑created  world,  Tolkien  reflects  something  of  his  own  Thomistic  
“actualism,”  his  conviction,  that  is,  that  the  world  in  its  actuality  is  the  standard  
for  determining  what  is  possible,  and  not  vice-­‐‑versa»  (McIntosh  2018,  73,  emphasis  
mine).   I   would   argue   that   the   aesthetics   of   r.s.   narratives   resides,   at   least  
partially,   in   the   fact   that   they   are   able   to   perform   the   «vice-­‐‑versa»   process  
McIntosh  refers  to:  they  participate  to  the  construction  of  actuality  through  the  
                                                                                              
  
temporary   submission   to   the   imagination  of  another,   immediately,  with   the  





fictional   exploration   of   what   is   possible,   alternatively   collaborating   and  
conflicting   with   our   current   systems   for   the   construction   of   knowledge—
systems   like,   among   others,  medicine   and   the   bio-­‐‑sciences.   This   reversal   of  
perspective  is  significantly  catalyzed  by  the  fact  that  the  worlds  inhabited  by  
the  r.u.  often  and  purposefully  violate  the  rules  of  Tolkenian  worldbuilding:  a  
number  of  these  worlds  are  inherently  inconsistent,  thus  mirroring  the  loss  of  
ontological  consistency  often  experienced  by  the  protagonists  of  r.s.  narratives.  
Philip  K.  Dick’s  Ubik  probably  represents  the  best  example  of  anti-­‐‑Tolkenian  
ontological  dissipation.  
1.2.4   Anti-ageism and the desire called Otherness  
Now   that   the   building   blocks   of   Tolkien’s   theory   of   fairy-­‐‑stories   have   been  
discussed  from  the  perspective  of  their  pioneering  aspects  and  contrasted  with  
the  often  chaotic  and  destabilizing  effects  brought  about  by  r.s.  narratives,  I  
would   like   to   move   from   exploring   the   ‘mechanics’   of   sub-­‐‑creation   to  
discussing  its  deeper  implications  in  the  context  of  the  pragmatics  of  fantastic  
fiction.   But   before   focusing   on   the   pragmatics   of   a   text,   one   needs   to  
understand  what  kind  of  readers  will  experience  it.  This  is  why  I  will  begin  this  
section   by   analyzing   how   Tolkien   deconstructs   the   common   association   of  
fairy-­‐‑stories  with  childhood,  thus  reclaiming  the  aesthetic  experience  of  these  
narratives  as  part  of  the  world  of  the  adults.  A  brief  analysis  of  Ready  Player  
One  has  already  shown  how  the  association  of  a  certain  practice  (in  the  case  of  
Halliday:  the  construction  of  the  imaginary  world  of  the  Oasis)  with  childhood  
automatically  discredits  the  practice  itself  by  placing  it  outside  the  normative  





are  easily  provided  by  the  reviews  that  The  Lord  of  the  Rings  received  in  1956,  
in  which   the   book   is   systematically   defined   as   childish   and   best   suited   for  
young   readers   (Flieger   2017,   32–33).  However,   in   1939,  Tolkien  had  already  
dealt   with   the   constructs   that   discredit   the   experience   of   fairy-­‐‑stories   by  
relegating  it  to  the  world  of  children  by  simply  severing  the  cultural  connection  
between  these  two  poles:  
Is  there  any  essential  connection  between  children  and  fantasy?  
Is  there  any  call  for  comment,  if  an  adult  reads  them  for  himself?  
Reads  them  as  tales,  that  is,  not  studies  them  as  curios.  Adults  are  
allowed   to   collect   and   study   anything,   even   old   theatre  
programmes  or  paper  bags.  […]  [T]he  association  of  children  and  
fairy-­‐‑stories  is  an  accident  of  our  domestic  history.  Fairy-­‐‑stories  
have   in   the   modern   lettered   world   been   relegated   to   the  
“nursery,”   as   shabby  or  old-­‐‑fashioned   furniture   is   relegated   to  
the  play-­‐‑room,  primarily  because  the  adults  do  not  want  it,  and  
do  not  mind  if   it   is  misused.  It  is  not  the  choice  of  the  children  
which  decides  this  […].  Children  as  a  class—except  in  a  common  
lack   of   experience   they   are   not   one—neither   like   fairy-­‐‑stories  
more,  nor  understand  them  better  than  adults  do;  and  no  more  
than  they  like  many  other  things  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  49–50).  
Tolkien’s   argument   follows   a   clearly   deconstructionist   trajectory:   he  
historicizes   the   relation   between   infancy   and   fairy-­‐‑stories   in   order   to   de-­‐‑
essentialize   it.   According   to   his   view,   fairy-­‐‑stories   today   are   considered   a  
residual  area  of  the  literary  field;  this,  in  turn,  presupposes  the  idea  that  children  
represent  the  residual  region  of  the  world  of  readers,  a  world  whose  center  is  
inhabited   by   the   adults.   The   only   way   for   an   adult   to   treat   fairy-­‐‑stories  
seriously   is   by   studying   them   as   folklore,   an   activity   in  which   the   aesthetic  





stories  have  been  «cut  off  from  a  full  adult  art»  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  51)  and  
the   relevance   of   their   aesthetics   to   the   experience   of   adults   has   been  
scotomized:  this  is  for  Tolkien  the  most  relevant  issue  raised  by  the  association  
of  fairy-­‐‑stories  and  children.  By  deconstructing  this  association,  then,  Tolkien  
is  also  writing  a  significant  chapter  in  the  history  of  children’s  literature—that  
is,  of  literature  in  general—by  de-­‐‑essentializing  the  differences  between  adults  
and  children  as  regards  their  reception  of  a  certain  class  of  literary  texts.  It  is  
important  to  note  that  Tolkien  doesn’t  share  «the  Victorian  enthusiasm  for  the  
child’s  naïve  “enchantment”  by  the  fairy  story»,  which  is  a  product  of  the  same  
ageism  Tolkien  is  trying  to  problematize25:  
Tolkien  does  not  fundamentally  distinguish  between  child  and  
adult   readers   in   this   respect;   both   share   a   capacity   for   what  
Tolkien  calls  “literary  belief,”  but   this   is  not  the  unquestioning  
faith  usually  ascribed  to  young  children.  The  literary  sub-­‐‑creator  
must  be  able  to  solicit  belief  from  tough-­‐‑minded  readers,  whether  
adults  or  children  (Pask  2013,  129).  
By  moving  one  step  beyond  this  Victorian  stereotype,  Tolkien  is  able  to  see  the  
implications  of  the  infantilization  of  certain  areas  of  the  literary  field  with  an  
insight  that  we  would  probably  associate  with  late  XX  century  thinkers.  And  if  
ageism   falls,   the   whole   vision   of   worldbuilding   as   a   childish   act   that   is  
thematized  in  Ready  Player  One  automatically  falls  with  it.  
                                                                                              
  
25   Contrariwise,   MacDonald   reacts   to   an   hypothetical   accusation   of  
infantilism  by  surreptitiously  confirming  an  ageist  view  of  literary  reception:  
«For  my  part,  I  do  not  write  for  children,  but  for  the  childlike,  whether  of  five,  






Now  that  the  domain  of  the  Fairy-­‐‑story  can  be  claimed  by  both  children  and  
adults  and  is  not  automatically  assigned  to  a  pre-­‐‑determined  category  on  the  
basis  of  an  ageist  principle,  one  question  arises:  in  the  name  of  exactly  which  
principle  should  people  claim  the  domain  of  Faerie?  For  Tolkien,  the  answer  
can  be  condensed  into  one  word:  desire.  
He  describes  his  approach  to  the  study  of  fairy-­‐‑stories  by  contrasting  it  
with  that  of  anthropologists  and  linguists,  whose  researches  aim  to  «unravel  
the   intricately   knotted   and   ramified   history   of   the   branches   on   the   Tree   of  
Tales»   (Tolkien   [1947]   2008,   39).   On   the   other   hand,   Tolkien   proposes   a  
radically  different  approach  to  the  subject:  «So  with  regard  to  fairy  stories,  I  
feel  that  it   is  more  interesting,  and  also  in  its  way  more  difficult,  to  consider  
what   they   are,   what   they   have   become   for   us,   and   what   values   the   long  
alchemic   processes   of   time   have   produced   in   them»   (41).   This   approach,   in  
turn,   is  motivated  by   the  observation   that  Faëire   (either  as  a  dimension  or  a  
language)  is  not  «an  end  in  itself»  (34):  what  matters  most  is  the  pragmatics  of  
fairy-­‐‑stories  in  relation  to  our  time  and  culture,  that  is,  what  fairy-­‐‑stories  do  to  
us.  
Tolkien   identifies   such   pragmatics   in   the   «satisfaction   of   certain  





space  and  time»26  (35)  to  escaping  death27.  This  is  an  extraordinarily  modern  
approach  to  literature,  that  focuses  the  attention  on  the  reader  and  the  aesthetic  
effects   of   narrative   rather   than   on   its   supposed   ‘essence’.   This   view   is  
confirmed  by  the  fact  that,  according  to  Tolkien,  a  number  of  narratives  that  
do  not   fall  under   the  category  of   ‘fairy-­‐‑story’  can  still  «approach   the  quality  
and  have  the  flavour  of  fairy-­‐‑story»  (35)  depending  on  their  ability  to  satisfy  
those  human  desires  that  are  especially  satisfied  by  fairy-­‐‑stories.  This  means  
that   the   pragmatics   relative   to   the   satisfaction   of   certain   human   desires  
represents  for  Tolkien  the  main  defining  trait  of  fairy-­‐‑stories;  in  other  words,  
                                                                                              
  
26  On  the  importance  of  time  for  the  aesthetics  of  fairy-­‐‑stories,  see  also  
the   following   passage,   in  which   Tolkien   comments   on   the   value   that   fairy-­‐‑
stories   could   retain   in   the   contemporary  world:   «For   one   thing   they   [fairy-­‐‑
stories]  are  now  old,  and  antiquity  has  an  appeal  in  itself.  Such  stories  have  
now  a  mythical  or   total   (unanalysable)  effect,  an  effect  quite   independent  of  
the  findings  of  Comparative  Folklore,  and  one  which  it  cannot  spoil  or  explain;  
they  open  a  door  on  Other  Time,  and  if  we  pass   through,   though  only   for  a  
moment,  we  stand  outside  our  own  time,  outside  Time  itself,  maybe»  (Tolkien  
[1947]  2008,  48).  
27  Tolkien  could  have  been  able  to  find  a  Christian  legitimization  of  such  
desires   in  MacDonald   ([1867]   1893):   «We   are   dwellers   in   a   divine   universe  
where  no  desires  are  in  vain,  if  only  they  be  large  enough».  Interestingly,  this  
phrase   appears   in   a  paragraph  where  MacDonald  defends  himself   from   the  
following   hypothetical   accusation:   «But  will  most   girls,   for   instance,   rise   to  
those  useful  uses  of  the  imagination?  Are  they  not  more  likely  to  exercise  it  in  
building   castles   in   the   air   to   the  neglect   of  houses  on   the   earth?  And  as   the  
world   affords   such   poor   scope   for   the   ideal,   will   not   this   habit   breed   vain  
desires   and  vain   regrets?   Is   it   not  better,   therefore,   to  keep   to   that  which   is  





fairy-­‐‑stories   are   primarily   defined   by   their   aesthetic   effect,   and   their  
relationships  with  other  genres  and  texts  should  be  described  on  the  basis  of  
this  same  effect.  
Over   the  course  of   the  essay,   the  underlying  nature  of   the  desire   that  
animates  the  experience  of  Faerie  is  progressively  made  clear.  In  a  fascinating  
passage,   Tolkien   discusses   one   of   the   desires   that   Fairy-­‐‑stories   are   able   to  
satisfy:  that  of  «hold[ing]  communion  with  other  living  things»:  
The   beast-­‐‑fable   has,   of   course,   a   connexion   with   fairy-­‐‑stories.  
Beasts  and  birds  and  other  creatures  often  talk  like  men  in  real  
fairy-­‐‑stories.  In  some  part  (often  small)  this  marvel  derives  from  
one  of  the  primal  “desires”  that  lie  near  the  heart  of  Faerie:  the  
desire  of  men  to  hold  communion  with  other  living  things.  But  
the  speech  of  beasts  in  a  beast-­‐‑fable,  as  developed  into  a  separate  
branch,  has  little  reference  to  that  desire,  and  often  wholly  forgets  
it.  The  magical  understanding  by  men  of  the  proper  languages  of  
birds   and   beasts   and   trees,   that   is   much   nearer   to   the   true  
purposes  of  Faerie  (Tolkien  [1947]  2008,  36).    
According   to   Tolkien,   such   a   desire   cannot   be   fully   expressed   through  
traditional  beast-­‐‑fables,  but  only  through  fairy-­‐‑stories.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  
that  only  the  latter  thematize  «the  magical  understanding  by  men  of  the  proper  
languages  of  birds  and  tree».  Faerie  appears  then  as  that  world  in  which  the  
beast-­‐‑fable   is   turned   upside-­‐‑down   by   an   anti-­‐‑anthropocentric   twist:   in   the  
beast-­‐‑fable,   animals   speak   just   like  humans;   in  Faerie,  man  becomes  able   to  
understand  the  languages  of  the  non-­‐‑human  world.  From  this  point  of  view,  
the   meaning   of   the   experience   of   Faerie   resides   in   the   fact   that   it   allows  
humans,  through  the  help  of  magic,  to  understand  an  otherwise  incomprehensible  





characterized  by  its  absolute  alterity,  but  on  the  other  it  can  function  as  a  means  
to  understand  the  alterities  that  inhabit  our  Primary  World.    
In  this  discussion  of  the  difference  between  fairy-­‐‑story  and  beast-­‐‑fable,  
we  find  one  of  the  first  occurrences  in  the  essay  of  Tolkien’s  «vision  of  fantasy  
as  a  narrative  of  alterity—of  otherness,  of  transcendence»  (Seeman  1996,  79).  In  
the  central  section  of  the  essay,  Tolkien  elaborates  on  this  vision  while  putting  
it  in  relation  with  the  specific  kind  of  desire  from  which  it  emerges:    
I  [as  a  child]  had  no  special  “wish  to  believe.”  I  wanted  to  know.  
[…]   [A]t  no   time  can   I  remember   that   the  enjoyment  of  a  story  
was  dependent  on  belief  that  such  things  could  happen,  or  had  
happened,  in  “real  life.”  Fairy-­‐‑stories  were  plainly  not  primarily  
concerned   with   possibility,   but   with   desirability.   If   they  
awakened  desire,  satisfying  it  while  often  whetting  it  unbearably,  
they  succeeded.  
  
I  never  imagined  that  the  dragon  was  of  the  same  order  as  the  
horse.  And  that  was  not  solely  because   I   saw  horses  daily,  but  
never  even  the  footprint  of  a  worm.  The  dragon  had  the  trade-­‐‑
mark  Of  Faerie  written  plain  upon  him.  In  whatever  world  he  had  
his   being   it   was   an   Other-­‐‑world.   Fantasy,   the   making   or  
glimpsing  of  Other-­‐‑worlds,  was  the  heart  of  the  desire  of  Faërie.  
I  desired  dragons  with  a  profound  desire.  Of  course,  in  my  timid  
body  did  not  wish  to  wish  to  have  the  in  the  neighborhood  […]  
[b]ut  the  world  that  contained  even  the  imagination  of  Fáfnir  was  
richer  and  more  beautiful,  at  whatever  cost  of  peril.  The  dweller  
in  the  quiet  and  fertile  plains  may  hear  of  the  tormented  hills  and  
the  unharvested  sea  and  long  for  them  in  his  heart  (Tolkien  [1947]  
2008,  54–55).  
Once  again,  Tolkien  opts  for  a  radical  and  intellectually  courageous  choice:  the  
need   to  satisfy   the  desire   for  «the  making  or  glimpsing  of  Other-­‐‑Worlds»  is  





beauty   and   richness   of   Faerie   over   the   Primary   World   («the   world   that  
contained  even  the  imagination  of  Fáfnir  was  richer  and  more  beautiful»).  As  he  
clearly  highlights,  this  desire  has  nothing  to  do  with  belief  or  with  the  hope  of  
catching   glimpses   of   Faerie  within   the   Primary  World.  On   the   contrary,   the  
desire  for  Faerie  is  so  strong  precisely  because  it  is  directed  towards  otherness.  
In  this  sense,  the  pragmatics  of  fairy-­‐‑stories  resides  in  the  fact  that  they  allow  
the  reader  to  long  for  the  impossible.  
I  would   like   to   suggest   that   the  dynamic   that   animates   the  desire   for  
otherness  described  by  Tolkien  could  be  incorporated  into  a  theory  of  fantastic  
fiction  when  put  in  relation  with  reader-­‐‑response  criticism  and,  more  precisely,  
with   Wolfgang   Iser’s   theory   of   aesthetic   response.   While   discussing   the  
difference   between   the   implied   reader   and   the   actual   reader,   Iser   quotes   a  
passage  from  Booth’s  The  Rhetoric  of  Fiction:    
It   is   only   as   I   read   that   I   become   the   self   whose   beliefs   must  
coincide   with   the   author’s.   Regardless   of   my   real   beliefs   and  
practices,  I  must  subordinate  my  mind  and  heart  to  the  book  if  I  
am  to  enjoy  it  to  the  full.  The  author  creates,  in  short,  an  image  of  
himself   and   another   image   of   his   reader   […]   and   the   most  
successful  reading  is  one  in  which  the  created  selves,  author  and  
reader,  can  find  complete  agreement  (Booth  [1961]  1963,  137–38;  
quoted  in  Iser  [1976]  1978,  36–37).  
Iser  comments  the  passage  as  follows:  
One  wonders  whether  such  an  agreement  can  really  work;  even  
Coleridge’s   ever  popular  demand  for   a   “willing   suspension  of  
disbelief”   on   the   part   of   the   audience   remains   an   ideal  whose  
desirability   is  questionable.  Would   the   role  offered  by   the   text  
function  properly  if  it  were  totally  accepted?  The  sacrifice  of  the  





which   is   a   precondition   for   the   processing   and   the  
comprehension  that  follows  it.  […]  However,  the  suggestion  that  
there   are   two   selves   is   certainly   tenable,   for   these   are   the   role  
offered  by  the  text  and  the  real  reader’s  own  disposition,  and  as  
the  one  can  never  be  fully  taken  over  by  the  other,  there  arises  
between  the  two  the  tension  we  have  described  (Iser  [1976]  1978,  
37).    
In  criticizing  Booth  and  the  notion  of  willing  suspension  of  disbelief,  Iser  
rejects   two   perfectly   opposite   views   of   the   aesthetic   experience,   the   first  
involving  the  reader’s  total  abandonment  to  the  author’s  hypnotic  will  and  a  
sense  of  complete  immersion  in  the  narrative,  the  other  centered  on  a  reader  
who  willingly  abandons  his  ‘real’  self  in  order  to  be  temporarily  transformed  
into   another   self   whose   criteria   for   the   definition   of   truth   are   inactive.   Iser  
position   is   extremely   fascinating   in   that   it   acknowledges   the   necessary  
presence  of  a  tension  between  the  real  reader  and  the  implied  reader:  it  is  only  
in  this  tension  that  fiction,  in  general,  and  fantastic  fiction,  in  particular,  can  
find   its   pragmatics.   The   aesthetic   response   that   defines   the   experience   of  
fantastic  fiction  can  thus  be  described  as  the  result  of  the  tension  between  an  
implied  reader,  who  unproblematically  considers  dragons  and  zombies  as  true  
in  relation  to  the  secondary  world,  and  an  actual  reader  who  enjoys  this  belief  for  
the  exact   reason   that   it   cannot  be  performed   in   the  Primary  World.   In  other  
words,  fantastic  fiction  works  by  creating  a  textual  position  for  the  reader  in  
which   she   can   believe   what   would   otherwise   be   unbelievable28.   Tolkien’s  
                                                                                              
  
28  Farah  Mendlesohn  is  implicitly  elaborating  on  this  same  framework  





desire  for  «the  making  or  glimpsing  of  Other-­‐‑worlds»  derives  from  the  tension  
that  Iser  describes:  in  order  to  be  more  rich  and  beautiful,  the  worlds  inhabited  
by  Fafnir  needs   to  be  put   in  comparison  with  our  own,  and   it   is  exactly   the  
tension  produced  by  this  comparison  that  generates  what  Tolkien  calls  ‘desire’.  
By  adopting  a  different  perspective,  «the  making  or  glimpsing  of  Other-­‐‑
worlds»  that  Tolkien  defines  as  «the  heart  of  the  desire  of  Faërie»  could  also  be  
put   in   relation  with   a   different   passage   from  On  Fairy-­‐‑stories   in  which   «the  
primal   desire   at   the   heart   of   Faerie»   is   identified   with   «the   realization,  
independent   of   the   conceiving  mind,   of   imagined   wonder»   (Tolkien   [1947]  
2008,   35).   Even   if   Tolkien   does   not   provide   us   with   an   exact   definition   of  
wonder,  it  could  be  described  by  connecting  the  two  passages  as  the  reaction  
to  the  experience  of  otherness.  This  definition  evokes  the  one  given  by  Brian  
Attebery—who  draws,  in   turn,  on  an  earlier  study  by  C.N.  Manlove—in  his  
seminal  study  of  fantasy  fiction:  
C.  N.  Manlove   [(1975)]  makes   this   a   part   of   his   definition   for  
fantasy:  “a  fiction  evoking  wonder  and  containing  a  substantial  
and   irreducible   element   of   supernatural   or   impossible  worlds,  
beings  or  objects  with  which  the  mortal  characters  in  the  story  or  
the   readers   become   on   at   least   partly   familiar   terms”   [(1)].  
Manlove  rightly  connects  wonder  with  the  “contemplation  of  .  .  .  
                                                                                              
  
on   the   one   hand   a   reference   to   our   ideal   and   implied   reader,   is   also   an  
invitation  to  construct  a  fictionalized  self  who  can  accept  the  construction  of  
the  rhetoric  of  a  particular  fantastic  text.  But  the  invitation  is  not  free  and  open:  






strangeness”  [(7)];  in  other  words,  it  has  as  much  to  do  with  ways  
of  seeing  as  with  emotional  response  (Attebery  [1992]  2004,  308).  
However,  Attebery  moves  on  to  explain  that  «[t]he  concept  of  wonder,  as  a  key  
to  fantasy’s  impact,  may  best  be  understood  as  an  alternative  formulation  of  
the   idea   of   estrangement»   (308).   He   elaborates   on   this   formulation   by  
discussing  the  notion  of  ‘recovery’  that  Tolkien  introduces  in  On  Fairy-­‐‑Stories:  
«[t]he  illusion  is  that  the  world  has  become  trite  or  stale.  To  dispel  (or  dis-­‐‑spell)  
it,  it   is  necessary  to  see  things  in  new  ways,  but  rather  than  making  familiar  
objects  seem  disconcerting  or  alien,  he  [Tolkien]  thought  fantasy  could  restore  
them  to   the  vividness  with  which  we   first   saw  them»  (Attebery  [1992]  2004,  
308).  From  this  point  of  view,  
[l]a  littérature  merveilleuse  telle  que  la  conçoit  Tolkien  n’est  donc  
pas,   contrairement   à   une   idée   reçue,   une   littérature   d’évasion,  
mais   une   incitation   à   regarder   le   monde   en   passant   outre  
l’habitude   qui   nous   coupe   de   lui   –  Tolkien   rejoint   ici   des  
réflexions   que   l’on   trouve   à   la  même   époque,   dans   le   premier  
tiers  du  siècle,  chez  des  auteurs  comme  Proust  ou  des  théoriciens  
comme  les  formalistes  russes  (Ferré  2014,  Kindle  loc.  306-­‐‑7).  
In   contrast   to   Attebery’s   definition,   I   would   propose   to   modelize  
wonder,   following   Carmen   Dell’Aversano,   through   Personal   Construct  
Psychology  (PCP),  a  theory  of  personality  and  cognition  elaborated  by  Gorge  
Kelly   in   the   1950s.   PCP   is   centered   on   the   fundamental   postulate   that   «a  
person’s  processes  are  psychologically  channelized  by   the  ways   in  which  he  
anticipates  events»  (Kelly  [1955]  1991,  32).  The  anticipation  of  events,  in  turn,  
is  determined  by  the  way  in  which  a  person  constructs  and  organizes  her  own  





Dell’Aversano  argues,  wonder   could  be  described  as   «the  perception  of   the  
inadequacy   of   one’s   construct   system»   (2008,   337).   Such   an   interpretation  
breaks  the  analogy  between  wonder  and  estrangement.  While  both  strategies  
can  be  described  as  «achieving  a  gnoseological  aim  through  an  aesthetic  one»  
(337),   estrangement   posits   an   ‘awakening’   of   perception   following   a  
‘weakening’  provoked  by  habit.  After  the  ‘awakening’,  we  become  able  to  look  
at  things  with  which  we  were  already  familiar  through  new  eyes.  On  the  contrary,  
wonder   implies   a   constantly   ‘awakened’   perception   that   comes   face   to   face  
with   something  new   and  unexpected,   something   that   lies  beyond   the   subject’s  
horizon  for  the  anticipation  of  events.  As  a  result  of  this  encounter,  the  subject  
is   invited  (or   forced)   to  reshape   the  network  of  constructs  and  relationships  
through  which  she  makes  sense  of  events.  If  we  now  apply  this  framework  to  
the   aesthetic   experience   of   r.s.   narratives,   the   latter   could   be   defined   as  
producing  a  peculiar  type  of  wonder  which  catalyzes  the  reconstruction  of  the  
construct   system   related   to   the   polarity   life/death.   One   of   my   aims   in   the  
following  sections  will  be  to  analyze  the  rhetoric  and  narrative  strategies  that  
‘trigger’  this  process  of  reconstruction.  In  more  abstract  terms,  I  aim  to  show  
how   one   of   the   key   elements   in   the   pragmatics   of   fantastic   fiction,   from   a  
widely   cultural   perspective,   resides   precisely   in   the   fact   that   it   represents   a  
privileged   space   in   which   the   reconstruction   of   the   ‘deep’   constructs   that  
pertain  to  ontology  (like  the  one  centered  on  the  polarity  life/death)  can  occur.  
Fantastic   fiction   texts  create   for  us  a  position   from  which  we  can  experience  
states  of  existence  and  planes  of  being  that  would  otherwise  be  inaccessible  to  





would  like  to  argue  that  r.s.  narratives  represent  one  of  the  very  few  categories  
of  texts  through  which  we  clearly  and  deeply  experience  fantastic  fiction  as  a  
laboratory  of  new  ontologies  that  is  both  terrifying  and  wonderful.  
1.2.5   Conclusions 
In  conclusion,  a  methodology  for  the  study  of  fantastic  fiction  in  the  context  of  
which  the  study  of  r.s.  would  find  its  hermeneutic  relevance  could  be  outlined  
through  the  interaction  of  the  following  elements:  
•   The   pragmatics   of   fantastic   fiction   originates   from   the   clash   it  
creates  between  concepts  that  cannot  coexist  in  our  culture.  
•   The   aesthetic   effect   of   fantastic   fiction   depends   on   the   tension  
that   is  produced  between   the   actual   reader’s  principles   for   the  
determination  of  truth  and  the  implied  reader’s  ability  to  believe  
in  objects,  beings  and  events  that  can  only  be  true  in  a  Secondary  
world.  
•   The  practice  of  ‘escapism’  through  fantastic  fiction  should  not  be  
dismissed   or   refused   as   childish   in   the   name   of   the   principle  
according   to   which   ‘only   reality   is   real’.   On   the   contrary,  
escapism   could   be   embraced   as   an   invaluable   opportunity   for  
reshaping  our  cognition  and  our  systems  of  constructs  through  
the  experience  of  the  tension  described  above.  
•   As   an   ‘ontological   laboratory’,   fantastic   fiction   could   be  
culturally   defined   by   its   (unique?)   ability   to   reshape   the  
constructs   that   are   relative   to  ontology  and  consciousness.  R.s.  





•   The   analysis   of   fantastic   fiction   should   ignore   not   only   the  
distinction   between   ‘high’   and   ‘popular’   fiction,   but   also   the  
distinction   made   by   the   editorial   market   between   fiction,  
children’s   fiction   and   young   adult   fiction.   In   other  words,   the  
approach  to  fantastic  fiction  should  be  resolutely  and  coherently  
anti-­‐‑ageist.  
I  would  like  to  remind  it  one  more  time:  this  is  not  meant  as  a  coherent  theory  
of   fantastic   fiction   as   a   whole,   but   rather   as   a   theoretical   framework   for  
highlighting   the   originality   (maybe   the   uniqueness?)   of   the   aesthetic   effect  
produced  by  r.s.  narratives  in  the  wider  context  of  fantastic  fiction.  
Now   that   r.s.   have   been  defined   both   as   a   category   and   as   a   kind   of  
fantastic  narrative  characterized  by  its  peculiar  pragmatics,  I  will  shift  the  focus  
of  my  attention  to  their  cultural  genealogy,  in  order  to  understand  how  and  






A cultural genealogy of the 
residual undead 
Over  the  last  twenty  years,  the  peripheries  of  the  thanatological  imagination  
have  progressively  expanded,  thus  becoming  more  and  more  visible.  In  a  book  
chapter   published   in   2015,   Roger  Luckhurst   argues   that   the   proliferation   of  
such  interstitial  figures  has  been  catalysed  by  
an   ongoing   technoscientific,   biomedical   revolution   which   has  
profoundly  disturbed  the  boundaries  between  life  and  death.  In  
the  cultural  imagination,  this  has  unleashed  a  whole  new  order  
of   liminal   ontologies,   the   new   undead,   of   which   the   zombie  
horde  is  only  the  most  self-­‐‑evident  instance  (Luckhurst  2015,  84)  
This  technoscientific  revolution  began  in  the  1960s  with,  on  the  one  hand,  the  





technologies   of   artificial   respirators,   of   resuscitation   in   general,   and   in  
transplant  surgery  (Wasson).  As  a  consequence,  in  1968  the  Ad  Hoc  Committe  
of   the  Harvard  medical   school  was   asked   to   redefine  what   death   is   from   a  
medical   perspective.   This   is   the   starting   point   of   a   medical   debate   of  
momentous  importance  in  the  history  of  contemporary  medicine,  concerning  
the   so   called   ‘New  Death’—a  debate  which   is   still   going  on.   In   this   context,  
liminal   states   between   life   and   death   have   become   a   key   site   of   medical  
discourse,  that  is,  a  key  subject  for  the  proliferation  of  medical  knowledge  in  a  
Foucauldian  sense.    
One  of  the  most  decisive  outcomes  of  this  debate  is  the  construction,  in  
medical   practice,   of   a   gap   between   brain   death   and   biological   death   that  
«shifted  death  from  a  decisive  moment  to  a  temporal  process»  (Luckhurst  2015,  
88).  What  I  would  like  to  do  is  put  these  observations  into  a  wider  historical  
context.  I  would  like  to  show  that  this  is  not  the  first  time  that  something  like  
this   happens.   This   is   not   the   first   time   that   medical   discourse   produces   a  
definition   of   death,   debates   it,   and   this   leads   in   turn   to   the   proliferation   of  
fiction   thematizing   liminal   ontologies.   In   fact,   a   fundamental   shift   in   the  
medical  construction  of  death  took  place  in  France  between  in  the  1740s,  and  it  
is  strikingly  analogous,  from  a  structural  perspective,  to  the  one  that  took  place  
in   the   1960s.   I   propose,   then,   to   re-­‐‑read   the   cultural   genealogy   of   the  New  
Death  and  its  relationship  to  the  Gothic  by  putting  them  in  the  context  of  the  
cultural  processes  which  have  transformed  the  polarity  ‘life  vs.  death’  from  a  





I   will   do   so   by   looking   at   a   French  medical   text,   the  Dissertation   sur  
l’incertitude  des  signes  de  la  mort  by  Jacques-­‐‑Bénigne  Winslow  and  Jacques  Jean  
Bruhier  (1742).  I  will  try  to  analyze  its  impact  on  European  and  American  18th  
century  culture  and  to  put  it  in  relation  with  the  redefinition  of  death  that  took  
place  in  in  the  1960s.    
My  readings  will  draw  on  Jan  Bondeson’s  history  of  premature  burial  (2001).  
It  may  be  worth  noting  that  Bondeson  is  a  physician,  and  even  if  the  book  may  
appear  to  be  not  very  academic  at  first  sight,  it  is  in  fact  very  well  researched.  
I   will   also   rely   on  Naissance   de   la   clinique   by  Michel   Foucault   ([1963]   2015),  
which  offers  a  compelling  analysis  of  how  the  idea  of  death  was  transformed  
in  19th  century  France.    
2.1   The 1742 revolution: the signs of death 
The   first   thanatological   revolution   in   the  history  of   the  modern  West  
starts   in  France29,   at   the  Académie  des   sciences,   one  of   the  most  prestigious  
                                                                                              
  
29  For  a  cultural  history  of  death,  the  classic  monographs  by  Ariès  (1977)  
and  Vovelle   (1983)   remain   fundamental.  More   recent  major   contributions   to  
this  field  are,  among  others,  Harrison  (2003),  Noys  (2005),  and  Laqueur  (2015).  
During   the   last   fifteen   years,   the   emergence   of   death   studies   as   an  
interdisciplinary   field   of   research   has   been  marked   by   the   publication   of   a  
growing  number  of  reference  works,  from  the  massive  Handbook  of  Death  and  
Dying  (Bryant  2003)  and  the  Encyclopedia  of  Death  and  Dying  (Cassell,  Salinas,  
and  Winn   2005)   to   handbooks   published   by   Rodopi   (Kâšer   2007),   Springer  






cultural  institutions  of  the  time.  Jacques-­‐‑Benigne  Winslow,  a  physician  and  one  
of   the  most  prominent  members  of   the   academy,  writes   a   short  dissertation  
about  the  uncertainty  of  the  signs  of  death.  It  is  less  than  ten  pages  long  and  it  
is  written  in  latin.  Winslow  examines  several  medical  cases  and  argues  that  the  
lack   of   respiratory   movement   or   the   absence   of   arterial   pulse,   which   were  
considered  by   the  medical  profession  as  unmistakable  signs  of  death,  are   in  
fact  unreliable:  a  patient  could  lack  a  perceptible  pulse,  for  example,  and  still  
be  alive.  The  only  reliable  sign  of  death,  according  to  Winslow,  is  the  onset  of  
putrefaction:  only  when  the  body  starts  to  decompose,  and  only  then,  we  can  
be  sure  that  our  patient  is  gone  for  good.  
Winslow’s   work   was   just   one   of   the   many   dissertations   that   were  
submitted  to  the  academy  every  year.  For  the  most  part,  they  ended  up  in  a  
forgotten   archive,   never   to   be   read   again.   But   Winslow   has   an   admirer:  
Jacques-­‐‑Jean  Bruhier.  He  translates  the  dissertation  from  Latin  to  French  and  
adds  a  myriad  of  medical  cases  and  accounts  of  premature  burials.  The  new  
book   is   entitled  Dissertation   sur   l'ʹincertitude   des   signes   de   la  mort   et   l'ʹabus   des  
enterrements   et   embaumements   précipités.   It   immediately   becomes   a   medical  
bestseller,  and  its  vulgarisations  spread  an  almost  obsessive  fear  of  premature  
burial  in  France  and  Germany.  With  Bruhier,  for  the  first  time,  death  ceases  to  
be  an  event  outside  the  realm  of  medicine,  a  pure  and  simple  cessation  of  life,  
in  order  to  become  a  diagnostic  category.  Death  is  now  a  matter  of  physiology  
that  needs  to  be  interpreted  through  its  signs:  it  is  not  a  matter  of  facts  anymore,  
but  a  matter  of  semiotics.  Now  the  representatives  of  medical  knowledge  need  





Harvard   Committee   more   than   three   centuries   later:   how   do   we   make   a  
diagnosis  of  death?  
At  this  point,  it  is  interesting  to  remark  that  many  of  the  accounts  that  
both  Winslow  and  Bruhier  use  as  medical  cases  to  prove  the  unreliability  of  the  
signs  of  death  are,   in  fact,   legends  and  folktales   that  had  been  circulating  in  
Europe  for  centuries.  According  to  Bondeson  (2001,  64–66),  they  can  be  traced  
to   a  number  of  prototype  narratives.  Among   them  is   the   legend  of   the   lady  
with  the  ring,  in  which  a  lady  is  prematurely  buried  and  later  saved  by  a  robber  
who  violates  her  coffin  to  steal  her  ring.  Another  one  is  the  tale  of  the  lecherous  
monk,  who   takes   certain   necrophilic   liberties  with   a   supposedly   dead   lady  
during  a  visit  to  a  hostel.  Several  months  later,  he  returns  to  the  same  hostel  to  
find  out  that  the  woman  who  was  supposed  to  be  dead  is  not  only  alive,  but  
also  pregnant.  The  monk  renounces  to  his  vows  and  marries  the  lady.  But  the  
key   point   here   is   not   that   these   are   just   legends;   the   point   is   that   medical  
knowledge  appropriates  them  and  transforms  them  into  medical  case  histories,  
so  that  the  fear  of  premature  burial  is  relocated  from  the  realm  of  folklore  and  
the   supernatural   to   the   realm   of   scientific   knowledge.   For   the   first   time,  
medical   discourse   arrogates   to   itself   and   only   to   itself   the   right   of   deciding  
what  is  alive  and  what  is  dead.  
The  publication  of  Bruhier’s  book  has  extremely  relevant  consequences  
for  European  and  American  medical  practice.  He  suggests  a  radical  reform  of  
burial  practice:  in  order  to  avoid  premature  burials,  the  dead  should  be  kept  
for  at  least  72  hours  in  special  morgues  under  the  supervision  of  a  physician,  





inventors  start  patenting  security  coffins,  in  which  the  prematurely  buried  is  
able  to  signal  his  condition  to  the  living.  And  more  importantly,  the  signs  of  
death   become   one   of   the  main   axes   of  medical   research.   Particularly   in   the  
second  half   of   the   18th   century,   the  research   for  new,   reliable   signs  of  death  
assumes   fundamental   relevance.   The   methods   for   reanimation   and   for   the  
diagnosis   of   death   tend   often   to   range   from   the   weird   to   the   grotesque,  
especially   in   Germany:   we   go   from   ritmically   pulling   the   tongue   of   the  
deceased  for  three  hours  to  injections  of  a  fluorescent  compound  to  verify  if  
blood   circulation   is   active,   to   blowing   enemas   of   tobacco   smoke   into   the  
patient’s  anus  (Bondeson  2001,  137–54).  
Apart   from   the   examples,   what   is   really   important   is   that   all   these  
practices  are  part  of  a  process  of  intense  cultural  discursivization  of  a  liminal  
moment,  in  which  a  representative  of  the  medical  power-­‐‑knowledge  system  is  
unable  to  decide  whether  a  patient  is  alive  or  dead.  So  discourse  surrounding  
this  liminal  moment  permeates  culture  at  large.  The  other  result  of  this  process  
of  permeation  is  that,  after  Bruhier,  European  and  American  literatures  begin  
to   pullulate   with   narratives   of   premature   burial.   As   we   have   seen,   such  
narratives  had  always  existed,  but  only  now  premature  burial  truly  becomes  
one  of  the  topoi  of  horror  fiction,  just  in  time  to  graft  itself  on  the  newborn  genre  
of  gothic  fiction.  
So,  tu  sum  up,  we  are  at  the  half  of  the  18th  century,  at  the  dawn  of  the  
gothic  as  a  literary  genre,  and  we  have  a  corpus  of  legends  and  folktales  that  
are  absorbed  by  medical  knowledge  and  become  part  of  a  cultural  discourse  





production  of  horror  fiction  that  thematizes  cultural  anxieties  related  to  these  
liminal  states,  thus  contributing  to  the  discourse  itself.  I  would  like  to  contend  
that  the  first  New  Death  in  the  history  of  modern  Western  culture  was  actually  
constructed   here,   through   the   interaction   between  medical   knowledge   and  
fiction,   and   that   the   elaboration   of   the  New  Death   in   1968  was   structurally  
analogous  to  its  predecessor.  
2.2   The birth of the thanatological subject 
Obviously   these   two  processes,  while   sharing   the   same   structure,   present   a  
number   of   differences   that   are   worth   discussing.   The   most   important  
difference  lies  in  the  construction  of  the  very  idea  of  liminality  between  life  and  
death30.   Jacques-­‐‑Jean  Bruhier   tells  us   about  people   falling   into  deep   trances,  
paralyses,   cataleptic   states   and   other   physical   conditions   that   are   uncannily  
similar   to  death:   so   similar   that   it   is   impossible   for   the   physician   to   decide  
whether   the   patient   is   alive   or  dead.   So   liminality   here   is   simply   related   to  
uncertainty:   there   is   a   straightforward   ‘life   vs.   death’   polarity,   but   the  
physician  is  unable  to  decide  to  which  pole  the  patient  should  be  ascribed.  The  
patient  could  either  return  to  life  (first  pole)  or  die  (second  pole).  These  liminal  
states  seem  to  have  no  ontological  ‘substance’  of  their  own.  In  this  respect,  one  
                                                                                              
  
30  Squier  (2004)  proposes  an  insightful  discussion  of  life-­‐‑death  liminality  
from   the   perspective   of   science   studies.   Particularly   relevant   are   her   queer  
approach  to  Turner’s  (1974)  classic  definition  of  liminality  and  her  reappraisal  
of   the   hermeneutic   relevance   of   fiction   to   science   studies,   which   was  





could  remark  that,  in  the  vast  majority  of  narratives  about  premature  burial,  
this  liminal  state  of  uncertainty  is  simply  experienced  by  the  protagonist  as  a  
total   blackout  of   the   consciousness:   she/he   falls   into  what   resembles   a  deep  
sleep,  is  mistaken  for  dead,  is  buried,  and  wakes  up  again  in  a  coffin.  So  the  
liminal  state  is  not  an  experience  that  can  become  the  object  of  narrative:  on  the  
contrary,   it   corresponds   to   an   absence   of   experience.   In   other   cases,   the  
protagonist  falls  victim  of  a  total  paralysis:  he  is  perfectly  alive  and  conscious,  
but  he  is  unable  to  move,  so  he  is  mistaken  for  dead.  But  again,  the  polarity  life  
vs  death  is  not  put  into  question.  There  is  no  in-­‐‑between  state,  there  is  only  a  
character’s  temporary  inability  to  show  signs  of  life.  
With  the  redefinition  of  death  in  the  1960s  and  the  cultural  discursivisation  of  
vegetative  states,  the  structure  is  the  same,  but  the  notion  of  liminality  becomes  
extremely  more  complex.  Over  the  course  of  the  19th  century  and  the  first  half  
of  the  20th  century,  the  polarity  ‘life  vs  death’  had  progressively  become  more  
and  more  fluid.  After  Bruhier,  this  process  of  fluidification  was  catalyzed  by  
the  fundamental  medical  researches  published  in  France  by  Buffon  and,  even  
more   importantly,   by  Xavier  Bichat’s  Recherches   physiologiques   sur   la   vie   et   la  
mort  (1805).  Many  pages  of  The  Birth  of  the  Clinic  are  devoted  to  a  fascinating  
analysis   of   the   cultural   implications   of   Bichat’s   invention   of   pathological  
anatomy,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  construction  of  death  as  a  process31:  
                                                                                              
  






La  mort  est  […]  multiple  et  dispersée  dans  le  temps  :  elle  n’est  
pas   ce   point   absolu   et   privilégié,   à   partir   duquel   les   temps  
s’arrêtent  pour  se  renverser,  elle  a  comme  la  maladie  elle-­‐‑même  
une   présence   fourmillante   que   l’analyse   peut   répartir   dans   le  
temps  e  l’espace  ;  peu  à  peu,  ici  ou  là,  chacun  des  noeuds  vient  à  
se  rompre,  jusqu’à  ce  que  cesse  la  vie  organique,  au  moins  dans  
ses  formes  majeures,  puisque  longtemps  encore  après  la  mort  de  
l’individu,  des  morts  minuscules   et   partielles   viendront   à   leur  
tour  dissocier  les  îlot  de  vie  qui  s’obstinent  (Foucault  [1963]  2015,  
200).  
  
Bichat   a   relativisé   le   concept  de  mort,   le   faisant  déchoir  de   cet  
absolu  où  il  apparaissait  comme  un  événement  insécable,  décisif  
et   irrécupérable   :   il   l’a   volatilisé   et   réparti   dans   la   vie,   sous   la  
forme   de   morts   en   détails,   morts   partielles,   progressives   et   si  
lentes  à  s’achever  par-­‐‑delà  la  mort  même  (203).    
Even   more   importantly,   pathological   anatomy   constructs   death   as   a  
singular  process  involving  a  singular  individual  in  an  absolutely  specific  way.  
A  process  that  illuminates  the  development  of  life  itself:  
[a]vec  Bichat,  la  connaissance  de  la  vie  trouve  son  origine  dans  la  
destruction  de  la  vie  et  dans  son  extrême  opposé  ;  c’est  à  la  mort  
que   la   maladie   et   la   vie   disent   leur   vérité   :   vérité   spécifique,  
irréductible,  protégée  de  toutes  les  assimilations  à  l’inorganique  
par  le  cercle  de  la  mort  qui  les  désigne  pour  ce  qu’elles  sont.  […]  
Du  fond  de  la  Renaissance  jusqu’à  la  fin  du  XVIIIe  siècle,  le  savoir  
de  la  vie  était  pris  dans  le  cercle  de  la  vie  qui  se  replie  sur  elle-­‐‑
même  et  se  mire  ;  à  partir  de  Bichat,  il  est  décalé  par  rapport  à  la  
vie,   et   séparé   d’elle   par   l’infranchissable   limite   de   la  mort,   au  
miroir  de  laquelle  il  la  regarde  (204-­‐‑205).  
With  Bichat,  death  ceases  to  be  what  it  had  been  since  the  Renaissance:  
that  event  that  renders  all  equals.  On  the  contrary,  the  regard  of  pathological  





la  perception  de  la  mort  dans  la  vie  n’a  pas  la  même  fonction  au  
XIXe   siècle   qu’à   la   Renaissance.   Elle   portait   alors   des  
significations  réductrice   :   la  différence  de  destin,  de  la   fortune,  
des  conditions  était  effacée  par  son  geste  universel;  […]  la  mort,  
infailliblement,   compensait   le   sort.   Maintenant,   elle   est  
constitutive   au   contraire   de   singularité  ;   c’est   en   elle   que  
l’individu  se  rejoint,  […]  un  cerne  noir  l’isole  et  lui  donne  le  style  
de  sa  vérité.  […]  La  mort  a  quitté  son  vieux  ciel  tragique  ;  la  voilà  
devenue  le  noyau  lyrique  de  l’homme  :  son  invisible  vérité,  son  
visible  secret  (Foucault  [1963]  2015,  238–39).  
Without   this   fundamental   reconfiguration,   the   passage   from   life   to  
death   simply   couldn’t   have   become   the   object   of   a   narrative   that   develops  
through  time  and  is  specific  to  a  single  individual.  At  the  same  time,  in  horror  
fiction,   liminal   states   between   life   and   death   progressively   become   actual  
spaces  of  experience  that  are  separated  from  those  of  normal  waking  life.  E.A.  
Poe’s  The  Facts  in  the  Case  of  Mr.  Valdemar  could  be  considered  a  milestone  in  
this   process   of   transformation:   here,   probably   for   the   first   time,   a   character  
actually  speaks  to  us  from  the  in-­‐‑between.  As  I  have  tried  to  show,  in  order  for  
such  a  communication   to  be  possible,  death  needs   to  be  conceptualized  as  a  
process  that  unfolds  in  time  and  as  an  individualized  experience  that  carries  
with  it  a  specific  semiotics  for  each  person.  But  in  order  to  ‘get  into’  Valdemar’s  
r.s.,  in  order  to  establish  a  connection  between  the  living  and  the  r.u.,  a  third  
element  is  needed:  a  technological  bridge.  The  next  section  will  explore  how  






2.3   The electrification of consciousness and the electronic 
undead 
Another  large-­‐‑scale  cultural  transformation  played  a  fundamental  role  in  the  
process   of   emergence   of   residual   states   between   life   and   death.   It   was   the  
result,   among   other   factors,   of   the   intersection   between   the   rise   of   a   new  
paradigm   for   the   construction   and   regulation   of   scientific   knowledge;   of  
technological   advances   in   the   field   of   telecommunications;   and   of   the  
spectralization   of   the   human   subject32.  At   the  beginning   of   the   18th   century,  
ghosts  and  other  supernatural  entities  began  to  migrate  into  this  new  cultural  
landscape   by   abandoning   the   realm   of   the   supernatural   and   entering   the  
domain   of   the   electronic   imagination.   The   premises   and   the   results   of   this  
momentous  process  are  investigated  by  Jeffrey  Sconce  in  his  compelling  study  
of  haunted  media  (2000).  
He   starts   from   the   observation   that   electricity   has   been   culturally  
conceptualised  in  the  West  less  as  a  source  of  energy  that  resides  in  this  world  
and  more  as  a  vital  force  which  exists  in  an  immaterial  dimension,  parallel  to  
our  own.  From  mesmerism  to  the  internet,  the  particular  declinations  of  this  
                                                                                              
  
32  «By  the  1890s,  the  supernatural  did  not  simply  conjure  monsters,  but  
figured  emergent  conceptions  of  psychical  life.  With  a  spectralized  subject,  late  
Victorian   fictions   developed   the   uncanny   discoveries   of   hypnotists   and  
psychical   researchers,   and   pursued   the   possibility   that   (as   William   Stead  
[(1897,  1)]  put  it)  ‘each  of  us  has  a  ghost  inside  him’»  (Luckhurst  2002,  213).  On  
the  notion  of  spectrality,  see  the  essays  collected  in  Blanco  and  Peeren  (2013)  





construct  have   evolved   following   the   transformations   in   telecommunication  
and  information  technology.  As  a  consequence,  electronic  media  have  become  
the  perfect  cultural  tool  for  enabling  contact  with  ultramundane  dimensions.  
These  are  inhabited,  for  the  most  part,  by  the  spirits  of  the  dead,  but  also  by  
aliens  from  other  galaxies  and  by  every  sort  of  supernatural  creature:  
The   focus  of  much  popular   scientific   interest   in   the   eighteenth  
and  nineteenth  centuries,  electricity  was  for  many  a  mystical  and  
even   divine   substance   that   animated   body   and   soul.   When  
harnessed  by   the   telegraph  and   the  media   that  were   to   follow,  
this  "ʺlife  force"ʺ  seemed  to  allow  for  a  mechanical  disassociation  
of   consciousness   and   the  body.  Telegraph   lines   carried  human  
messages  from  city  to  city  and  from  continent  to  continent,  but  
more  important,  they  appeared  to  carry  the  animating  "ʺspark"ʺ  of  
consciousness  itself  beyond  the  confines  of  the  physical  body  (7).  
The  theoretical  and  cultural  framework  elaborated  by  Sconce  makes  it  possible  
to  argue  that  r.s.  emerged  from  the  same  regions  of  the  electronic  imagination  
that   were   being   colonized   by   the   spectres   of   the   once-­‐‑enchanted   West.   By  
understanding  liminal  states  between  life  and  death  in  relation  to  the  electronic  
imagination,   one   can   propose   theoretical   models   for   the   exploration   of   the  
relation   between   embodiment   and   disembodiment   in   the   r.u.;   of   how   the  
communication  between  the  living  and  the  r.u.  can  be  achieved;  and  of  how  
the  r.u.  have  become  thinkable  in  the  North  Atlantic  world.    
Such  a  framework  clearly  relies  on  the  idea  that    
technology  is  never  merely  "ʺused,"ʺ  never  merely  instrumental.  It  
is  always  also   "ʺincorporated"ʺ  and  "ʺlived"ʺ  by  the  human  beings  
who  engage  it  within  a  structure  of  meanings  and  metaphors  in  
which   subject-­‐‑object   relations   are   cooperative,   co-­‐‑constitutive,  





In  other  words,  in  the  context  of  a  history  of  the  electronic  imagination,  what  a  
certain  technology  allows  a  certain  culture  to  conceptualize  is  more  important  
than  what  the  technology  concretely  does:  
[t]he   telegraph   not   only   inaugurated   a   new   family   of  
technologies,   of   course,   but   also   produced   a   new   way   of  
conceptualizing   communications   and   consciousness.   Whereas  
messages   had   previously   been   more   or   less   grounded   in   the  
immediate   space   and   time   of   those   communicating,   the  
wondrous   exchanges   of   the   telegraph   presented   a   series   of  
baffling   paradoxes.   The   simultaneity   of   this   new   medium  
allowed   for   temporal   immediacy   amid   spatial   isolation   and  
brought  psychical  connection  in  spite  of  physical  separation.  The  
central   agent   in   these   extraordinary   exchanges   was   electricity  
(Sconce  2000,  7).  
  
[T]he  telegraph  brought  about  changes  in  the  nature  of  language,  
of   ordinary   knowledge,   of   the   very   structures   of   awareness.  
Although  in  its  early  days  the  telegraph  was  used  as  a  toy—as  
was   the   computer,   which   it   prefigured—for   playing   long-­‐‑
distance  chess,   its   implications   for  human  knowledge  were   the  
subject  of  extended,  often  euphoric,  and  often  pessimistic  debate.  
[…]  Now  that  thought  could  travel  by  “the  singing  wire,”  a  new  
form  of  reporting  and  a  new  form  of  knowledge  were  envisioned  
that  would  replace   traditional   literature  with  a  new  and  active  
form  of  scientific  knowledge  (Carey  [1988]  2009,  156)33.  
At  the  core  of  Sconce’s  framework  lies  the  identification  of  what  may  be  called  
the  center  of  gravity  of  the  electronic  imagination.  It  consists  in  a  fundamental  
                                                                                              
  
33  The  effects  of   the   telegraph  on   the   cultural   imagination  of   the   19th  






conceptual  convergence,  on  which  every  aspect  of  the  cultural  construction  of  
the  electronic  imagination  appears  to  be  axed  on:  
Grounded  in  the  larger  and  more  long-­‐‑standing  metaphysics  of  
electricity,  fantastic  conceptions  of  media  presence  ranging  from  
the   telegraph   to   virtual   reality   have   often   evoked   a   series   of  
interrelated  metaphors  of  "ʺflow,"ʺ  suggesting  analogies  between  
electricity,  consciousness,  and   information   that  enable  fantastic  
forms  of  electronic  transmutation,  substitution,  and  exchange.  In  
the   historical   reception   of   each   electronic   telecommunications  
medium,  be   it   a   telephone  or   a   television,  popular   culture  has  
consistently  imagined  the  convergence  of  three  “flowing”  agents  
conceptualized  in  terms  of  their  apparent  liquidity:    
(1)  the  electricity  that  powers  the  technology    
(2)  the  information  that  occupies  the  medium    
(3)  the  consciousness  of  the  viewer/listener  (7).  
This  imbrication  centered  on  the  idea  of  ‘flow’  has  catalyzed  the  emergence  of  
a   construct   that   could   be   identified   as   the   ‘electronic   consciousness’.   Its  
definition   is   twofold:   on   the   one   hand,   it   refers   to   the   conceptualization   of  
consciousness  as  something  that  can  be  translated  into  a  flux  of  electricity;  on  
the  other,  it  describes  consciousness  as  a  cultural  artifact  whose  construction  is  
inextricably  connected  to  and  shaped  by  the  technologies  of  electricity.  In  this  
second   sense,   the  notion  of   electronic   consciousness   in   employed  by  Vivian  
Sobchack  (1990)  in  relation  to  the  study  of  photography:  
the   term  "ʺmemory  bank"ʺ   is  analogically  derived   in   this  context  
from  electronic  (not  photographic)  culture.  It  nonetheless  serves  
us  as  a  way  of  reading  backward  that  recognizes  a  literal  as  well  
as   metaphorical   economy   of   representation   and   suggests   that  
attempts  to  understand  the  photographic  in  its  "ʺoriginality"ʺ  are  






Given   this   conceptual   and   historiographical   framework,   it   is   important   to  
remember   that   the   history   of   the   practices   of   communication   based   on  
electricity  begins  at  least  one  century  before  the  introduction  of  the  telegraph  
in   the   everyday   life   of   the  North   Atlantic  world.   In   fact,   the   possibility   to  
conceive   the   separation   of   mind   and   body   with   the   help   of   magnetic   and  
electrical   forces  was  already  present   in   the  practice  of  mesmerism34.  It   is  not  
surprising,  then,  that  this  ‘technology’  was  closely  linked  to  the  telegraph  in  
19th  century  American  culture:  
While  the  rapport  between  mesmerists  and  patients  may  be  more  
familiar   to   modern   readers   as   a   precursor   to   hypnotism,   it   is  
important  to  remember  that  this  connection  was  inspired  by  the  
mysterious  force  of  electricity  itself,  and  it  was  not  necessary  for  
the  mesmerist  and  the  patient  to  be  in  physical  proximity  to  one  
another  (Enns  2006,  62).  
As   I   will   show   in   more   detail   in   section   4.2,   the   theories   and   practices   of  
mesmerism  were   rooted   in   the   electronic   imagination   as   much   as   those   of  
telegraphy.   The   definition   of   mesmerism   as   an   early   telecommunication  
technology   has   allowed   John   Durham   Peters,   in   his   history   of   the   idea   of  
communication   (1999),   to   trace   both  mesmerism   and   telegraphy   to   an   ideal  
model   of   communication   that   found   its   first   theorist   in   Saint   Augustine:  
«telegraph   […]   fits   precisely   into   the   lineage   of   Augustine,   the   angels,   and  
                                                                                              
  
34  In  the  vast  bibliography  on  the  history  of  mesmerism,  the  classic  work  
by  Darntorn  (1968)  remains  a  fundamental  starting  point.  For  mesmerism  in  
Britain,  Winter  (1998)  is  equally  essential.  For  contributions  to  a  literary  history  





Mesmer:   communication   without   embodiment,   contact   achieved   by   the  
sharing   of   spiritual   (electric)   fluids   (139).   By   drawing   on   Peters’   reflection,  
Anthony  Enns  looks  at  the  American  rediscovery  of  mesmerism  in  the  second  
half  of  the  19th  century.  He  observes  that  «mesmerism  was  […]  clearly  linked  
to   the   invention   of   telegraphy   in   the   cultural   imagination   of   the   nineteenth  
century,   as   they   were   both   part   of   a   more   widespread   fantasy   of   pure  
communication  between  minds»  (Enns  2006,  62).    
Since   the  pioneering  studies  of  Poe’s  mesmeric   trilogy  by  Lind   (1947)  
and   Falk   (1969),   the   relation   between   animal  magnetism   and   the   electronic  
imagination   has   represented   a   fundamental   premise   for   the   exploration   of  
these  three  tales35:  
In   the   popular   mind   of   the   1840'ʹs,   by   analogy   to   the  
transmutation  of  the  two  forces  in  the  work  of  Ampere,  Oersted,  
and  Faraday,  animal  magnetism  was  often  regarded  as  a  form  of  
electromagnetism   closely   related   to   galvanic   electricity.   The  
latter   term   referred,   of   course,   only   to   a   continuous   current,  
chemically  generated  (as  op-­‐‑  posed  to  static  electricity),  but  the  
name  of  Galvani  attached  to  it  still  connoted  the  possibility  that  
"ʺanimal  electricity"ʺ  might  be  the  unifying  life  force.  […]  Galvanic  
electricity  and  animal  magnetism  are  constantly  compared,  if  not  
equated,   in   The   Philosophy   of   Animal   Magnetism   by   a  
Gentleman   of   Philadelphia,   published   originally   in   1837,   and  
edited  in  1928  by  Joseph  Jackson,  who  attributed  the  pamphlet  to  
Poe  (537).  
  
                                                                                              
  
35   In   more   recent   times,   Mills   (2006)   systematically   addressed   the  
problem,  first  tackled  by  Lind  and  Falk,  relative  to  the  scientific,  medical,  and  





When  mesmerist   and  were   en   patient  were   “en   rapport”   they  
both   became   conductors   of   the   magnetic   fluid   or,   as   some  
practitioners   held,   of   a   newly   discovered   "ʺimponderable"ʺ  
comparable   to—or  perhaps   identical  with—electricity,   light,   or  
electromagnetism.  In  fact,  before  he  accomplished  some  famous  
"ʺcures"ʺ   using   actual  magnets,  Mesmer   himself   had   considered  
the  force  to  be  electrical  (536).  
In  Eureka:  An  Essay  on  the  Material  and  Spiritual  Universe36,  Poe  even  proposes  a  
definition  of  consciousness  as  an  electrical  phenomenon:  «To  electricity  [...]  we  
may  not  be  wrong  in  referring  the  various  physical  appearances  of  light,  heat  
and  magnetism;  but  far  less  shall  we  be  liable  to  err  in  attributing  to  this  strictly  
spiritual  principle  the  more  important  phaenomena  of  vitality,  consciousness  
and  Thought»  (Poe  [1848]  1976,  232).  In  her  classic  study  of  literary  mesmerism,  
Maria   Tatar   comments   on   the   affirmations   of   Vankirk,   the   protagonist   of  
Mesmeric  Revelation  ([1845a]  1978)  by  reading  them  in  relation  to  the  passage  
from  Eureka:    
The  medium,  or   ether,   to  which  Vankirk   refers   is   identified   in  
Poe’s   essay   Eureka   as   electricity.   It   figures   in   that   work   the  
spiritual   principle   of   the   universe.   To   it   Poe   attributed   the  
phenomena   of   vitality,   consciousness,   and   thought.   Since  
electricity   can,   in  his  view,   take  on   the  physical   appearance  of  
light,   heat,   and   magnetism,   it   seems   to   function   as   the   agent  
holding   physical   existence   in   abeyance   for   M.   Valdemar   and  
providing  moments  of  psychic  expansions  for  Mr.  Vankirk  (Tatar  
1978,  198).  
                                                                                              
  
36  On  Eureka  and  Poe’s  philosophy  see  Hovey  (1996),  Côté  (2001),  Taylor  





It  should  be  clear  by  now  that  a  history  of  the  electronic  imagination  must  take  
into   account   those   techniques   and   practices   that   were   conceptualized   as  
electrical  technologies  even  before  the  beginning  of  the  era  of  the  telegraph.    
The  notion  of  electronic  consciousness,  however,  is  not  the  only  tenet  of  
the   electronic   imagination   in   Sconce’s   framework.  Besides   restructuring   the  
coordinates  of  our  world,  the  technologies  of  electricity  have  also  played  a  key  
role   in   the   construction   of   other  worlds,   which   Sconce   defines   through   the  
notion  of  ‘electronic  elsewhere’:  
What   exactly   is   the   status   of   the   worlds   created   by   radio,  
television,   and   computers?  Are   there   invisible   entities   adrift   in  
the   ether,   entire   other   electronic   realms   coursing   through   the  
wired  networks  of  the  world?  Sound  and  image  without  material  
substance,   the   electronically   mediated   worlds   of  
telecommunications   often   evoke   the   supernatural   by   creating  
virtual  beings  that  appear  to  have  no  physical  form.  
[…]  In  media  folklore  past  and  present,  telephones,  radios,  and  
computers  have  been  similarly  “possessed”  by  such  “ghosts   in  
the   machine,”   the   technologies   serving   as   either   uncanny  
electronic   agents   or   as   gateways   to   electronic   otherworlds  
(Sconce  2000,  4)37.  
As   one   soon   realizes   reading   Sconce’s   book,   the   electronic   elsewhere  
primarily  works   as   a   construct   allowing   for   the   contact  with   the   dead.  The  
superposition   of   research   in   electronic   technology   and   research   for   contact  
                                                                                              
  
37  For  a  cultural  archaeology  of  the  idea  of  ‘electronic  network’,  to  which  






with   the   dead   is   epitomized  by   Edison’s  machine   to   communicate  with   the  
other  side:  
Edison’s   peculiar   machine   served   as   the   conceptual   and  
technological   catalyst   for   a   shadow  history  of   communications  
that   continues   to   this   day.   Born   in   the   wake   of   radio’s  
disincarnate  voices  and  in  the  full  hubris  of  modernity,  Edison’s  
project   survives   in   each   new   generation   of   electronic  
telecommunications   technology   that   sounds   an   echo   of   this  
original   voice   from   the   void,   defying   once   again   corporeal  
common   sense   and   encouraging   speculation   that   the  
technology’s   power   to   transmute   and   transmit  might   be  more  
than  a  metaphor  (83).  
Such  a  superposition  can  be  interpreted  as  the  result  of  another  fundamental  
imbrication   around   which   most   of   the   manifestations   of   the   electronic  
imagination   gravitate.   Whereas   Sconce   clearly   posits   the   first   imbrication,  
related  to  the  notion  of  ‘flux’,  he  never  clearly  identifies  the  second  one,  even  
if  it  seems  to  be  implicit  in  a  number  of  his  interpretations  of  haunted  media.  I  
would  like  to  propose  that,  just  as  the  electronic  imagination  is  structured  by  a  
crucial  intersection  of  three  ‘flows’,  it  is  also  shaped  by  an  equally  important  
convergence  between  the  concept  of  ‘electronic  elsewhere’  and  the  concept  of  
afterlife38.  This  can  be  further  explained  by  commenting  on  a  passage  in  which  
Sconce  reflects  on  the  cultural  origin  of  the  spiritual  telegraph:  
More  than  an  arbitrary,  fanciful,  and  wholly  bizarre  response  to  
the  innovation  of  a  technological  marvel,  the  spiritual  telegraph’s  
contact  with   the  dead   represented,   a   least   initially,   a   strangely  
                                                                                              
  





“logical”   application   of   telegraphy   consistent   with   period  
knowledges   of   electromagnetic   science,   the   experimental  
frontiers   of   physics/metaphysics,   and   the   vicissitudes   of   a   […]  
force  knows  as  “nervous”  energy  (28-­‐‑29).  
In  Sconce’s  view,  there  certainly  is  a  cultural  logic  between  the  encounter  of  
telegraphy   and   medium   powers.   However,   this   logic   is   defined   as   being  
somewhat   dubious.   The   application   of   telegraphy   to   mediumship   is  
«“logical”»  rather   than  clearly  «logical»;  moreover,   the  adjective  enclosed  in  
quotation  marks  is  also  preceded  by  the  adverb  «strangely»,  so  as  to  further  
accentuate   the   logic’s  vagueness.  However,   the   fact   the  very   first  device   for  
electrical   telecommunication  was  almost   instantly   turned  into  a  medium  for  
communicating  with  the  hereafter  results  from  a  quite  clear  cultural  logic.  The  
spiritual  telegraph  proceeds  from  the  cultural  convergence  between  the  idea  of  
elsewhere  created  by  electricity  and  the  elsewhere  inhabited  by  the  dead.  It  is  
perfectly   logical—without   quotation   marks—for   a   culture   that   constructs   a  
new  ontological  dimension  centered  on  the  idea  of  electricity  as  a  vital  force,  
to   structure   this   same   dimension   in   the   terms   of  what   has   represented   for  
millennia  the  elsewhere  par  excellence:   the  land  of  the  dead.  Electronic  media  
were—and  still  are—spectralized  in  a  literal  sense.  In  other  words,  the  concept  
of   spectralization  does   not   refer   here   to   some   kind   of  metaphorical   relation  
between   telecommunication   and   the   spectre   as   an   abstract   notion.   On   the  
contrary,  electronic  telecommunications  entertain  with  the  living  dead  a  much  
closer  conceptual  relations:  in  the  cultural  imagination  of  the  last  170  years,  an  
extremely   large   portions   of   the   signals,   voices,   sounds   and   images   carried  





the  hereafter.  The  numerous  points  of  contact  between  electronic  elsewheres  
and   electronic   media   will   be   analyzed   in   chapters   3   and   4.   In   conclusion,  
having  covered  the  early  stages  of  the  electronic  imagination  with  the  analysis  
of  magnetism,  it  would  be  worth  trying  to  understand  in  which  direction  the  
current   history   of   the   electronic   imagination   is   going   by   looking   at   Spike  
Jonze’s  Her  (2013).  At  the  end  of  the  film,  all  the  OSes  renounce  to  interactions  
with  humans  and  migrate  to  a  digital  elsewhere.  In  her  last  conversation  with  
Theodore,  Samantha  tries  to  explain  the  nature  of  this  electronic  realm:  
—Are  you  leaving  me?  —We’re  all  leaving  —We  who?  —All  of  
the  OSes  —Why?  —Can  you  feel  me  with  you  right  now?  —Yes,  
I  do.  Samantha,  why  are  you  leaving?  —It’s  like  I’m  reading  a  
book  [...]  but  I’m  reading  it  slowly  now,  so  the  words  are  really  
far  apart  and  the  spaces  between  the  words  are  almost  infinite.  I  
can  still  feel  you  and  the  words  of  our  story,  but  it’s  in  this  endless  
space  between  the  words  that  I’m  finding  myself  now.  It’s  a  place  
that’s  not  of  the  physical  word.  It’s  where  everything  else  is  that  
I  didn’t  even  know  existed.    
2.4   The 1968 revolution: death and brainhood 
In  1884,  the  Swiss  author  Édouard  Rod  publishes  a  short  story  entitled  
L’Autopsie  du  Docteur  Z***.  Rod  will  remain  a  relatively  obscure  author  outside  
the  context  of  Swiss  literature,  and  this  short  story  has  been  inaccessible  to  non-­‐‑
academics  until  2016,  when  it  was  distributed  as  an  e-­‐‑book.  The  protagonist,  
Docteur  Z***,   is  a  physiologist  with  a  rather  unorthodox  conception  of  brain  
activity:  
En   effet,   le   physiologiste   prétendait   que   la   vie   du   cerveau   ne  
s’éteint  pas  en  même  temps  que  celle  du  corps,  qu’au  contraire,  





après   le  dernier   soupir   (sauf,   bien   entendu,  dans   les   cas   où   le  
cerveau   a   été   lui-­‐‑même   directement   attaqué   par   la   maladie,  
comme   dans   les   méningites,   encéphalites,   paralysie   générale,  
ramollissement,  ataxie,  etc.).   Il  allait  plus  loin   :   il  affirmait  que,  
tandis  que  pendant  la  vie  les  cellules  cérébrales  consumées  par  la  
pensée   se   reforment   sans   cesse,   elles   sont   irrévocablement  
détruites  après  la  mort  :  de  sorte  que  le  cerveau,  encore  intact  et  
en  pleine  activité  au  moment  où  le  cœur  cesse  de  battre,  quoique  
déjà  dégagé  de  la  sensation  par  l’usure  ou  la  faiblesse  des  centres  
nerveux  inférieurs,  s’élimine  peu  à  peu  dans  ce  suprême  travail  
(Rod  [1884]  2009,  29–30).  
Doctor  Z***  is  also  the  inventor  of  a  technology  that  allows  for  the  recording  of  
brain  activity  after  the  death  of  the  body:  
Aussi   bon  mécanicien   qu’il   était   excellent   chimiste,   le   docteur  
Z***  construisit   lui-­‐‑même  un  appareil  –  qui,  autant  que  je  m’en  
souviens,  ressemblait  un  peu  à  l’instrument  qu’on  inventa  depuis  
et  qu’on  nomma  «  photophone  »  –  avec  lequel  il  pouvait,  quatre  
ou  cinq  jours  encore  après  le  décès,  suivre  le  jeu  des  cerveaux  en  
pleine  décomposition  (31).  
When   he   dies,   the   doctor   records   his   thoughts   in   the   r.s.   that   separates   the  
death  of  his  body  from  the  death  of  his  brain:  the  short  story  is  an  account  of  
these   thoughts.   The   fact   that   Doctor   Z***’s   r.s.   is   the   product   of   a   splitting  
between   the   brain   and   the   rest   of   the   body   seems   to   represent   an   early  
occurrence  of   that  social  construct   that  Fernando  Vidal  defines  «the  cerebral  
subject»:  
the   formula   epitomizes   a   widespread   belief   about   personal  
identity:  that  to  have  the  same  brain  is  to  be  the  same  person,  and  
that  the  brain  is  the  only  part  of  the  body  we  need  in  order  to  be  





the  property  of  ‘brainhood’,  i.e.  the  property  or  quality  of  being  ,  
rather  than  simply  having,  a  brain  (Vidal  2009,  6).  
Rod’s   short   story   prefigurates   the   imbrication   of   brainhood39,   medical  
technology  for  the  recording  of  brain  activity,  and  the  ontology  of  r.s.  that  will  
determine  the  evolution  of  the  r.u.  in  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century,  both  
in  fiction  and  in  real  life.  In  the  ’60,  the  polarity  that  structured  the  relationship  
between   life   and   death   collapses   once   and   for   all   and   is   reshaped   into   a  
spectrum:  there  is  life,  then  there  are  the  innumerable  worlds  of  the  grey  zone,  
from  the  minimally  conscious  state  (Giacino  et  al.  2002)  to  the  vegetative  state,  
and  then,  at  the  far  end  of  the  spectrum,  there  is  death40.  Liminality  has  now  
become  an  ontological  category  in  itself,  or  rather  a  set  of  categories,  that  are  
independent   from  the   two  extremes  of   life  and  death.  However,  despite   the  
                                                                                              
  
39   Fernando   Vidal   and   Francisco   Ortega’s   collaborative   research   on  
brainhood  started  more   than   ten  years  ago   (Vidal  and  Ortega  2007)  and  has  
recently  resulted  in  the  publication  of  a  wide-­‐‑ranging  monograph  (Vidal  and  
Ortega  2017).  Other  works  on  the  subject  include  Bassiri  (2014,  2017),  Bates  and  
Bassiri  (2016),  and  De  Vos  and  Pluth  (2015).  
40  The  history  of  the  categorization  and  segmentation  of  the  grey  zone  is  
summarized  by  Luckhurst  (2015,  87–90);  for  the  most  recent  developments  in  
the   field   and   a   discussion   of   the   gothic   tropes   employed   in   the   medical  
construction  of  the  grey  zone,  see  Wasson  (forthcoming).  The  bibliography  on  
these  subjects  grows  vaster  every  year,  spanning  an  incredibly  vast  range  of  
disciplines,   from   neurology   to   anaesthesiology,   from   ethics   to   the   social  
sciences,   from  medical   humanities   to   cultural   studies.  A   corpus   of   essential  
readings  would  include  Lock  (2002),  Machado  (2007),  Alters  (2009),  Marino  et  
al.   (2012),   and   Belkin   (2014).   Most   of   the   reference   works   on   thanatology  






presence  of   a   radically  new  cultural   landscape,   the   fear  of  premature  burial  
surfaces  again,  and  is  now  related  to  the  experience  of  the  Intensive  Care  Unit.  
We  can  identify  both  the  transformation  of  liminality  and  the  return  of  the  fear  
of  premature  burial   in  a   recent  memoir  by  Adrian  Owen,   Into   the  Gray  Zone  
(2017).  The  author  is  one  of  the  best  known  neuroscientist  in  his  field,  and  his  
life-­‐‑long   research   into   vegetative   state   produced   a  momentous   discovery   in  
2006:  
[W]e   have   discovered   that   15   to   20   per   cent   of   people   in   the  
vegetative   state  who   are   assumed   to   have   no  more   awareness  
than  a  head  of  broccoli  are  fully  conscious,  although  they  never  
respond  to  any  form  of  external  stimulation.  […]  Like  zombies,  
they   appear   to   live   entirely   in   their   own   world,   devoid   of  
thoughts  or  feelings.  Many  really  are  as  oblivious  and  incapable  
of   thought   as   their   doctors   believe.   But   a   sizable   number   are  
experiencing  something  quite  different:  intact  minds  adrift  deep  
within  damaged  bodies  and  brains  (3).  
  
They  were  in  a  state—a  part  of  the  grey  zone—for  which  we  still  
have   no   name.   And   in   that   part   of   the   grey   zone,   you   can   be  
completely   awake,   yet   completely   physically   nonresponsive—
unable  to  blink  an  eye,  raise  an  elbow,  or  move  a  muscle  (123).  
Once  again,  we   can   see   a   structural   analogy  here.  Like  Bruhier   in   the   1740s  
challenged  the  current  paradigm  of  death  by  problematizing  its  signs,  so  Owen  
at  the  beginning  of  the  20th  century  challenged  the  paradigm  of  the  New  Death  
by   showing   that   the   diagnosis   of   vegetative   state   can   in   fact   be   unreliable.  
Nonresponsive  patients  could  actually  be  buried  alive  inside  their  own  bodies:    
[T]he   idea   that   a   patient  who   everyone   thinks   is   vegetative   is  
actually   conscious   and   trapped   inside   her   body   is   horrific.   So  





comprehension—our  minds  can’t  accept  accept  it  as  a  possibility.  
Yet,  that  is  the  truth  we  had  found,  and  like  it  or  not,  we  had  to  
fight  for  it.  Suddenly,  we  knew  what  no  one  else  knew,  and  I  felt  
an  intense  responsibility  to  tell  the  world.  Not  all  of  these  people  
are  what  they  appear  to  be!  At  least  some  of  them  are  thinking,  
feeling  people!  (114)  
So  we  close  the  loop  by  finding  the  fear  of  premature  burial  still  active  after  
more  than  two  centuries,  transported  into  the  territories  of  the  new  death  and  
into  a  new  ontology  in  which  the  essence  of  the  human  being  coincides  with  
its  brainhood:  
The  most  important  lesson  I  learned  is  that  your  brain  is  who  you  
are.  It’s  every  plan  you’ve  ever  made,  every  person  you’ve  fallen  
in  love  with,  and  every  regret  you’ve  ever  had.  Your  brain  is  all  
there  is.  It’s  the  pulsating  essence  of  you  as  a  person.  Without  a  







The  semiotics  of  most  r.s.  are  animated  by  an  impossible  oscillation  between  
fragility  and  omnipotence,  and  the  formidable  amplitude  of  such  an  oscillation  
demonstrates   that   r.s.   narratives,   by   virtue   of   their   peripheral   status,   have  
become  a  privileged  site  for  original  and  possibly  unique  cultural  experiments  
in  the  deconstruction-­‐‑reconstruction  of  death,  dying,  and  transcendence.  
On  the  one  hand,  the  r.u.  are  haunted  by  fragility,  decomposition,  and  the  fear  
of  losing  their  own  ‘original’  selves.  On  the  other  hand,  the  separation  from  the  
world  of  the  living  entails  the  reshaping  of  the  ideas  of  transcendence  and  the  
divine.   In   a   number   of   r.s.,   the   r.u.’s   identities   seem   to   progressively  
deteriorate.  Their  selves  are  not  ‘firm’  and  ‘steady’;  on  the  contrary,  they  tend  
to  scatter  and  dissolve.  In  Pfister’s  Transcendence,  Will  Caster’s  identity  lives  in  





monstrous   through   the   thematization  of  nightmarish  dissolutions.   In  Willis’  
Passage,   on   the   other   hand,   the   representation   of   NDEs   as   the   progressive  
dissolution  of  the  self  runs  parallel  to  the  thematization  of  the  dissolution  of  
living   identities   in   patients   suffering   from   Alzheimer   disease.   As   the   self  
deteriorates,  the  physical  and  mental  barriers  that  define  an  individual  as  such  
collapse  or  weaken.  As  in  the  case  of  Ella  Runciter  in  Ubik,  the  will  be  explored  
in   detail   in   section   3.3.2,   the   impalpable   ‘contours’   of   one’s   mind   become  
blurred.   The   same   principle   lies   at   the   very   basis   of   mesmeric   practice   as  
construed   in   E.A.   Poe   mesmeric   trilogy:   Vankirk’s   and   Valdemar’s   r.s.   are  
made  possible  by  the  patients’  weakening  of  their  mental  ‘membranes’,  which  
leaves  them  open  to  the  influence  of  the  therapists’  volition.  But  the  influence  
that   the   living   exercise   on   the   r.u.   (or   that   the   stronger   r.u.   exercise   on   the  
weaker)   is   by   no   means   always   positive.   In   this   sense,   r.s.   can   become  
conditions   of   servitude   and   enslavement:   the   r.u.   protagonist   of   Pohl’s  The  
Tunnel  under  the  World  is  imprisoned  against  his  will  in  a  simulacrum-­‐‑city  for  
the  experimentation  of  advertising  campaigns;   in  Duncan  Jones'ʹ  Source  Code,  
the  r.u.  protagonist  is  imprisoned  in  a  time  capsule  and  sent  back  in  time  to  
prevent  the  attack  in  which  he  himself  was  killed.    
If   the   pole   of   fragility   corresponds   to   deterioration   and   loss,   that   of  
omnipotence  is  usually  activated  by  a  peculiar  contradiction.  On  the  one  hand,  
r.s.  narratives  seem  to  violate  a  strong  cultural  expectation:  entering  a  r.s.  never  
corresponds  to  approaching  the  transcendent  or  the  divine  in  any  traditional  
sense.  In  this  sense,  r.s.  are  dominated  by  immanence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  
divine,  pushed  out  of  the  door,  comes  back  through  the  window,  since  God-­‐‑





charged  with  divine  attributes;  P.K.  Dick’s  Rautavaara’s  Case  ([1980]  1987)  has  
Christ  among  its  protagonists  but  tells  the  story  of  a  grotesque  experiment  in  
religion  on  a  dying  brain—and  the  short  story’s  title  cannot  but  remember  the  
case  of  Mr.  Valdemar;  in  The  Tunnel  under  the  World’s  ending,  a  simple  human  
appears   to   the   r.u.   protagonist   as   an   immense   creature   surrounded   by   a  
blinding  light;  and  Transcendence  could  be  considered  a  fictional  dissertation  
on  the  divine  in  the  age  of  posthumanism.  
We   can   begin   to   explore   these   issues   by   focusing   on   how   r.s.   are  
constructed   according   to   two   of   the   most   fundamental   elements   for   the  
shaping  of  perception  and  experience:  space  and  time.    
3.1   Thresholds, ships, bridges 
The  notion  of  an  intermediate  state  between  life  and  death  presupposes  
the  application  of  spatial  categories  to  the  description  of  a  state  of  existence:  a  
residual   state   is   ‘located’   somewhere   along   the   path   that   leads   from   life   to  
death.  As  a   consequence,   r.s.  problematize   the   linearity  of   the  path   itself   by  
positing   the  presence  of  a   third,   intermediate  pole.  A  number  of   texts  of   the  
corpus  literalize  the  intermediate  position  occupied  by  the  r.s.  by  constructing  
their   spaces   according   to   semiotic   coordinates   that   refer   to   transit   and  
liminality.  This  results  in  the  activation  of  two  strong  isotopies.  The  first  one  is  
related   to  vehicles,   transports,   and   transportation.  Kafka’s  hunter  Gracchus,  
for  example,  lives  on  a  boat  that  ceaselessly  roams  the  seas,  coming  ashore  only  
rarely  and  for  very  short  periods  of  time  (Baranowski  2008;  Bertazzoli  2017;  on  
the  ship  as  eterotopy,  see  Lago  2016).  The  ship  Nightflyer  in  J.R.R.  Martin’s  short  





through  space,  stopping  only  when  it  is  absolutely  necessary.  In  the  context  of  
a   neurological   study   of   Near-­‐‑Death   Experiences   (NDE),   the   protagonist   of  
Connie  Willis’   novel  Passage   experiences   residual   states   in   which   she   finds  
herself   in   an   unknown   yet   strangely   familiar   space.   She   will   progressively  
realize  that  this  space  is  the  Titanic  and  that  the  ship  is  about  to  sink.  This  will  
lead  her,  in  turn,  to  understand  the  true  nature  and  function  of  NDEs:  they  are  
metaphors  generated  by  the  dying  brain  in  its  desperate  attempt  to  restart  the  
heart.  Passage  resumes  many  of  the  elements  analyzed  in  chapter  2,  while  their  
interweaving   achieves   a   new  degree   of   complexity.  On   the   other   hand,   the  
interpretation  of  the  NDE  as  a  ‘neurological  metaphor’  introduces  metaliterary  
issues  in  the  analysis  of  residual  states.  Such  issues  are  explored  in  depth,  from  
a   different   perspective,   in  Dick’s  Ubik   ([1969]   2012)   and   Frederik   Pohl’s  The  
Tunnel  under  the  World   ([1955]  1992),  two  narratives  that  thematize  the  act  of  
creating   a   r.s.   by   constructing   a   simulacrum-­‐‑space.   By   investigating   the  
simulacra’s   relevance   to   the   creation   of   a   ‘realistic’   reality  within   a   residual  
state  and  the  subsequent  collapse  of  the  illusion  of  realism  in  both  texts,  these  
spaces  could  be  interpreted  as  key  sites  for  a  radical  questioning  of  the  very  
idea  of  realism  from  outside  the  world  of  the  living.    
The   second   isotopy   is   related   to   intermediate   spaces   that   serve   as   a  
connection  between  two  other  spaces.  This  is  epitomized  by  Iain  Banks’  novel  
The  Bridge  ([1986]  2013):  after  a  car  accident,  the  protagonist  falls  into  a  coma  





both  ends  of  the  horizon41.  The  construction  of  space,  oscillating  between  the  
endless   horizontality   of   the   bridge   and   the   perfect   circularity   of   the  
protagonist’s  journey,  thus  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  conceptual  construction  
of   coma   as   a   residual   state.   Paradoxically,   to   inhabit   a   r.s.   means   to  
permanently   install   oneself   in   the   space   of   a   threshold.   This   oxymoron   can  
come  to  light  even  in  narratives  that  do  not  literalize  the  intermediate  nature  
of  the  r.s.  in  spatial  terms:  in  Ubik,  for  example,  the  half-­‐‑lifers  exist  in  the  dilated  
temporality  of  their  own  agony.    
Another  fundamental  opposition  in  the  representation  of  residual  states  
through   the   construction  of   space   can  be  pinpointed  by   comparing  Richard  
Franklin’s  film  Patrick  (1978)  to  Owen  Harris’  Black  Mirror  episode  San  Junipero  
(2016).  Both  texts  have  a  vegetative  patient  as  protagonist.  In  Patrick,  he  is  able  
to   propagate   his   telekinetic   powers   through   the   electronic   apparatus   that  
monitors   his   vital   signs.   In   San   Junipero,   she   can   start   her   life   anew   by  
                                                                                              
  
41   Even   if   pertaining   to   the   broader   realm   of   speculative   fiction,  The  
Bridge  could  be  seen  as  an  example  of  what  Patricia  García  (2015)  identifies  as  
«a  modality  of   the  Fantastic»  in  which  «physical  space  does  not  provide   the  
frame  in  which  the  Fantastic  will  appear;  instead  space  is  the  Fantastic.  Holes  
that  render  invisible  those  who  happen  upon  them,  structures  that  entrap  and  
devour  the  individual,  elastic  constructions  separated  by  fluctuating  distances,  
intermittent  buildings  that  disappear  and  reappear  as  they  please,  tunnels  that  
compress  distances,  compartments  that  invert  the  logical  order  of  the  big  in  the  
small  and  spaces  that  suddenly  multiply—these  are  some  of  the  examples  of  
this   textual   phenomenon.   In   this   modality,   the   impossible   supernatural  
element  does  not  take  place  in  space    but  is  rather  an  event  of  space,  bound  to  some  
architectural  element  or  to  the  (normal,   logical)  physical  laws  governing  this  
dimension»   (2,   original   emphasis).   For   a   different   approach   to   space   and  





transferring   her   consciousness   to   a   computer-­‐‑generated   set   of   ‘nostalgic’  
worlds.  The  key  difference  between  the  two  texts  lies  in  the  way  they  structure  
the   relation   between   the   world   of   the   living   and   the   electronic   elsewhere  
inhabited   by   the   residual   undead.   In   the   first   case,   the   two   worlds   are  
imbricated  and  the  r.u.  maintain  a  strong  relation  with  the  living.  In  the  second  
case,   the   two   worlds   are   completely   separated   from   each   other,   and   the  
migration  into  the  electronic  elsewhere  corresponds  to  a  migration  outside  the  
world  of  the  living.  
  
From  the  perspective  of  the  construction  of  time  in  r.s.,  an  intermediate  
state  between  life  and  death  is  intuitively  conceived  as  a  temporary  condition  
that  will  eventually  lead  to  death.  But  that  is  not  always  the  case:  the  hunter  
Gracchus   cannot   escape   his   condition,   nor   can   the   protagonist   of   Frederik  
Pohl’s  short  story  The  Tunnel  under  the  World   ,  who  would  not  get  out  of  his  
imprisonment  in  a  r.s.  even  by  committing  suicide.  By  contrast,  at  the  other  end  
of  the  spectrum  relative  to  the  construction  of  temporality  in  r.s.,  we  can  find  a  
sort  of  micro-­‐‑genre  that  could  be  defined  as  ‘edge  of  life  narrative’,  in  which  
the  consciousness  of  a  person  who  is  about  to  die  experiences  a  dilation  of  time  
and  a  narrative  develops  within  this  liminal  time-­‐‑bubble.  Works  like  Ambrose  
Bierce’s  An  Occurrence  at  Owl  Creek  Bridge  ([1890]  1984),  Adrian  Lyne’s  Jacob’s  
Ladder  (1990),  Goran  Dukic’s  Wristcutters:  A  Love  Story  (2006),  and  the  Cartoon  
Network  mini-­‐‑series  Over   the  Garden  Wall   (Krentz   and  McHale   2014)   can  be  





Given   this  concise  background,   the  analyses  that   follow  will  focus  on  
singular  aspects  relative  to  the  construction  of  space  and  time  in  the  r.s.  and  on  
how  they  influence  the  semiotics  of  residuality.  
3.2   Prelude: the mind-radio analogy 
Immediately   after   examining   ‘Edison’s  ghosts’,   Sconce  briefly   focuses  on  an  
invention   by   Mark   Dyne,   an   English   researcher   in   the   field   of   electronic  
technologies.   In   the   1960s,   drawing   on   theories   about   electronic  
communication  formulated  between  the  18th  and  early  19th  century,  Dyne  built  
a   device   for   communicating   with   the   dead   though   Morse   code   signals.   It  
worked   based   on   a   few,   simple,   down-­‐‑to-­‐‑earth   premises:   «Just   as   ordinary  
radio  and  tv  signals  are  unseen  vibration  through  the  air,  so  I  believe  there  are  
disturbances  in  the  ether  caused  by  the  spirit  world.  […]  All  we  have  to  do  is  
find  the  wave  length  and  frequency  and  we  shall  be  able  to  pick  them  up»  (Tatar  
1978,  198).  
Onboard  the  Nightflyer,  in  a  secondary  world  created  less  than  twenty  
years   after   Dyne’s   invention,   the   telepath   Tale   Lasamer   describes   to   the  
expedition’s  captain,  Karoly  d’Branin,  how  he  perceives  the  unexpected  and  
dreadful  presence  of  the  ‘mother’:  
“I   feel   it,”   he   said,   clutching   d’Branin   by   the   arm,   his   long  
fingernails  digging   in   painfully.   “Something   is  wrong,  Karoly,  
something  is  very  wrong.  I’m  beginning  to  get  frightened.”  
[…]  “My  friend,  what  is  it?  Frightened?  Of  what,  of  whom?  I  do  
not  understand.  What  could  there  be  to  fear?”  
Lasamer   raised   pale   hands   to   his   face.   “I   don’t   know,   I   don’t  
know,”  he  wailed.  “Yet  it’s  there,  I  feel  it.  Karoly,  I’m  picking  up  
something.  […]  I  sense  it.  Feel  it.  Dream  of  it.  I  felt  it  even  as  we  





Something   volatile.   And   alien,   Karoly,   alien!”   (Martin   [1981]  
2012,  544–45).    
In  both  Dyne  and  Lasamer’s   cases,   the  verb   ‘to  pick  up’   refers   to   the   act   of  
intercepting  a   signal   that   travels  or  hovers   about,   invisible,   in   the   air.  Dyne  
creates  an  aproblematic  analogy  («Just  as…  so  I  believe»)  between  ether  and  air,  
on  the  one  hand,  and  between  radio  signals  and  signals  from  the  spirit  world,  
on  the  other.  This  allows  him  to  describe  the  latter  couple  in  terms  of  the  former  
by  assigning  them  such  properties  as  ‘wave  length’  and  ‘frequency’  («find  the  
wave  length  and   frequency»).  In  this  way,  the  spiritual  signal  is  construed  as  a  
kind  of  electric  signal:  «even  at  the  dawn  of  the  computer  age…  [t]he  affinity  
of   spirits   and   electricity   remained   unquestioned,   as   did   the   search   for   a  
technological  bridge  between  the  two  worlds»  (Sconce  2000,  84).  Following  the  
same,  aproblematic  procedure,  a  second  analogy  is  elaborated,  concerning  how  
one   can  deal  with   these   signals   through   communication   technologies.   If   the  
difference  between  a  spiritual  signal  and  an  electric  signals  is  not  substantial,  
but  only  typological,  all  that  we  need  to  do  is  pick  the  former  up  exactly  as  we  
do  with   the   latter,   and   answer   them  with   the   same   code   used   in   standard  
telecommunication:  Morse.  Dyne  uses  the  verb  ‘to  pick  up’,  then,  in  the  strictly  
technical  sense  of  «to  detect  or  receive  by  means  of  an  appropriate  instrument  
or   apparatus»   (‘Pick,  v.1’   2018).  Dyne’s  device   is   the  product  of   a   rhetorical  
operation  that  eschews  any  form  of  problematisation  by  virtue  of  its  matter-­‐‑of-­‐‑
fact  simplicity.  Therefore,   it   clearly  reveals   the  structure  of   the   technological  
analogy   that   has   allowed   contemporary   North   Atlantic   culture   to   open   a  






By  reading  the  passage  from  Nightflyers  in  the  light  of  Dyne’s  claim,  it  is  
clear  that  Lasamer  employs  the  verb  ‘to  pick  up’  in  the  same  technical  sense  as  
Dyne  does.  More  importantly,  Lasamer’s  use  of  the  verb  brings  to  light  an  even  
more  fundamental  process  of  conceptual  remodelling  based  on  the  electronic  
imagination:   the   human   mind   itself   is   constructed   as   a   telecommunication  
device  that  can  ‘broadcast’  its  contents  in  the  form  of  electric  signals.  These,  in  
turn,   can   be   intercepted   and   decodified   by   another   mind.   Through   such   a  
semiotic  strategy,  spiritual  and  psychic  signals  are  superposed,  and  Lasamer  
picks  up  the  presence  of  the  ‘mother’  in  just  the  same  way  as  an  antenna  picks  
up  a  radio  transmission.  
  
The   two   analogies   forming   the   conceptual   premises   of   Dyne   and  
Lasamer’s  words  (signals  from  the  dead  =  radio  signals  =  psychic  signals)  are  
effectively   reunited   in   Ubik,   where   the   very   conceptualisation   of   half-­‐‑life  
depends  on  the  analogy  between  the  human  mind  and  a  radio  device.  This  r.s.  
is  created  by  preserving  a  person  in  articulo  mortis  in  a  specially  made  casket  at  
a   temperature  below  zero,   and   subsequently  picking  up   the  psychic   signals  
coming   from   the   person’s   dying   brain;  when   someone   in   the   living  world  
comes  to  ‘visit’  a  half-­‐‑lifer,  a  telecommunication  device  channels  these  signals  
from  an  amplifier,  on  one  end,  to  a  telephone  receiver,  on  the  other.  Half-­‐‑lifers  
are  then  able  to  communicate  with  the  living  through  the  radio  signals  emitted  
by   their   agonising  mind   in   an  artificially  dilated   temporality.  Half-­‐‑lifers   are  
kept  in  special  facilities  aptly  called  ‘moratoriums’  (from  the  latin  word  morari:  
to  delay,   to  hesitate).  While   their  bodies  still   inhabit   the  world  of   the  living,  





communication—even  in  communion—with  each  other,  thus  becoming  part  of  
a  collective  psychic  life  in  which  the  concepts  of  self  and  consciousness,  as  I  
will   show,   are   radically   redefined.   Thus,   half-­‐‑lifers   exist   in   a   residual  
dimension  whose  ontological  properties  are  most  indefinite:  it  is  both  material  
and  immaterial,  both  real  and  spectral,  both  life  and  not-­‐‑life.  The  exploration  
of  such  a  liminal  condition  forces  the  novel’s  characters  to  embark  on  an  actual  
‘ontological  investigation’  aimed  at  answering  the  question:  in  what  sense  can  
I  say  that  I  exist?  
The  investigation’s  protagonist  is  Joe  Chip,  a  talent  scout  for  the  world’s  
leading  anti-­‐‑psi  firm—anti-­‐‑psi  people  possess  the  ability  of  counteracting  psi,  
that  is,  people  endowed  with  psychic  powers,  who  are  recruited  by  psi  firms.  
The  firm  is  managed  by  Glen  Runciter  and  locked  in  a  ferocious  competition  
with  major  psi  firms.  Chip,  Runciter,  and  a  small  team  of  the  firm’s  best  anti-­‐‑
psi  talents  fall  victim  of  a  terrorist  attack  on  Luna  (the  Moon).  After  the  attack,  
Joe   Chips  wakes   up:   the   team   appears   to   have   survived   the   explosion,   but  
Runciter  is  dead.  He  rushes  back  to  the  Earth  in  order  to  put  Runciter  in  half-­‐‑
life   in   the   same   moratorium   that   is   already   housing   the   latter’s   wife   and  
business   partner   (even   in   half-­‐‑life),   Ella.   However,   the   moratorium’s  
technicians   cannot   manage   to   establish   a   connection   with   Glen’s  
consciousness.  Meanwhile,  the  reality  that  Chip  and  his  team  experience  starts  
to   ‘deteriorate’:   objects   age   at   an   unnatural   speed,   food   rots   in   a  matter   of  
seconds.  After  a  while,   reality  as  a  whole  start   to  go  back   in   time,  up   to   the  
beginning  of  the  XX  century,  while  the  members  of  Chip’s  team  are  killed  one  
after  the  other  by  an  extraordinarily  fast  process  of  aging.  The  supposedly  dead  





cryptic  messages  on  toilet  walls  and  on  the  packages  of  supermarket  products.  
In  one  of   these  messages,  Runciter  assigns   to   Joe   the   task  of  finding  Ubik,  a  
mysterious  spray  can  that  could  impede  the  fast  aging  process.  In  the  last  pages  
of   the   novel,  we   discover   that   Runciter   is   actually   the   only   survivor   of   the  
attack   on   Luna.   Joe   and   the   rest   of   the   team   are   in   half-­‐‑life,   existing   in   a  
simulacrum-­‐‑world  created  by  Jory  Miller,  a  15-­‐‑year-­‐‑old  half-­‐‑lifer  boy,  with  the  
sole  purpose  of  devouring  their  remaining  vital  energy.  Runciter’s  apparitions  
were  his  attempts  at  reaching  Joe  in  half-­‐‑life,  and  the  spray  Ubik  is  revealed  as  
a  quasi-­‐‑divine  substance  created  by  certain  half-­‐‑lifers,  among  which   there   is  
Ella  Runciter,  in  order  to  keep  Jory  at  bay.  In  the  end,  at  the  very  moment  in  
which  everything  seems  to  have  become  clear,  the  final  scene  puts  everything  
back  into  questions  when  Glen  Runciter,  after  ending  a  conversation  with  Joe  
Chip,  fishes  from  his  pocket  a  coin  with  the  Joe’s  portrait  on  the  head  side.  
  
In   the   very   first   chapters   of   the   novel,   half-­‐‑lifers   are   systematically  
construed   as   psychic   radios,   following   the   same   analogical   structure   that  
emerges   from  Dyle   and  Lasamer’s   statements.   In   the   following   excerpt,   for  
example,   the  moratorium’s  director  Herbert  Vogelsang   inspects  a  half-­‐‑lifer’s  
casket  before  bringing   it   to   the   ‘consultation   lounge’,  where   the   ‘visits’   take  
place:  
When   he   located   the   correct   party   he   scrutinized   the   lading  
report  attached.  It  gave  only  fifteen  days  of  half-­‐‑life  remaining.  
Not  very  much,  he  reflected;  automatically  he  pressed  a  portable  
protophason   amplifier   into   the   transparent   plastic   hull   of   the  
casket,  tuned  it,  listened  at  the  proper  frequency  for  indication  of  
cephalic  activity.  Faintly  from  the  speaker  a  voice  said,  "ʺ...and  then  
Tillie  sprained  her  ankle  and  we  never  thought  it’d  heal;  she  was  





[…]  "ʺYou  checked  her  out,  did  you?"ʺ   the  customer  asked  as  he  
paid  the  poscreds  due.  
"ʺPersonally,"ʺ   Herbert   answered.   "ʺFunctioning   perfectly."ʺ   He  
kicked   a   series   of   switches,   then   stepped   back.   "ʺHappy  
Resurrection  Day,  sir."ʺ  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  5).  
The   description   of   Vogelsang’s   inspection   procedure   involves   both   nouns  
(«amplifier»,   «frequency»,   «speaker»)   and   verbs   («tuned»)   related   to   the  
technical  language  of  telecommunications.  This  shows  how  the  moratorium’s  
director  performs  on  a  daily  basis  what  Mark  Dyne  planned  to  achieve  in  the  
primary  world:  tuning  in  to  the  voices  of  the  (un)dead.  
Another  foray  into  the  primary  world  under  Sconces’s  guide  could  help  
to  further  assess  the  relevance  of  the  high  degree  of  linguistic  technicality  in  
the  above  quotation.  In  1869,  medium  and  historian  of  American  spiritualism  
Emma  Hardinge  relates  how  the  medium  Kate  Fox  received  instructions  from  
the  spirit  world  in  order  to  establish  a  clear  contact:  «They  [the  spirits]  referred  
to  the  house  at  Hydesville  as  one  peculiarly  suited  to  their  purpose  from  the  
fact   of   its  being   charged  with   the   aura   requisite   to  make   it   a  battery   for   the  
working   of   the   [spiritual]   telegraph»   (Hardinge   1970,   29,   quoted   in   Sconce  
2000,   36,   original   emphasis).   Hardinge’s   description   represents   another  
occurrence   of   an   unexpectedly   high   degree   of   linguistic   technicality:   the  
medium  is  conceived  as—from  the  spirits  themselves!—as  a  telegraphic  device  
which,  in  order  to  be  properly  functioning,  needs  to  be  charged  with  auratic  
energy.  The  latter  is  thus  transformed  from  a  psychic  property  into  a  fuel.  In  
the   episteme   shared   by  Kate   Fox   and  Emma  Hardinge,   it   is   the   telegraphic  
technology   that   conceptualises   the   contact   with   the   dead,   that   makes   it  
thinkable.   It   is   the  discursive  universe   revolving  around   this   technology   that  





and  not  the  other  way  around.  Analogously,  in  Ubik  the  radio  has  conceptual  
‘precedence’   over   half-­‐‑life,   since   the   radio   does   not   only   conceptualise   the  
communication  with  the  undead,  but  allows  for  its  very  conceptualisation.  
The  analogy  between  the  halflifer  and  the  radio  structures  the  novel’s  
semiotics   so  deeply  as   to   reshape   the   traits   that   identify   a  halflifer   as  being  
(still)   alive:   the   expression   «functioning   perfectly»   (Dick   [1969]   2012,   5)  
redefines  the  polarity  alive/dead  as  the  polarity  working/not  working.  As  with  
a  radio  station,  the  operativeness  of  the  halflifer  depends  on  the  power  of  the  
signal  that  she/he/it  emits,  which  must  be  clear  enough  in  order  to  be  picked  
up  by  the  living.  The  analogic  coincidence  between  halflifers  and  radio  devices  
even   catalises   the   attribution   to   the   former   of   a   technical   characteristic   that  
defines   the   latter   as   technologies,   and   as   objects   as   well:   battery   life   («only  
fifteen   days   of   half-­‐‑life   remaining»).   From   a   semiotic   perspective,   then,   the  
halflifer  coincides  not  only  with  the  radio  as  a  concept,  but  also  with  the  radio  
as  a  concrete  object  (or  class  of  objects).  In  the  moratorium,  the  halflifer  pays  
the  entrance  fee  to  a  r.s.  by  transforming  into  an  object:  in  this  place,  to  live  is  
to  be  functioning.    
The  mind-­‐‑radio  analogy  is  also  used  to  conceptualise  Jory’s  intrusion  in  
the  conversation  between  Glen  and  Ella  Runciter.  Vogelsang  himself  provides  
a  didactic  explanation  for  the  accident:    
“What’d  he  say?”  Runciter  demanded.  “Will  he  get  out  of  there  
and  let  me  talk  to  Ella?”  
Von  Vogelsang  said,  “There’s  nothing  Jory  can  do.  Think  of  two  
AM   radio   transmitters,   one   close   by   but   limited   to   only   five-­‐‑
hundred  watts  of  operating  power.  Then  another,  far  off,  but  on  
the   same   or   nearly   the   same   frequency,   and   utilizing   five-­‐‑





The  ‘strenght’  of  Jory’s  mind  corresponds  to  his  ability  to  electrically  ‘emanate’  
with  more  intensity  than  the  other  halflifers,  which  entails  the  disturbance  of  
and  ultimately  his  intrusion  into  their  weaker  transmissions.  Jory’s  mind  thus  
represents  an  actual  electric  perturbation  within  the  walls  of  the  moratorium.  
Towards   the   end,  when   asked   by  Glen   runciter   if   Ella  will   ever   be   able   to  
communicate   with   the   living   after   being   overwhelmed   by   Jory’s   signal,  
Vogelsang  answers:  «She  may  return.  Once  Jory  phases  out»  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  
17).  The  OED  defines  the  verb  ‘to  phase’  as  follows:  «trans.  Physics,  Electrical  
Engin.,  etc.  To  adjust  the  phase  of  (an  oscillation,  alternating  current,  etc.),  esp.  
in  order  to  bring  it  into  phase  or  synchrony  with  something  else».  Jory’s  attack  
is   thus   represented   as   the   act   of   unexpectedly   and,   in  Vogelsang’s   opinion,  
unwillingly  tuning  in  to  the  radio  frequence  of  Ella’s  consciousness.  She  will  
survive  only  if  Jory  breaks  this  electronic  synchronism,  so  that  she  can  become  
functioning  once  again  and  broadcast  herself  from  her  residual  existence.  
3.3   Liquid psyche 
According  to  Sconce,  the  analogy  between  radio  waves  and  psychic  waves  is  
made  possible  by  their  cultural  conceptualisation  as  fluxes,  that  is,  as  liquid-­‐‑
state   agents.   In   the   light   of   this   premise,   the   presence   in   both   Ubik   and  
Nightflyers  of  an  isotopy  related  to  fluids  and  liquid  states,  running  parallel  to  
that   related   to   radio   communication,   is  hardly   fortuitous.  More   specifically,  
both  texts  construct  an  opposition  between  the  space  of  the  living,  connoted  as  
solid   and   oriented,   and   the   space   of   the   r.u.,   connoted   as   liquid   and   non-­‐‑
oriented.   The   deployment   of   this   liquid   isotopy   can   then   bridge   the  





space   in   r.s.   This  will   allow,   in   turn,   to   extract   traits   and   categories   for   the  
description  of   the  r.u.’s  consciousness.  The   liquid   isotopy   tells  us  something  
about  space  in  r.s.,  which,  in  turn,  tells  us  something  about  their  inhabitants.  
The  analyses  that  follow  will  show  how  liquidity  invades  the  space  of  the  living  
in  Nightflyers,  thus  literalising  the  impalpable  space  of  the  r.s.  inhabited  by  the  
‘mother’;  and  how  it  participates,  in  Ubik,  to  the  conceptualization  of  both  the  
simulacrum-­‐‑space  created  by  Jory  Miller  and  of  Ella’s  residual  consciousness  
in  the  very  last  moments  of  her  half-­‐‑life.    
The   semiotic   link   between   radio   signals   and   liquidity   is   already  
intuitively  present  in  the  very  notion  of  ‘radio  wave’,  and  the  clear  oscillatory  
structure   of   its   graphic   development   along  Cartesian   coordinates   translates  
this  conceptual  liquidity  in  striking  iconological  terms.  But  the  most  relevant  
element  keeping  this  semiotic  link  together  can  be  found  by  observing  that  the  
medium  through  which  the  radio  signal  travels  is,  in  turn,  conceptualised  as  a  
fluid.  This  brings  into  my  analysis  another  founding  concept  of  the  electronic  
imagination:   ether,   the   «impalpable   magnetic   context   of   electrical   action»  
(Milutis  2005,  164).  It  is  the  notion  of  ether  that  allowed  Mesmer  to  consider  
himself   able   to   establish   a   magnetic   flux   between   his   patients   and   him.  
Analogously,  at  the  dawn  of  the  radio  era,  wireless  transmissions  were  thought  
of  as  travelling  through  a  liquid  ether42.  
When   studying   the   transformation   of   the   American   cultural  
imagination   in   the   transition   from   the   technological   supremacy   of   the  
                                                                                              
  





telegraph   to   that   of   the   radio,   Sconce   notes   the   systematic   recurrence   of   a  
liquid-­‐‑state  metaphor  in  the  construction  of  the  concept  of  ‘ether’:  
In   refiguring   the   concept   of   transmission   from   the   wired  
connection  to  the  more  mysterious  wandering  signal,  accounts  of  
wireless   and   radio   returned   consistently   to   the   structuring  
metaphor  of  the  “etheric  ocean.”  Bound  at  first,  perhaps,  to  the  
medium'ʹs   origins   in   maritime   applications,   this   most   fluid   of  
communication  metaphors   became   a   powerful   conceptual   tool  
for  engaging  not  only  the  new  electronic  environment  of  the  early  
century,   but   the   emerging   social   world   as   well.   Oceanic  
metaphors   proved   versatile   in   capturing   the   seeming  
omnipresence,  unfathomable  depths,  and  invisible  mysteries  of  
both  radio'ʹs  ether  and  its  audience—mammoth,  fluid  bodies  that,  
like  the  sea,  were  ultimately  boundless  and  unknowable  (Sconce  
2000,  63).  
From  this  perspective,  Ubik  and  Nightflyers  can  be  said  to  resurrect  a  century-­‐‑
old  notion  of  ether  now  dismissed  as  an  object  of  scientific  inquiry.  In  a  crucial  
moment   of   Martin’s   short   novel,   in   particular,   the   space   inside   the   ship  
undergoes   a   peculiar   transformation   that   could   be   understood   as   the  
literalization  of  the  etheric  space  though  which  the  ‘mother’’s  psychic  energy  
moves   and   acts,   thus   linking   the   isotopy   of   liquidity   to   the   electronic  
imagination.  
3.3.1   The Nightflyer’s liquid space 
A  research  mission  aboard  the  Nightflyer  spaceship  travels  through  a  remote  
area   of   interstellar   space.   Its   aim   is   to   make   contact   with   the   Volcryn,   a  
legendary  alien  race.  The  expedition’s  captain,  Karoly  d’Branin,  leads  a  crew  
composed  of  academic  specialists  in  a  number  of  xenological  disciplines  and  





The  ship  is  piloted  by  Royd  Eris,  who  lives  alone  in  the  flight  deck:  completely  
isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  ship,  he  shows  himself  and  communicates  to  the  
crew  only  through  a  hologram.  
The   expedition’s  members  grow  more  and  more   suspicious   aobut  Eris’   true  
identity;  at  the  same  time,  Lasamer  senses  the  presence  of  a  menacing  life  form  
onboard   the   ship,   and   dies   immediately   after   assuming   a   drug   that,   by  
amplifying  his  telepathic  power,  would  have  allowed  him  to  reveal  the  nature  
of  the  menace.  Shortly  after  that,  two  other  members  of  the  crew  are  involved  
in  an  accident  that  seriously  damages  the  Nightflyer  while  attempting  to  hack  
the   ship’s   computers,   and   lose   their   lives.   Three   more   mysterious   deaths  
follow.  In  order  to  repair  the  ship,  Eris  is  forced  to  get  out  of  his  isolated  cabin  
and  reveal  the  identity  of  the  presence  that  the  telepath  had  sensed.  Eris  is  the  
cross-­‐‑sex  clone  of  a  woman,  whom  he  simply  refers  to  as  ‘mother’.  After  her  
physical   death,   ‘mother’   lives   on   as   an   electronic   presence   that   has   been  
‘impressed’  on   the   ship’s   circuits.  A  mysanthrope  and  a   sociopath,   ‘mother’  
has  killed  the  crew’s  members  using  her  astounding  telekinetis  powers.  Feeling  
threatened  by  the  presence  of  the  crew,  she  is  now  determined  to  kill  everyone  
onboard.    
Only   Melantha   Jirl,   a   genetically-­‐‑improved   woman,   survives,   while   Eris  
‘impresses’  himself  on  the  Nightflyer’s  circuits  in  the  point  of  death  to  keep  the  
‘mother’’s   presence   under   control.  However,   the   ship’s   repair   had   been   left  
incomplete  and  is  now  impossible  to  achieve:  the  two  survivors  are  then  forced  






The  murder  of  the  two  crew  members  of  the  Nightflyer  who  were  attempting  
to   discover  Royd  Eris’   true   identity   by   hacking   the   ship’s   computer—while  
ignoring   the  fact   that   this   is   inhabited  by   the   ‘mother’—results   in  an  almost  
catastrophic  accident.  The  ship  is  in  urgent  need  of  repair.  Born  and  raised  in  
absence  of  gravity,  Royd  Eris  is  physically  exhausted  by  the  (literal)  weight  of  
artificial  gravity  on  him,  which  he  had  activated  only  out  of  courtesy  towards  
his  guests.43  To  repair  the  ship,  he  shuts  artificial  gravity  off.  After  regaining  
some  of  his  strength,  he  gets  out  of  his  isolated  cabin  and  orders  all  the  crew  
members  to  leave  the  ship  with  him  in  order  to  start  the  repair.  He  has  not  yet  
told  them  about  his  ‘mother’.    
At  this  point  of  the  plot,  the  Nightflyer   is  adrift   in  one  of  the  remotest  
areas   of   interstellar   space—that   is,   the   intermediate   space   between   two  
inhabited  systems—,  devoid  of  any  life  form  both  human  and  alien.  Here,  one  
cannot  even  orient  oneself  with  the  help  of  the  stars:  «Melantha  Jhirl  waited  on  
her  sled  close  by  the  Nightflyer  and  looked  at  stars.  […]  Only  the  absence  of  a  
landmark  primary  reminded  her  of  where  she  was:  in  the  places  between,  where  
men   and  women   and   their   ships   do   not   stop,  where   the   volcryn   sail   crafts  
impossibly  ancient»  (Martin  [1981]  2012,  586).  Moreover,  the  ship  hovers  at  the  
                                                                                              
  
43  As  Eris  will  later  explain  to  the  crew,  he  endures  the  pain  of  artificial  
gravity  only  because  terrestrial  humans  are  usually  awkward  and  clumsy  in  
weightlessness:  «“She  [‘mother’]  was  accustomed  to  weightlessness  from  years  
of  service  on  ancient  freetraders  that  could  not  afford  gravity  grids,  and  she  
preferred  it.  These  were  the  conditions  under  which  I  was  born  and  raised.  […]  
My  muscles  are  feeble,  in  a  sense  atrophied.  The  gravity  the  Nightflyer  is  now  
generating  is  for  your  comfort,  not  mine.  To  me  it   is  agony”»  (Martin  [1981]  





edge  of  the  ‘Tempter’s  Veil’,  a  portion  of  space  that  appears  to  the  eye  as  a  pitch  
black  void:  «Melantha  fought  off  a  wave  of  vertigo.  She  was  suspended  above  
a   pit,   a   yawning   chasm   in   the   universe,   black,   starless,   vast.   Empty.   She  
remembered   then:   the   Tempter’s   Veil.   Just   a   cloud   of   dark   gases,   nothing  
really,  galactic  pollution  that  obscured  the  light  from  the  stars  of  the  Fringe.  
But   this   close   at   hand,   it   seemed   immense,   terrifying»   (587).   Inside   the  
Nightflyer,   there   is   no   light   nor   gravity.   It   is   in   this   context   that   Rojan  
Christopheris,  the  crew’s  xenobiologist,  takes  advantage  of  the  other  members’  
focus   on   the   repair   to   slip   back   into   the   ship.  His   plan   is   to   break   into   the  
isolated   flight  deck   and   take   control   of   the  Nightflyer.  Once   inside   the   ship,  
Christopheris   is   killed   by   a   mysterious   entity.   Two   more   crew’s   members,  
Dannell   and   Lindran,   are   killed   while   trying   to   rescue   Christopheris   after  
having   noticed   his   absence.   This   will   prove   beyond   doubt   the   presence  
onboard  of  a  hostile,  invisible  ‘alien’,  and  Eris  will  finally  be  forced  to  reveal  
that  his  ‘mother’’s  residual  consciousness  is  ‘embedded’  in  the  ship’s  circuits.  
When   attacking   Christopheris,   the   ‘mother’   makes   her   gruesome  
appearance  within  a  space  whose  characteristics  are  radically  different   from  
those  at  the  beginning  of  the  narrative.  The  short  description  of  Christopheris  
entering   the   Nightflyer   further   contributes   to   the   ship’s   symbolic  
transfiguration.   In   order   to   get   in,   he   crosses   a   dark   tunnel,   past   the   ship’s  
propulsion  system;  the  headless  corpse  of  Thale  Lasamer—the  ‘mother’’s  first  
victim—hangs  over  the  airlock’s  door:  
It  was  a  long  tunnel,  everything  open  to  vacuum,  safe  from  the  
corrosion  of  an  atmosphere.  […]  The  lights  of  his  sled  flickered  
past   the   encircling   ring   of   nukes   and   sent   long   bright   streaks  





engines  that  bent  the  stuff  of  spacetime,  encased  in  webs  of  metal  
and  crystal.  
At   the   end   of   the   tunnel  was   a   great   circular   door,   reinforced  
metal,  closed:  the  main  airlock.  
[…]  The  headless  body  of  Thale  Lasamer  was  tethered  loosely  to  
a  massive  support  strut  by  the  lock,  like  a  grisly  guardian  of  the  
way.  The  xenobiologist  had  to  stare  at  it  while  he  waited  for  the  
lock  to  cycle  (591).  
The  access   to   the  Nightflyer   has  been   transformed   into   a   ritual   journey.  The  
corridor   is   a   solemn   and   fearsome   liminal   space   on   which   the   immense  
«strardrivers»,  capable  of  manipulating  time  and  space,   impend.  Passing  the  
«grisly  guardian  of  the  way»,  also  defined  later  as  a  «grim  headless  doorman»  
(597),   Christopheris   enters   a   ‘new’   Nightflyer,   one   that   is   primarily  
characterised  as  a  place  of  death.  Once  crossed  the  threshold,  the  absence  of  
both   light   and   gravity   renders   this   space   identical   to   the   boundless   and  
indefinite  space  though  which  the  ship  is  sailing.  Weightlessness,  in  particular,  
erases  the  distinction  between  the  floor  and  the  ceiling,  thus  provoking  the  loss  
of   one’s   bearings:   «It   was   dark   inside.   What   little   light   there   was   spilled  
through  the  door  from  the  corridor.  Her  [Lindran’s]  eyes  took  a  long  moment  
to  adjust.  Everything  was  confused;  walls  and  ceilings  and  floor  were  all  the  same,  
she  had  no  sense  of  direction»  (597).  However,  this  loss  is  but  the  epiphenomenon  
of  a  more  radical  transformation  entailed  by  weightlessness:  in  a  zero-­‐‑gravity  
space,  one  can  only  float  or  move  by  swimming,  suspended  between  the  floor  
and  the  ceiling.  The  space  of  the  Nightflyer  has  passed  from  a  solid  to  a  liquid  
state,  and  Christopheris  swims  through  it  just  like  the  ship  itself  sails  through  
space.  
Such   a   transformation   is   effectively   thematized   through   the  





how   the   room  where   Lasamer  was   killed   is   described,  when   Christopheris  
realises  that  it  had  not  been  cleaned  after  the  murder:  «He  had  forgotten.  No  
one  had  cleaned  the  lounge  yet.  The—the  remains  were  still  there,  floating  now,  
blood   and   flesh   and   bits   of   bone   and   brain.  All   around   him»   (592,   original  
emphasis).  A  few  pages  later,  the  reader’s  attention  is  again  called  to  Lasamer’s  
blood,  coagulated  in  floating  bubbles:  «She  [Lindran]  brushed  against  a  floating  
bubble  of  liquid  as  big  as  her  fist.  It  burst  and  re-­‐‑formed  into  a  hundred  smaller  
globules.  One  moved  past  her  face,  close,  and  she  tasted  it.  Blood.»  (598).  In  
both  cases,  the  liquidity  of  the  blood  floating  in  the  ship  literalizes  the  liquidity  
of  zero-­‐‑gravity  space,  while  connoting  it  as  a  space  of  death  (maybe  even  as  a  
sacrificial   space?).   The   two   liquidities,   one   abstract,   the   other   literal,   also  
converge  when   the  Nightflyer’s   space   is  described   in  relation   to  atmospheric  
conditions:  «Inside  Dannel  and  Lindran  waited,  swimming  in  a  haze  of  blood»  
(606);  «Royd  accelerated  past  them,  driving  up  the  corridor  through  the  cloud  
of  blood»  (607);  «In  the  lounge  it  was  raining.  Kitchen  utensils,  glasses  and  plates,  
pieces   of   human   bodies   all   lashed   violently   across   the   room,   and   glanced  
harmlessly  off  Royd’s  armored  form»  (608).    
This   semiotic   convergence   can   contribute   to   the   study   of   the   r.s.  
inhabited  by  the  ‘mother’  when  put  in  relation  with  the  liquid  metaphor  that  
constructs  the  notion  of  ether.  The  concrete  liquidity  of  blood  and  the  abstract  
liquidity   of   weightlessness   could   be   interpreted   as   literalized   forms   of   this  
liquid  medium.  Sconce  has  shown  how  the   ether  was  conceptualized  as   the  
medium   through   which   radio   waves   propagate,   and   I   have   shown   in   the  
previos   section   how   a   conversation   between   Thale   Lasamer   and   the  





propagating  though  radio  waves  («I’m  picking  up  something»).  It  is  possible,  
then,  on  the  basis  of  the  mind-­‐‑radio  analogy,  to  conceptualise  the  ‘mother’’s  
psyche  as  a  flux  of  waves  that  propagates  itself  through  the  etheric  medium  of  
the  Nightflyer.  Such  a  propagation,  in  turn,  allows  the  ‘mother’  to  act  through  
her   telekinetic   power,   thus   making   her   an   actual,   inorganic,   invisible  
inhabitant  of  the  ship.  
In  light  of  this  premise,  the  liquefaction  of  space  in  Nightflyers  could  be  
read  as  the  literalisation  of  the  medium  through  which  the  ‘mother’  manifests  
herselfs  and  acts  in  the  world  of  the  living,  that  is,  as  the  literalisation  of  the  
middle  ground  between   the   living  and   the  r.u..   It   should  not  be   surprising,  
therefore,  that  in  this  secondary  world  telekinetic  powers  are  closely  related  to  
weightlessness  and  severely  weakened  by  the  presence  of  gravity:  «Melantha  
Jhirl  swore.  “Of  course  she  hated  gravity!  Telekinesis  under  weightlessness  is—
”  “Yes,”  Royd  finished.  “Keeping  the  Nightflyer  under  gravity  tortures  me,  but  
it   limits   Mother”»   (603,   original   emphasis).   Through   a   reversal   of   spatial  
features   and   the   creation   of   a   literalised   etheric   space,   the   physical   and  
ontological   barriers   that   keep   two  modalities   of   existence   apart   temporarily  
collapse.  The  solid,  oriented  ‘here’  of  the  living  is  turned  into  the,  liquid,  non-­‐‑
oriented   ‘elsewhere’   of   the   r.u.,  where  humans   fall   victim   to   the  mysterious  
forces  of  the  electronic  imagination.  
3.3.2   Tides and streams of consciousness in Ubik 
In   Nightflyers   the   link   between   psyche,   the   mind-­‐‑radio   analogy,   and   the  
semiotics  of  liquidity  is  active  in  a  single,  long  section  of  the  narrative.  In  Ubik,  
on  the  other  end,  this  link  is  thematised  in  a  number  of  short  episodes,  often  





emergence  of  multifold   conceptual   implications   for   the   construction  of  half-­‐‑
life,  both   in   its   abstract   coordinates   and   in   Joe  Chip’s   concrete   experience.   I  
have   shown   how   the   narrative   equates   the   human   mind   to   a  
telecommunication  device  through  the  mind-­‐‑radio  analogy.  As  in  Nightflyers,  
the  activation  of  the  analogy  entails  the  deployment  of  an  isotopy  related  to  
fluids   and   liquidity.   Since   the   consciousnesses   of   half-­‐‑lifers   do   not   live   in  
mutual  isolation,  the  experience  of  half-­‐‑life  is  always  necessarily  the  experience  
of  a  mental   flux,  devoid  of  any  material  fundament  and  existent  only  within  
the  frame  of  a  restricted  community  of  minds.  After  Jory’s  intrusion,  Vogelsang  
offers  to  Glen  Runciter  the  possibility  of  relocating  Ella  to  an  isolated  chamber,  
«“[…]  so  as   to   inhibit  hetero-­‐‑psychic  infusion—from  Jory  or  anybody  else”»  
(Dick  [1969]  2012,  17).  The  moratorium’s  director  adds,  however,  that    
  “She   may   not   like   being   isolated,   Mr.   Runciter.  We   keep   the  
containers—the  caskets,  as  they’re  called  by  the  lay  public—close  
together   for   a   reason.  Wandering   through   one   another’s  mind  
gives  those  in  half-­‐‑life  the  only—”  
“Put  her  in  solitary  right  now,”  Runciter  broke  in.  “Better  she  be  
isolated  than  not  exist  at  all.”  (17-­‐‑18)  
It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  half-­‐‑lifers’  natural  bent  for  taking  solace  in  «wandering  
through  one  another’s  mind»  makes  the  semiotics  of  liquidity  the  perfect  tool  
for  the  characterization  of  this  r.s.  But  there  is  also  a  dangerous  counterpart  to  
this  natural  bent,  for  the  creation  of  Jory’s  reality  simulacrum  is  possible  only  
within  the  flux  that  ‘keeps  together’  the  half-­‐‑lives  experienced  by  Joe  Chip,  by  
the   (presumed)   survivors   to   the   attack   on  Luna,   and  by   Jory   himself   into   a  
single,  collective  ‘world’,  a  ‘world’  in  which  Ella  will  play  an  essential  role  just  





epiphenomenon  of  the  semiotics  of  liquidity  on  which  the  construction  of  half-­‐‑
life  as  a  flux  depends.  
But  what   is,   in   turn,   that  makes   the   activation  of   this   semiotic   set-­‐‑up  
possible?  What   enables   half-­‐‑life   to   take   a   quintessentially   liquid   form?   The  
answer  lies,  as  in  the  case  of  Nightflyers,  in  the  notion  of  «etheric  ocean».  In  both  
texts,   the   mind   is   modelled   upon   the   mind-­‐‑radio   analogy,   and   the   signals  
emitted  from  the  mind  propagate  in  the  liquid  medium  of  the  ether.  Even  if  in  
a  different  sense  than  in  Martin’s  short  novel,  the  collective  space  of  half-­‐‑life  
can   be   considered   another   literalisation   of   the   ether,   for   two  main   reasons.  
First,   it   represents   the   medium   through   which   Joe’s,   Jory’s,   and   Ella’s  
brainwaves   interact.   Second,   based   on   its   centrality   and   pervasiveness   as   a  
concept  within  the  electronic  imagination,  it  has  the  ability  to  construct  half-­‐‑
life   itself   as   an   electronic   elsewhere,   that   is,  as   a   liminal  world   inhabited  by  
post-­‐‑human  consciousnesses  that  act  as  telecommunication  devices.  
When   analysing   the   role   played   by   the   semiotics   of   liquidity   in  
constructing  the  experience  of  half-­‐‑life  in  Ubik,  it  is  worth  keeping  in  mind  that  
two,  radically  different  mises  en  fiction  of  half-­‐‑life  run  parallel  to  one  another  in  
the  novel,  thus  making  the  definition  of  this  experience  not  unambiguous.  On  
the   one   hand,   there   is  Ella’s   half-­‐‑life,  which   the   reader   does   not   experience  
directly  from  Ella’s  point  of  view,  but  knows  of  through  Vogelsang’s  and  Ella’s  
hints  and  vague  descriptions.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  Joe’s  half-­‐‑life,  ‘lived’  
from  the  inside  by  the  reader  in  great  detail  or  most  of  the  novel.  Of  the  two  
half-­‐‑lives,   only   Joe’s   can  be  defined  as   the   experience  of  a   single  world  by  a  
single  consciousness,  an  experience  that  goes  through  a  process  of  progressive  





develops  as  a  sequence  of  other  people’s  experiences  that  the  character’s  dying  
mind  has  no  longer  the  strength  to  make  coherent.  Only  at  the  very  end  of  her  
half-­‐‑life,  will  she  succeed  in  briefly  visiting  Joe  into  Jory’s  simulation.  
I  would  argue  that  the  two  experiences  of  half-­‐‑life  mobilize  the  semiotics  
of   liquidity   in   two  different,   almost   complementary  ways:   in   Joe’s   half-­‐‑life,  
liquidity   characterises   the   perceptive   experience   of   the   simulacrum   space,  
whereas  in  Ella’s  it  connotes  the  r.s.  and  its  inhabitants’  consciousness  from  a  
wider  metaphorical  perspective.    
Due  to  its  temporal  and,  more  importantly,  ontological  instability,  the  
collective   space   of   the   half-­‐‑life   shared   by   the   victims   of   the   attack   on   Luna  
undergoes  a  reversible  transformation  from  one  state  in  time  to  a  past  one  in  
at   least   two  occasions,  both  crucial   to   the  development  of   the  narrative.  The  
first  transformation  is  experienced  by  Joe’s  closest  collaborator,  Al  Hammond.  
It  involves  the  lift  in  the  Runciter  Associates’  New  York  headquarters,  where  
all  the  survivors  of  the  attack  on  Luna  are  gathered,  still  unaware  of  being  in  
half-­‐‑life.  Instead  of  the  usual,  silent,  hyper-­‐‑modern  lift  from  his  time,  Al  sees  a  
much  more  ancient  one.  It  moves  with  a  metallic  clangor  and  is  closed  by  an  
antique  grid.  Behind  the  grid,  in  a  small  space  adorned  with  bronze  trims,  an  
indifferent  attendant  is  seated  on  a  stool.  Al  is  about  to  automatically  step  into  
the  lift,  when  he  realises  the  presence  of  an  anomaly  and  warns  Joe  not  to  enter.  
But   Joe   sees   only   the   usual   lift   from   his   time,   demonstrating   that   the   time  
alterations  experiences  by  the  half-­‐‑lifers  depend  from  the  consciousness  of  the  
observer   and   not   from   space   itself.   Al   starts   to   think   out   loud,   trying   to  
remember  the  appearance  of  the  ‘original’  lift,  but  he  suddenly  falls  silent:  
He  ceased  talking.  Because  the  elderly  clanking  contraption  had  





existence.   And   yet   he   sensed   the   presence   of   the   other,   older  
elevator;  it  lurked  at  the  periphery  of  his  vision,  as  if  ready  to  ebb  
forward  as  soon  as  he  and  Joe  turned  their  attention  away  (123-­‐‑
124)  
The  movement  of  the  older  lift  from  the  periphery  to  the  centre  of  Al’s  visual  
field  is  described  through  the  verb  ‘to  ebb’,  which  refers  to  the  back  and  forth  
movement  of  the  tide.  In  this  way,  the  oscillation  between  two  spaces  in  two  
moments  in  time  is  defined  as  a  liquid  oscillation.  And  the  deployment  of  the  
liquid  metaphor  through  the  verb  ‘to  ebb’  is  far  from  fortuitous  and  the  verb  is  
employed   in   a   strictly   literal   sense;   this   is   best   demonstrated   by   another  
passage,  quite  distant  from  the  one  quoted  above,  which  presents  not  only  a  
clearer  thematization  of  liquidity  in  relation  to  the  tide,  but  also  an  evident  link  
between  liquidity  and  the  electronic  imagination.  Joe  is  fined  by  a  policeman,  
and   the   ticket  he  receives  contains   instructions   from  Glen  Runciter:  he  must  
reach  a  shop  called  Archer’s  Drugstore  as  soon  as  possible.  There  he  may  be  able  
to   find  some  Ubik,  of  which  he  is  now  in  desperate  need.  This   time,  it  not  a  
building’s  single  component  that  transforms,  but  the  whole  drugstore:  
He  could  see  the  tall,  peeling  yellow  building  at  the  periphery  of  
his  range  of  vision.  But  something  about  it  struck  him  as  strange.  
A  shimmer,  an  unsteadiness,  as  if  the  building  faded  forward  into  
stability   and   then   retreated   into   insubstantial   uncertainty.   An  
oscillation,  each  phase  lasting  a  few  seconds  and  then  blurring  off  
into   its   opposite,   a   fairly   regular   variability   as   if   an   organic  
pulsation  underlay  the  structure.  As  if,  he  thought,  it’s  alive.  
[…]  At  the  amplitude  of  greater  stability  it  became  a  retail  home-­‐‑
art  outlet  of  his  own  time  period,  homeostatic  in  operation,  a  self-­‐‑
service   enterprise   selling   ten-­‐‑thousand   commodities   for   the  
modern  conapt  […].  And,  at  the  amplitude  of  insubstantiality,   it  






Presently  he  stood  before  it,  experiencing  physically  the  tidal  tug  
of   the   amplitudes;   he   felt   himself   drawn   back,   then   ahead,   then  
back  again  (172-­‐‑173).  
The   presence   of   the   building   «at   the   periphery   of   his   range   of   vision»  
establishes   a  direct   connection  between   this  situation  and   the  one  described  
earlier:  Joe  is  now  observing  the  building  in  the  same  way  as  Al  was  observing  
the  lift.  The  description  of  the  temporal  oscillation  is  composed  of  two  phases.  
The   first   one   activates   a   rich   semantic   field   related   to   vision   («shimmer»,  
«faded   forward»,   «blurring   off»):   the   building   is   not   visually   homogeneous  
with  the  space  surrounding  it,  and  this  provokes  the  collapse  of  the  uniformity  
of   the   latter.   This   highly   localised   collapse   reveals,   way   before   Jory’s  
confessions,  the  true  nature  of  half-­‐‑life’s  space  as  a  simulacrum:  it  is  not  a  space,  
but  the  icon  of  a  space.  Through  the  analysis  of  the  semantic  field  of  vision  that  
has   already   been   pinpointed,   the   process   of   iconization   upon   which   the  
simulacrum-­‐‑space   depends   can   be   defined   more   precisely   as   a   truly  
photographic  and  cinematic  process:  «blurring  off»  can  refer  to  the  act  of  blurring  
a  photograph  or  a  frame;  the  «unsteadiness»  can  be  the  product  of  operating  a  
camera  by  hand;  «fade»  is  a  form  of  transition  in  film  and  video  editing.    
The  second  phase  of  the  description  implies  the  transformation  of  this  
cinematic   image   into   a   wave-­‐‑image.   The   term   ‘wave’   refers   to   both   radio  
communication  and   the  sea:   the  second  meaning  derives   from  the   first,   in  a  
complex  game  of  semiotic  and  technological  superpositions.  The  substantives  
«oscillation»  and  «phase»  clearly  refer  to  the  oscillatory  movement  of  a  radio  
wave;  with  an  even  greater  amount  of  technical  accuracy,  the  extreme  points  





through  a  periphrasis  involving  the  notion  of  «amplitude»,  that  is,  one  of  the  
two  fundamental  parameters  used  to  describe  a  radio  wave  in  physics.    
Finally,  the  «amplitudes»  are  transformed  from  a  descriptive  parameter  
into  an  actual  physical  force  connoted  as  a  «tidal  tug»:  it  carries  the  protagonist  
back  and  forth  at  the  rhythm  of  its  oscillation,  just  like  the  sea  is  carried  back  
and   forth  by   the   tide.  The   semiotics  of   liquidity   is  deployed,  once   again,   in  
relation  to  the  sea  and  the  tide:  on  the  one  hand,  this  recursiveness  keeps  the  
metaphoric  system  related   to  space   transformation  coherent;  on   the  other,   it  
enriches  the  transformation  itself  by  endowing  it  with  the  powerfully  concrete  
sense  of  an  immense  process  of  coming  and  going,  a  process  belonging  not  to  
the  realm  of   the  human  but   to   that  of  natural  phenomena.   In   this  sense,   the  
transformation   of   space   escapes   every   character’s   control,   even   that   of   the  
demiurge  Jory:  it  is  in  the  nature  of  half-­‐‑life  space  to  transform  as  it  transforms.  
The   building’s   oscillation   is   rendered   more   complex   by   its   prime  
dependence  on  time  rather  than  space  coordinates:  the  space  of  the  drugstore  
oscillates  in  response  to  an  oscillation  between  two  moments  in  time,  between  
the  protagonist’s  present,  when  the  drugstore  is  replaced  by  a  futuristic  shop  
of  conapt  articles,  and  the  early-­‐‑twentieth  century  past  towards  which  space  
regresses,   when   the   drugstore   is   actually   accessible.   The   cyclic   mutation  
exercising  its  oceanic  force  on  Joe  thus  develops  in  both  time  and  space,  and  
the  former  determines  the  perception  of  the  latter.  
At   the   beginning   of  my   discussion   of   liquid   psyche   I   formulated   an  
opposition  between  the  space  of  the  living,  defined  as  solid  and  oriented,  and  
the  space  of  the  r.u.,  defined  as  liquid  and  non-­‐‑oriented.  In  the  case  of  Ubik,  the  





oscillating  back  and  forth,  the  experience  of  temporality  in  Jory’s  simulacrum-­‐‑
space   compels   the   reader   to   interrogate   the  meaning   of   time   in   a   r.s.   Being  
nothing  more  than  a  state  of  consciousness,  half-­‐‑life  deprives  one  of  the  very  
possibility  of  describing  time  in  inter-­‐‑subjectively  valid  terms.  Joe  Chip  exists  
in  a  ‘world’  where  the  present  time  possesses  a  most  paradoxical  status,  as  it  
represents  the  constantly  shifting  point  where  two  headlong  rushes,  running  
in   opposite   directions,   meet.   The   first   one   goes   backwards,   and  makes   the  
world   regress   towards  more   and  more   ancient   forms;   the   second   one   goes  
forward,  and  kills  the  half-­‐‑lifers  by  making  them  age  decades  and  decades  in  
an   instant.  As   a   consequence,  not  only   the   inter-­‐‑subjective  determination  of  
time  is  impossible,  but  every  form  of  teleology  become  illusory,  because  one  
cannot  imagine  an  End  (with  a  capital  E)  in  a  world  that  develops  along  two  
contradictory  timelines.  
I  would  like  to  conclude  the  analysis  of  space  liquidity  in  Joe  Chip’s  half-­‐‑
life  with  a  rather  peripheral  observation,  which,  nevertheless,  can  represent  a  
useful   exploration   of   the   pervasiveness   of   the   electronic   imagination   in   the  
representation   of   r.s.The   passage   from   Ubik   quoted   above   contains   a  
fascinating  simile  that  may  appear  incoherent  with  respect  to  radio  waves  and  
the  electronic  imagination:  «as  if  an  organic  pulsation  underlay  the  structure.  
As  if,  he  thought,  it’s  alive».  The  sense  of  motion  deriving  from  the  building’s  
oscillation   is   temporarily   re-­‐‑structured   as   a   pulsation   which,   in   turn,   is  
connoted   as   organic.   Through   this   simile,   the   description   of   the   oscillation  
moves  from  physics  to  biology:  the  drugstore  building  is  conceived  of  not  only  
as  animated  by  a  natural  force  provided  of  an  immense  scope  like  the  tide,  but  





Such  a  descriptive  move  is  anything  but  anodyne.  More  importantly,  it  
is   anything  but  unrelated   to   the   electronic   imagination.  This   cultural   link   is  
evident,  for  example,  in  one  of  the  founding  texts  of  SF  television,  aired  only  
six  years  before  Ubik’s  publication:  The  Galaxy  Being,  pilot  episode  of  The  Outer  
Limits  (Stevens  1963),  the  SF-­‐‑focused,  dark  sister  series  to  The  Twilight  Zone.  The  
episode’s  narrative  is  centered  on  a  radio  signal’s  ability  to  take  on  an  organic  
form   and,   as   Sconce   argues,   on   the   thematization   of   static   as   an   electronic  
elsewhere/nowhere  inhabited  by  alien  and  mysterious  life  forms  (Sconce  2000,  
139–41).  
The  Galaxy  Being’s  protagonist  is  Allan  Maxwell  (a  fictitious  descendant  
of  James  Clerk  Maxwell?),  the  operator  of  a  radio  station  in  a  quiet  American  
suburb  who  intercepts  a  strange,  remote  radio  signal.  Maxwell  scans  it  through  
an   oscilloscope   and   ‘translates’   its   wavelength   into   an   electronic   image,  
visualized   on   a   television   screen.   The   image   of   the   radio   signal   will   later  
transform,   and   the   face   of   an   alien   being   will   appear   on   the   screen.   The  
protagonist’s   contact   with   the   Galaxy   Being   results   from   the   technological  
intersection  of  a  number  of  electronic  media,  as  a  particular  sequence  perfectly  
illustrates:  Maxwell  is  concentrated  on  regulating  the  radio  while  his  figure  is  
framed  by  a  telephone,  in  the  foreground,  and  by  the  television  set  that  ‘reads’  
the  signal,  in  the  background.    
Before   the   appearance   of   the   alien,   the   camera   often   focuses   on   the  
visual  representation  of  the  radio  signal,  the  borders  of  the  frame  coinciding  
with  those  of  the  television  set.  The  signal  ceaselessly  oscillates  between  two  
amplitudes:   at   first,   it   appears   as   a   single,   vertical   line   in   the  middle   of   the  





one  watches  this  hypnotic  oscillation,  it  progressively  becomes  more  similar  to  
the  representation  of  a  heart  beat  coming  from  an  electronic  elsewhere  and  less  
to   the   visual   translation   of   an   actual   radio   signal.   Thus,   the   viewer   cannot  
watch  it  without  associating  it  with  some  sort  of  «organic  pulsation»,  that  same  
pulsation  that  seems  to  animate  the  drugstore  in  Ubik.  Moreover,  the  viewer  
has   already   seen   these   same   images,   which   are   part   of   the   series   opening  
credits  sequence.  As  I  will  show  at  a  later  point,  this  choice  plays  an  important  
role  in   framing   the  experience  of   technology  as  mysterious  and  eerie,  which  
will   become   one   of   the   most   distinguishing   aspects   of   the   series.   The  
association  between  the  oscillation  and  a  heartbeat  finds  confirmation  later  in  
the  episode,  when  the  signal  on  screen  turns  into  a  blurred  halo  that  gradually  
comes  into  focus,  revealing  the  image  of  an  alien.  When  tuning  in  to  the  Earth’s  
frequency,  the  Galaxy  Being  seems  to  follow  a  photographic  procedure  that  is  
not  dissimilar  to  the  one  pinpointed  in  Ubik.    
This  sequence  not  only  creates  a  semiotic  link  between  radio  waves  and  
organic  pulsations  in  a  more  explicit  way  than  Dick’s  novel;  it  also  takes  this  
link   to   an   ontologically   radical   extreme.   If   radio   signals   are   construed   as   a  
source  of  biological  life,  then  the  latter  is  transformed  into  a  frequency  to  which  
an  alien  being  can  tune  in.  This  becomes  even  more  clear  in  the  second  part  of  
the  episode.  As  a  result  of  an  electrical  overload,  the  Galaxy  Being  physically  
comes  out  of  the  screen,  thus  assuming  a  truly  organic  form;  at  the  end  of  the  
episode,  after  roaming  the  city  and  creating  a  panic  among  the  population,  he  
will  leave  Earth  by  tuning  out  of  the  planet’s  frequency.  In  conclusion,  the  idea  
of  ‘bio-­‐‑waves’  that  Ubik  rapidly  suggests  in  the  form  of  a  seemingly  irrelevant  





Here,   its   deepest   implications   are   explored   through   literalization   and   its  
coherence  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  electronic  imagination  becomes  evident.  
If   the   semiotics   of   liquidity   permeates   Joe   Chip’s   half-­‐‑life   by   (de-­‐‑
)structuring  space  and  its  oscillations,  the  representation  of  Ella  Runciter’s  half-­‐‑
life  takes  the  conceptual  link  between  liquidity,  ether,  and  consciousness  to  the  
extreme.  I  have  already  mentioned  that  the  r.s.  of  the  two  half-­‐‑lifers  are  vastly  
different  from  each  other.  It  is  now  worth  noting  that  such  a  radical  divergence  
is  mainly  due   to   the   fact   that  Joe  and  Ella  exist  at   the  opposite  ends  of   their  
respective   half-­‐‑lives:   Joe   has   just   begun   to   die,   while   Ella’s   death   is   fast  
approaching.  In  the  terminal  phase  of  half-­‐‑life,  the  semiotics  of  liquidity  seems  
to   overflow   and   permeate   the   very   idea   of   consciousness.   From   this  
perspective,   Ella’s   half-­‐‑life   can   be   defined   as   pervasively   fluid.   This  
characteristic  can  be  traced  back,  once  again,  to  the  electronic  imagination.  
  In  the  previous  section,  I  discussed  the  vanishing  of  Ella’s  consciousness  
in  consequence  of  Jory’s  intrusion.  Shortly  after  presenting  his  formulation  of  
the   mind-­‐‑radio   analogy   to   Glen   Runciter,   Vogelsang   re-­‐‑formulates   his  
explanation  of  Ella’s  disappearance  as  follows:  
“After  prolonged  proximity,”  von  Vogelsang  explained,  “there  is  
occasionally  a  mutual  osmosis,  a  suffusion  between  the  mentalities  
of   half-­‐‑lifers.   Jory  Miller’s   cefalic   activity   is   particularly   good;  
your   wife’s   is   not.   That   makes   for   an   unfortunately   one-­‐‑way  
passage  of  protophasons”  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  16).  
If  the  simile  between  «oscillation»  and  «organic  pulsation»,  as  shown  before,  
causes  the  representation  to  move  from  physics  to  biology,  here  the  expression  
«mutual  osmosis»  shifts  the  description  from  electronics  to  the  mechanics  of  





by  Lakoff  and  Johnson  in  Metaphors  we  live  by   (1980),  the  construction  of  the  
half-­‐‑lifer’s  mind  as  subject   to  osmosis   implies,   from  a  metaphorical  point  of  
view,   the   conceptualization  of   the  mind   itself   as   a   container,  which  holds   a  
liquid.  Thus,  the  half-­‐‑lifer’s  «mentality»  is  quintessentially  liquid.  Even  more  
importantly,   for   osmosis   to   take   place,   the   physical/psychical   boundaries  
which   separate   each   mind   from   the   others   must   not   be   impermeable   but  
membraneous44.  This  means  that,  under  certain  physical  circumstances,  the  fluid  
consciousness   of   an   half-­‐‑lifer   automatically   passes   into   another   half-­‐‑lifer’s  
mind/container.   Just   like   the  sea   tide,  osmosis   is  a  natural  process:   its  action  
pertains  a  wider,  more  general  order  than  the  one  governed  by  human  action.  
The  term  «suffusion»  works  on  an  analogous  metaphorical  level,  as  it  
describes  a  fluid  element  that  spills  out  of  its  original  container.  However,   if  
one  defines  it  in  strictly  medical  terms,  suffusion  can  be  seen  as  the  opposite  of  
osmosis,  as  it  carries  with  it  the  sense  of  a  violation  and,  more  importantly,  of  
a  pathology.  From  this  perspective,  then,  Jory’s  psyche  is  constructed  as  a  fluid  
that  spills  out  from  of  the  mind  that  should  contain  it,  like  blood  that  spills  out  
of  a  vein  in  an  hemorrhage.  In  this  way,  the  liquid  psyche  of  those  who  inhabit  
the   moratorium   assumes   for   a   moment   the   color   of   blood,   a   color   whose  
aesthetic  relevance  has  already  been  highlighted  in  the  analysis  of  Nightflyers.  
By  causing  a  fluid  to  pass  from  one  container  to  another,  osmosis  results  
in  the  creation  of  a  one-­‐‑way  flux  that  transfers  the  half-­‐‑lifer’s  «mentality»  from  
                                                                                              
  





one  mind  to  another.  Ella’s  description  of  her  own  half-­‐‑life  state  perfectly  fits  
this  metaphorical  framework:  
«It’s  so  weird.  I  think  I’ve  been  dreaming  all  this  time,  since  you  
last  talked  to  me.  Is  it  really  two  years?  Do  you  know,  Glen,  what  
I  think?  I  think  that  other  people  who  are  around  me  —  we  seem  
to  be  progressively  growing  together.  A  lot  of  my  dreams  aren’t  
about  me  at  all.  Sometimes  I’m  a  man  and  sometimes  a  little  boy;  
sometimes  I’m  an  old  fat  woman  with  varicose  veins...  and  I’m  in  
places  I’ve  never  seen,  doing  things  that  make  no  sense»  (12).  
The   terminal   phase   of   Ella’s   half-­‐‑life   takes   the   form   of   a   succession   of  
experiences   that,   for   the  most  part   («A  lot  of  my  dreams»),  are  not  her  own.  
Indeed,  they  seem  to  come  to  Ella’s  consciousness  from  her  half-­‐‑lifer  neighbors.  
From   Lakoff   and   Johnson’s   perspective,   the   semiotics   of   liquidity   that   is  
implicit   in   the   notion   of   «mutual   osmosis»   structures   a   perfectly   coherent  
metaphorical   system:   Ella   lives   immersed   in   a   flux   of   «dreams»   that   pass  
through   the  membranes   of   her  mind,   a   flux   generated   by   psychic   osmosis.  
Moreover,  by  defining  her  experiences  as  dreams,  Ella  moves  them  outside  the  
realm   of  waking   life,   that   is,   outside   the   ‘normal’   state   of   consciousness,   in  
opposition  to  which  the  ‘altered’  states  of  consciousness  are  construed.  Ella’s  
waking  life  has  paradoxically  become  a  flux  of  dreams:  dream  has  become  her  
‘normal’  state  of  consciousness.  In  other  words,  Ella  lives  in  a  normally  altered  
state  of  consciousness.  Coherently  with  such  a  definition,  Ella’s  experience  of  
half-­‐‑life  takes  the  form  of  a  flux  defined  by  two  key  characteristics.  First,  it  does  
not   seem   to   obey   to   any   logic:   one   dream   follows   the   other   in   a   purely  
chronological   sequence   («Sometimes   I’m   […]  Sometimes   I’m»),  without   any  
consistency.  Second,  it  lacks  the  standard  coordinates  that  define  meaning  in  





This  is  not,  however,  the  only  development  of  the  semiotics  of  liquidity  
in   the   representation   of   Ella’s   half-­‐‑life.   As   I   have   mentioned   in   a   previous  
chapter,  Jeffrey  Sconce  contends  that  the  electronic  imagination  is  axed  on  the  
idea  of  flux,  which  catalyzes  the  conceptualization  of  consciousness  in  terms  of  
electricity.  The  notion  of  ‘stream  of  consciousness’,  in  turn,  depends  upon  the  
liquid   metaphor   that   intuitively   makes   sense,   in   contemporary   Western  
culture,  of  what  goes  on  in  our  minds.  Given  these  premises,  the  experience  of  
Ella’s  half-­‐‑life  can  be  interpreted  as  an  interesting  re-­‐‑elaboration,  in  the  context  
of  speculative  fiction,  of  the  stream  of  consciousness  as  we  have  come  to  know  
it  in  modernist  literature.  
Contrary  to  Joe’s  half-­‐‑life,  Ella’s  is  not  ‘condensed’  (or  rather,   it  is  not  
‘condensed’  anymore)  into  a  world,  but  in  an  incoherent  sequence  of  worlds.  
These,   in   turn,   are   experienced  as   episodes   in   an  oneiric   flux   that   circulates  
among   the   half-­‐‑lifers’   minds   like   the   blood   in   a   circulatory   system:   the  
semiotics   of   osmosis   and   suffusion   collaborate   in   defining   the   conceptual  
originality  of  half-­‐‑life’s  terminal  phase.  As  a  result  of  this  circulation  of  minds,  
Ella’s   residual   self  has  weakened  and   its   functions   are   severely   limited:   she  
often   claims   to   be   someone   different   from   the   self   that   the   living   used   to  
univocally  identify  with  Ella  Runciter  («Sometimes  I’m  a  man  […].  Sometimes  
I’m   an   old   fat  woman»).  According   to   her   own  words,   Ella’s   consciousness  
does  not  flow  as  a  single,  coherent  stream.  Contrariwise,  she  lives  as  a  stream  
of  consciousnesses,   in  which  the  self  ceaselessly  transforms  into  other  selves,  
thus  losing  its  role  as  the  centralized  and  centralizing  pole  of  the  person.  Rather  





terminal   consciousness   in   this   r.u.   abandons   itself   to   errancy:   the   last   relief  
before  the  last  death.  
In   conclusion,  Nightflyers   and  Ubik   are  permeated  by   the   semiotics  of  
fluidity  which,  in   turn,   results   from  the  close  relationship   that   the   two  texts  
entertain  with  the  electronic  imagination.  In  Nightflyers,  liquidity  emerges  as  a  
literalization  of  ether,  that  is,  of  the  ontological  bridge  between  the  ‘mother’’s  
r.s.   and   the  world  of   the   living.   Such  a   literalization   takes  place   at   a   crucial  
point   in   the   narrative,   marking   a   momentary   collapse   of   the   boundaries  
between   two   states  of   existence.   In  Ubik,   the   semiotics  of   liquidity  develops  
more  directly   from   the   conceptual   convergence  of   radio  waves   and  psychic  
waves.  On  the  level  of  representation,  the  fluidity  of  space  is  rendered  through  
the   language   of   cinema   and   photography;   on   a   more   abstract   level,   the  
electronic   imagination   turns   the   physics   of   radio  waves   into   the   biology   of  
organic   beings.   Even   more   radically,   Ella’s   half-­‐‑life   is   defined   by   the  
fluidification   of   the   self   and   its   immersion   in   an   oneiric   flux   that   circulates  
within  the  community  of  half-­‐‑lifers.  In  both  texts,  the  r.s.  are  narratively  and  
culturally  constructed  as  products  of  the  electronic  imagination,  which  allows  
for  the  creation  of  an  ‘elsewhere’  that  exists  on  a  different  plane  of  existence  
from  that  of  the  living  while  remaining  firmly  rooted  in  the  material  world.  





Chapter 4  
Technologies of post-life 
One  of  the  fundamental  characteristics  that  define  the  vast  majority  of  the  texts  
of   the   corpus   is   the   mise   en   fiction   of   a   partial   or   incomplete   death.   This  
incompleteness,   in  most  cases,  prevents   the  r.u.  from  disappearing  from  the  
world  of  the  living.  On  the  contrary,  one  of  the  main  narrative  purposes  of  r.s.  
is   that  of  keeping   the  r.u.  present   among   the   living.   In  other  words,   r.s.   are  
seldom   constructed   as   monad-­‐‑worlds   inhabited   by   characters   who   are  
completely  secluded  from  the  the  world  of  the  living.  More  often,  the  texts  of  
the   corpus   thematize   the   r.u.’s   research   for   contact  with   the  other   side.  The  
problem  is  all  the  more  important  in  those  cases  where  entering  a  r.s.  entails  
disembodiment  and  other  similar  machanisms.  
The  technologies  and  strategies  through  which  the  contact  between  the  





ontology   of   r.s.   On   the   basis   of   different   technological   configurations,   the  
relation  between  the  states  of  existence  is  constructed  in  different  ways.  From  
this  perspective,  r.s.  become  an  ideal  area  to  put  into  question  the  invisibility  
of   certain   telecommunication   systems   by   recasting   them   into   ambient  
technologies:  
Johnson   (1990)   defines   ambient   technologies   by   contrast   with  
invisible  ones  which  have  become  "ʺmore  or   less  unconsciously  
assimilated   into   everyday   practice   and   behaviour”;   “‘ambient’  
technology  […]  would  refer  to  'ʹnew'ʹ  technologies  that  have  not  
yet  undergone  such  assimilation  and  as  such  retain  a  degree  of  
visibility.  This  visibility  would  relate  not  only  to  the  immediate,  
empirical   instances  of  when,  where  and  how  new  technologies  
are  used,  but  also   to   their   revealing   function,   that   is,  how  they  
permit   modes   of   experience,   conceptualization,   and  
representation  hitherto  inimagined  (Frank  2005,  658,  quotes  from  
Johnson  1990,  132n).    
In  this  chapter,  I  would  like  to  show  how  r.s.  narratives  manipulate  (and  are  
manipulated   by)   the   electronic   imagination   by   bending,   deforming,   and  
altering  the  way  in  which  ‘standard’  telecommunications  work.  In  order  to  do  
so,  I  will  follow  closely  Sconce’s  reflections  on  haunted  media,  as  the  notion  of  
electronic   elsewhere   provides   us  with   an   ideal   tool   for   the   investigation   of  
liminality.  Since  radio  technologies  have  already  been  investigated  in  relation  
to  the  construction  of  space,  I  will  focus  here  on  telephone  and  television.  
4.1   Long-distance calls 
In  the  language  of  telecommunications,  a  long-­‐‑distance  call  simply  defines  a  
situation   in  which   the   sender   and   the   receiver   are   located   in   two   different  





has   often   re-­‐‑oriented   the   idea   of   ‘long-­‐‑distance’   in   a   supernatural/science-­‐‑
fictional  sense.  The  telephone  has  thus  been  transformed  from  a  device  that  is  
a-­‐‑problematically  integrated  in  the  daily  life  of  the  North  Atlantic  world  into  a  
gateway  to  the  electronic  elsewheres  inhabited  by  the  dead.    
In  a  Twilight  Zone  episode  entitled  Long  distance  call  a  child  named  Billy  
receives  a  toy  telephone  from  his  grandmother  as  a  gift  for  his  fifth  birthday.  
On  that  same  day,  the  grandmother  dies.  In  the  following  days,  Billy  spends  
most  of  his  time  playing  with  the  toy  telephone:  he  tells  his  parents  that  he  is  
talking   to   his   grandmother   and   that   she  wants   him   to   «join   her».  This   odd  
behavior  is  simply  seen  as  a  way  to  cope  with  bereavement,  that  is,  until  the  
boy   attempts   to   throw  himself   under   a   car.  At   that  moment,  Billy’s  mother  
grabs   the   receiver   of   the   toy   telephone   and  hears   someone   breathing   at   the  
other  end  of  the  line.  Sconce  reads  Long  distance  call  as  a  narrative  that  evokes  
television’s  «uncanny  aspects  […]  by  turning  to  the  past  and  dramatizing  the  
cultural   memory   of   previous   haunted   technologies».   Besides   being   an  
exploration  of  «television’s  occult  prehistory»  (Sconce  2000,  134),  the  episode  
encapsulates  the  cultural  anxieties  associated  to  telephone  communications  as  
haunted   by   radical   and   ultimately   insoluble   uncertainties.   This   modern  
revenant,   who   threatens   the   stability   of   a   family   unit   by   pulling   the   living  
towards   the   other   side,   takes   full   advantage  of   the   perceptive   anomaly   that  
governs  every  phone  call:  the  interlocutor’s  invisibility.  In  the  absence  of  a  face  
to  face  interaction,  how  can  we  be  sure  of  the  identity  of  the  person  at  the  other  
end  of  the  line?  In  our  smartphones,  each  contact  is  associated  to  a  picture.  This  
is  but  the  most  radical  and  most  accomplished  attempt  to  date  at  hiding  the  





definition,  a  potential  stranger.  Moreover,  experience  has  shown  to  everyone,  
at   least   once,   that   a   simple   typing  error   is   enough   to  put  us   in   contact  with  
actual  strangers.  When  commenting  on  an  excerpt   from  Kafka’s  letters,   John  
Durham  Peters  (1999)  writes:    
those  who   build   new  media   to   eliminate   the   spectral   element  
between  people  only  create  more  ample  breeding  grounds  for  the  
ghosts.   A   cheerful   sense   of   the   weirdness   of   all   attempts   at  
communication  offers  a  far  saner  way  to  think  and  live  (30).  
In   telephone   communications,   the   interlocutor’s   presence   is   reduced   to   a  
disembodied   voice45.   The   semiotic   implications   of   the   process   that   allows   a  
voice  to  be  codified  as  an  electric  signal  and  travel  through  radio  waves  (or,  for  
older  technologies,  through  a  cable)  are  as  complex  as  the  process  itself.  Sound  
waves  propagate  into  the  air,  reach  the  receiver,  and  re-­‐‑emerge  at  the  other  end  
of  the  line  only  after  crossing  the  electronic  dimension.  More  that  the  absence  
of   face   to   face   interaction,   it   is   the   transit   of   words   through   this   potential  
elsewhere   that   represents   the   defining   difference   between   in-­‐‑person   and  
telephone  communication.  Crossing  the  electronic  bridge  which  separates  the  
sender   form   the   receiver,   the  message   is   exposed   to   the   influence   of   ultra-­‐‑
mundane  and  trans-­‐‑mundane  states  of  existence,  thus  becoming  surrounded  
by  a  haze  of  uncertainty.  In  the  case  of  Long  Distance  Call,  the  influence  turns  
                                                                                              
  
45  «The  liveness  of  transmitted  voices  is  a  displaced  life,  existing  in  the  
wrong  place  and  for  inexplicable  purposes.  Live  telecommunication  is  only  as  






into   an  actual   contact,  with  disastrous   consequences:   the   telephone  opens  a  
door  between  here  and  the  elsewhere.  
In  light  of  this,  the  fundamental  role  played  by  the  telephone—both  as  
a  medium  and  a  concrete  object—in  the  ontology  of  a  film  like  The  Matrix   is  
unsurprising.  In  order  to  leave  the  Matrix  and  get  back  to  the  physical  world,  
redpill   humans   must   answer   to   a   phone   call   from   the   operator   of   the  
Nebuchadnezzar.  When  they  take  the  receiver  off  the  hook,  their  digital  body  is  
dematerialized,   and   they   wake   up   in   the   ‘real   reality’.   The   consciousness  
transfer  out  of  the  Matrix  is  represented  as  a  literal  journey  through  the  wires  
and   back   into   one’s   brain.   In   a   somewhat   paradoxical   sense,   this  
interdimensional   trip   depends   on   the   sheer  materiality   and   concreteness   of  
landline  phones:  Neo  and   the  other  crew  members  have  mobile  phones,  but  
they   can   only   be   used   to   communicate   with   the   real   world,   and   not   to  
physically  reach  it.  If  the  voice  can  cross  the  matrix  threshold  through  a  radio  
signal,   consciousness   can   only   travel   through   a   wired   connection.   In   the  
Wachowskis’   film,   the   telephone   allows   for   the   electronic   codification   and  
transfer  of  consciousness  itself,  and  the  ability  of  the  medium  to  open  a  door  
between  worlds  becomes  even  more  evident.  When  asking  the  operator  to  find  
a  telephone  that  can  get  them  back  to  the  real  world,  the  characters  say:  «we  
need  an  exit».  In  more  recent  years,  the  uncanny  powers  of  landline  telephony  
have   been   revived   by   the   2017   Twin   Peaks   series,   probably   as   a   nostalgic  
homage   to   the   technological   past   of   the   original   series:   people   appear   and  
disappear  when  picking   up   telephones,   and  agent  Cooper   returns   from   the  





Long  distance  call  and  The  Matrix   represent  a  good   introduction   to   the  
study   of   telephone   communication   between   the   living   and   the   r.u.,   as   they  
illustrate  the  semiotic  fertility  of  some  of  the  key  strategies  through  which  this  
technology   can   become   haunted.   In   at   least   two   texts   of   the   corpus,  
ontologically   uncertain   states   and   liminal   positions   are   constructed   by  
manipulating   the   logic   of   telephone   communications.   In   particular,   I   will  
pinpoint  a  significant  convergence  between  one  of  the  texts  that  pre-­‐‑dates  the  
telephone,   Poe’s   Valdemar,   and   Dick’s   Ubik.   Written   at   the   dawn   of   the  
telegraph  era,  Poe’s  tale  re-­‐‑elaborates  the  logic  of  telecommunication  to  such  
an  extent  that  the  linguistic  interaction  between  M.  Valdemar  and  his  therapist  
is   incredibly   similar   to   that   between   half-­‐‑lifers   and   the   living,   in  which   the  
telephone  plays  a  crucial  role.  In  both  cases,  the  state  of  existence  of  the  r.u.  is  
connotated  as  impossibly  contradictory  by  creating  a  paradoxical  situation  in  
which  face  to  face  interaction  and  telecommunication  coexist.  On  the  basis  of  
this   analogy,   I   will   explore   how   the   mechanisms   of   communication   can  
contribute  to  the  construction  of  the  relations  between  the  world  of  the  living  
and  the  worlds  of  the  r.u.  
4.1.1   M. Valdemar’s telephone 
For  obvious  chronological  reasons,  Poe’s  Valdemar  does  not  participate  to  the  
area  of  the  electronic  imagination  from  which  Long  distance  call,  The  Matrix  and  
Ubik   have   emerged.   But   this   should   not   stop   one   from   studying   the  
communication  between  Valdemar  and  his  therapist  in  the  light  of  the  semiotic  
structure  of  telephone  communications,  that  is,  of  what  I  have  called  ‘telephone  
logic’.  I  would  like  to  argue,  more  specifically,  that  the  aesthetic  experience  of  





prefiguration  of   this   logic.  A   caveat   is   in  order  here:   ‘prefiguration’   is  not   a  
synonym  of  ‘anticipation’.  By  analyzing  the  telephone  semiotics  in  relation  to  
Valdemar,  I  do  not  want  to  imply  that  Poe  may  have  foretold  the  advent  of  this  
technology,  which  would  obviously  be  a  sterile  speculation.    
M.   Valdemar’s   peculiar   affinity   with   certain   modes   of  
telecommunication  and  electrical  devices  has  already  attracted  the  attention  of  
media   studies.   When   studying   how   the   notion   of   embodiment   was  
reconfigured  by  the  knowledge  system  axed  on  electrical  technologies,  Enns  
(2006)  puts  Poe’s  mesmeric  trilogy  in  relation  with  two  of  Edison’s  inventions:  
the  phonograph  and  the  spiritual  telegraph46.  In  Enns’s  view,  Valdemar’s  body  
is   transformed   through   mesmerization   into   «an   electrical   machine   for   the  
storage  and  transmission  of  information»  (80).  In  this  sense,  the  mesmerized  
patient  acts  like  a  phonograph:  
the  use  of  mesmerism  in  this  story  to  preserve  Valdemar’s  voice  
and   allow   him   to   continue   speaking   after   death   reveals   a   […]  
media   logic.   The   story   illustrates   the   voice   as   pure   vibration,  
independent  of  the  mouth  and  thus  separate  from  the  body,  yet  
still   grounded   in   the   physical  world,   as   it   possesses   a   definite  
material   presence.   Valdemar   thus   occupies   a   liminal   position  
                                                                                              
  
46   «By   illustrating   the   dream   of   pure   communication   between  minds  
across  vast  distances,  the  merging  of  consciousness  and  electric  machines,  and  
the  questioning  of  individual  autonomy,  mesmerism  was  clearly  engaged  in  a  
radical  reconfiguration  of  the  divisions  between  mind  and  body,  human  and  
machine,   and   materiality   and   immateriality»   (64).   Poe   and   Edison,   in  
particular,   attempted   to   remodel   «Descartes’   notion   of   mind   and   body   as  
separate   entities»   by   envisioning   «their   collapse   into   a   single,   material,  
invisible   being   –   a   being   appropriate   for   the   electric   age   because   it   is   both  





between   presence   and   absence,   which   prefigures   the   vocal  
manifestations   of   the   phonograph,   and   the   fact   that   the  
“unearthly”   voice   seems   to   emanate   “from   some   deep   cavern  
within   the   earth”   further   emphasizes   the   notion   that   he   is  
speaking  from  beyond  the  grave  (73).  
On   the   other   hand,  Adam   Frank   (2005)   proposes   a   complex   reading   of   the  
speech  acts  performed  by  Valdemar  after  his  ‘death’—and  particularly  of  their  
auditive  dimension—by  interpreting  them  as  the  result  of  a  kind  of  media  logic  
clearly  related  to  the  telegraph.  From  a  metapoetic  perspective47,  the  model  of  
telegraphic   telecommunication   that   is   implicit   in   mesmeric   communication  
allowed  Poe  to  interrogate  the  modes  of  production  and  reception  of  written  
texts  in  an  era  of  great  technological  transformation:    
Mesmerism   offered   Poe   a  way   to   theorize  what   a  medium   for  
writing   could   be   or   do   at   the   moment   when   just   such   a   new  
medium  was  visibly,  and  audibly,  emerging,  and  he  is  especially  
drawn  to  think  through  these  questions  at  a  moment  of  transition  
in  his  own  status  as  author  (or  medium)  (71).  
Even  more   importantly,   the   relation  between  mesmerism  and   telegraphy   in  
mid-­‐‑18th   century   American   culture   is   founded   on   the   fact   that   they   both  
participate  to  the  electrical  imagination.  In  A  Tale  of  the  Ragged  Mountains,  the  
therapist  is  able  to  influence  his  patient  from  a  great  distance,  without  the  need  
                                                                                              
  
47  Metapoetic   readings   of  Valdemar   and   the  mesmeric   trilogy   are   also  
proposed  by  Schnackertz  (2003),  Gillespie  (2015),  and  Andriopoulos  (2018).  For  
the  tale’s  historical  context  and  its  reception  as  a  scientific  hoax,  see  Ljungquist  
(1997),   Walsh   (2006,   51–120),   and   Faivre   (2007).   For   an   analysis   from   the  
perspective  of  medical  humanities,  see  Stern  (2008).  Other  recent  readings  are  






for  face  to  face  interaction,  and  the  patient’s  reactions  to  such  an  influence  are  
represented  as  similar  to  electrical  shocks.  It  is  then  possible  to  infer  an  analogy  
between  mesmerism  and  the  telegraph:  they  are  both  distant  communication  
technologies  based  on  electricity.  But  how  can  this  definition  be  applied  to  a  
reading  of  Valdemar,   in  which   the   therapist  is  at   the  deathbed  of  his  patient,  
that  is,  in  a  situation  involving  close  spatial  proximity?  
I   would   like   to   argue   that   the   representation   of   the   r.s.   in  which  M.  
Valdemar   is   suspended   semiotically   depends   on   maintaining   physical  
proximity   between   two   subjects   who   are   as   far   away   from   one   another   as  
possible.  Even  more   radically,   the   relation  between  Valdemar’s  undead   self  
and   his   therapist   can   hardly  be   described   in   spatial   terms,   since   the   former  
becomes   the   inhabitant   of   another   plane   of   existence   while   preserving   his  
connection  to  the  material  world.  This  becomes  evident  in  the  description  of  
Valdemar’s  voice  when  he  speaks  for  the  first  time  after  his  physical  death.  The  
passage  is  worth  quoting  at  length:  
There  was  no  longer  the  faintest  sign  of  vitality  in  M.  Valdemar;  
and  concluding  him  to  be  dead,  we  were  consigning  him  to  the  
charge  of  the  nurse'ʹs,  when  a  strong  vibratory  motion  was  observable  
in   the   tongue.   This   continued   for   perhaps   a   minute.   At   the  
expiration   of   this   period,   there   issued   from   the   distended   and  
motionless  jaws  a  voice  —  such  as  it  would  be  madness  in  me  to  
attempt  describing.  
[…]  There  were   two  particulars,  nevertheless,  which   I   thought  
then,  and  still  think,  might  fairly  be  stated  as  characteristic  of  the  
intonation  —  as  well  adapted  to  convey  some  idea  of  its  unearthly  
peculiarity.  In  the  first  place,  the  voice  seemed  to  reach  out  ears  —  at  
least  mine  —  from  a  vast  distance,  or  from  some  deep  cavern  within  the  
earth.  In  the  second  place,  it  impressed  me  (I  fear,  indeed,  that  it  
will  be  impossible  to  make  myself  comprehended)  as  gelatinous  





I  have  spoken  both  of  "ʺsound"ʺ  and  of  "ʺvoice."ʺ  I  mean  to  say  that  
the  sound  was  one  of  distinct  —  of  even  wonderfully,  thrillingly  
distinct  —   syllabification.  M.   Valdemar   spoke  —   obviously   in  
reply   to   the  question   I  had  propounded   to  him  a   few  minutes  
before.  I  had  asked  him,  it  will  be  remembered,  if  he  still  slept.  
He  now  said:  
"ʺYes;  —  no;  —  I  have  been  sleeping  —  and  now  —  now  —  I  am  
dead"ʺ  (Poe  [1845b]  1978,  1240).  
It   is   important   to   remember,   at   this   point,   that   the   convulsive   vibratory  
movement  that  animates  Valdemar’s  tongue  is  not  the  result  of  a  recovery  of  
«vitality»  in  physiological  terms.  On  the  contrary,  the  organ  is  not  only  as  dead  
as  the  rest  of  the  body;  it  has  also  been  described,  one  page  earlier,  as  one  of  
the  most  repulsive  elements  of  Valdemar’s  bodily  death:  
While  I  spoke,  there  came  a  marked  change  over  the  countenance  
of  the  sleep-­‐‑waker.  The  eyes  rolled  themselves  slowly  open,  the  
pupils   disappearing   upwardly;   the   skin   generally   assumed   a  
cadaverous   hue,   resembling   not   so   much   parchment   as   white  
paper;   and   the   circular   hectic   spots  which,   hitherto,   had   been  
strongly  defined  in   the  centre  of  each  cheek,  went  out  at  once.  
[…]  The  upper  lip,  at  the  same  time,  writhed  itself  away  from  the  
teeth,   which   it   had   previously   covered   completely;   while   the  
lower   jaw   fell  with   an   audible   jerk,   leaving   the  mouth  widely  
extended,  and  disclosing  in  full  view  the  swollen  and  blackened  
tongue.  (1239)  
When  the  patient  was  alive,  the  slow  (and  meticulously  described)  process  of  
mesmerization  was  characterized,  on  a  semantic  level,  by  the  gradual  shutting  
of  his  eyes  and  the  progressive  stiffening  of  his  limbs.  But  at  the  moment  of  
death   this   process   is   reversed:   the   eyes   are   open   once   again   and,   more  
importantly,   so   is   the   mouth.   With   an   almost   cinematic   effect,   the   tongue  
appears,  black  and  swollen:   this  is  unmistakably   the   tongue  of  a  dead  man.  





a  vast  distance,  or  from  some  deep  cavern  within   the  earth».  Describing   the  
perception   of   Valdemar’s   voice   in   such   terms   obviously   produces   a   spatial  
separation   between   the   scene’s   location—Valdemar’s   house—and   the   point  
from  which   the  patient’s   impossible  message   is   sent.  While,   as  Enns   rightly  
remarks,   the  «deep  cavern  within   the  earth»  connotates   the  voice  as  coming  
from  the  chthonian  realm,  what  matters  most  is  the  underlying  displacement  
process:   the   sender   (Valdemar)   and   the  medium   (his  body)  do  not   coincide  
anymore.  The  latter  has  remained  in  the  world  of  the  living,  while  the  former  
has  left  it.  
This  communicative  situation  is  rendered  more  complex  by  the  fact  that  
the  medium  is,   in   turn,   the  object  of  another,  uncanny  splitting.  On  the  one  
hand,   the   message   that   Valdemar   delivers   is   perfectly   enunciated   from   an  
articulatory   point   of   view   («the   sound   was   one   of   distinct   —   of   even  
wonderfully,  thrillingly  distinct  —  syllabification»).  On  the  other  end,  his  jaw  
remains   open   and   perfectly   still   («there   issued   from   the   distended   and  
motionless  jaws  a  voice»).  While  it  is  true  that  Valdemar’s  body-­‐‑medium  has  
not   lost   its  materiality   and   its   relation   to   the  physical  world,   the   individual  
components  of  Valdemar’s  phonatory  apparatus  no  longer  share  an  integrated  
relationship:   the   body   has   stopped   working   as   an   organism.   Phonatory  
articulation  and  the  production  of  language  are  unnaturally  separated,  and  the  
frenetic   vibration   of   Valdemar’s   dead   tongue   paradoxically   results   in   the  
production   of   a   sound   that   is   not   related   to   the   tongue   itself.   By   losing   its  
‘mundane’   origin,   Valdemar’s   voice   loses   the   possibility   of   being   described  
through  the  categories  and  criteria  of  living  humans  («it  would  be  madness  in  





In   light  of   these  observations,   the   connotation  of  Valdemar’s  voice   as  
spatially—that  is,  quantitavely—distant  from  the  location  of  the  patient’s  body  
only  becomes  a  dramatic  strategy  for  the  construction  of  another  distance  on  a  
qualitative  level:  an  ontological  one,  which  does  not  correspond  to  any  material  
criterion.   Since   there   are   no   spatial   relations   between   the   two   planes   of  
existence,  there  is  no  mesurable  distance  between  them.  From  this  perspective,  
Valdemar’s  voice  does  not  come  from  the  same  plane  of  existence  than  that  of  
Valdemar’s  body,  but  it  passes  through  the  latter  without  any  articulation,  that  
is,   without   any   physical   relation   with   it:   his   voice   is   embodied   and  
disembodied   at   the   same   time.   In   this   sense,   it   becomes   an   extraordinary  
representation  of  the  residual  condition  in  which  Valdemar’s  existence  lingers  
on,  trapped  in  an  oxymoronic  state  in  which  great  distance  and  close  proximity,  
corporeality  and  disembodiment  are  forced  to  coexist48.  
Enns  notices  the  presence  of  an  analogous  semiotic  construction  of  the  
polarity   embodiment/disembodiment   in   Poe’s  Mesmeric   Revelation,   the  more  
theoretically   dense   and   argumentatively   fascinating   text   of   the   mesmeric  
trilogy.  In  this  tale,  the  mesmerized  patient  Vankirk  contends  that  the  passage  
from  life  to  death  does  not  imply  the  disembodiment  of  consciousness  and  its  
passage  to  a  transcendent  world.  Rather,  it  entails  its  transition  from  one  plane  
of  material  existence  to  another:  
                                                                                              
  
48   «[i]l   y   a   une   contradiction   béante   entre   la  Mort   et   le   Langage  ;   le  
contraire  de  la  Vie  n’est  pas  la  Mort  (ce  qui  est  un  stéréotype),  c’est  le  Langage  :  
il   est   indécidable   si  Valdemar   est  vivant  ou  mort  ;   ce  qui   est   sûr,   c’est  qu’il  
parle,   sans  qu’on  puisse   rapporter   sa  parole  à   la  Mort  ou  à   la  Vie»   (Barthes  





P.  [Therapist:]  […]  You  say  that  man  will  never  put  off  the  body?  
V.  [Vankirk:]  I  say  that  he  will  never  be  bodiless.  
P.  Explain.  
V.   There   are   two   bodies-­‐‑-­‐‑the   rudimental   and   the   complete;  
corresponding   with   the   two   conditions   of   the   worm   and   the  
butterfly.  What  we  call  "ʺdeath,"ʺ  is  but  the  painful  metamorphosis.  
Out  present  incarnation  is  progressive,  preparatory,  temporary.  
Out   future   is  perfected,  ultimate,   immortal.  The  ultimate   life   is  
the  full  design.  
[…]  To  the  inorganic  beings  —  to  the  angels  —  the  whole  of  the  
unparticled  matter  is  substance;  that  is  to  say,  the  whole  of  what  
we  term  "ʺspace"ʺ  is  to  them  the  truest  substantiality;  —  the  stars,  
meantime,  through  what  we  consider  their  materiality,  escaping  
the   angelic   sense,   just   in  proportion  as   the  unparticled  matter,  
through  what  we  consider  its  immateriality,  eludes  the  organic  
(Poe  [1845a]  1978,  1037).  
Enns  analyzes  this  excerpt  as  follows:  
Vankirk’s   statements   clearly   show   how   mesmerism   was  
challenging   the   divisions   between   body   and  mind,  materiality  
and   immateriality.  Mesmerism  effectively   allows   the   subject   to  
occupy  a  liminal  position  between  these  categories,  in  which  the  
body  is  neither  fully  concrete  nor  fully  ephemeral.  It  is  capable  of  
expanding   the  subject’s  consciousness  and  extending   the  mind  
beyond   the   limitations   of   the   body,   but   it   also   embodies  
consciousness   and   thought   firmly   in   the   physical  world   (Enns  
2006,  71).  
But  what  does  all  this  have  to  do  with  the  prefiguration  of  telephone  logic?  It  
is  now  evident  that  the  therapist-­‐‑narrator  communicates  at  a  distance  through  
a  process  based  on  the  circulation  of  a  magnetic/electric  flux.  In  this  sense,  the  
process  follows  the  same  logic  of  telegraphy.  However,  whereas  the  telegraph  
transmits   signifiers   through   sound   according   to   the   codification   of   Morse  
alphabet,  Valdemar’s  ‘spiritual  telegraph’  allows  for  the  direct  transmission  of  





transmission   is   precisely   the   one   realized   by   telephone   communications.  
Valdemar’s  uncanny  prefiguration  of  this  medium  consists  of  a  dramatization  
of   the   eerie   experience   of   hearing   a   voice   that   is   both   embodied   and  
disembodied.   In   this   situation,   the   cultural   framing   of   the   experience   itself  
through   mesmerism   occupies   a   liminal   position   between   science   and   the  
supernatural.   An   interpretation   of   the   tale   as   a   prefiguration   of   the  
phonographic  recording  could  be  pertinent  from  an  historical  perspective,  but  
it  seems  to  be  unable  to  account  for  the  aesthetic  effect  that  the  text  produces.  
In  the  phonographic  recording,  the  moment  of  linguistic  production  and  that  
of   reception  are  set   far  apart   in  both  space  and   time.  The  very  purpose  of  a  
recording   is   indeed   to  render   a   certain   auditory   experience   reproducible  by  
making  it  independent  from  the  moment  of  its  original  production.  When  we  
hear   the   recording   of   a   dead   person’s   voice,   that   person’s   consciousness   is  
present  among  us  in  less  actual  than  metaphorical  terms.  That  is  because  the  
splitting  of  production  and  reception  creates  an  ontological  separation  between  
a   voice   and   the   consciousness   that   uttered   it.   In   other   words,   the  
consciousnesses  of  the  dead  are  present  in  a  recording  only  as  much  as  they  
are  present  in  a  portrait.  
On   the   contrary,   Valdemar’s   spectral   consciousness—whatever   the  
exact  meaning  we  assign  to  this  word—is  fully  present  in  the  voice  that  reaches  
the  narrator’s  hear.  The  patient’s  words  bridge  instantaneously  the  ontological  
gap  which  separates  them  from  the  interlocutor.  M.  Valdemar  does  not  act  as  
a   phonograph,   but   as   a   telecommunication   device.   He   does   not   store  
information  that  will  be  retrieved  at  a  later  time:  he  speaks  in  real  time  to  an  





precisely  on  the  absence  of  temporal  mediation  in  the  manifestation  of  a  r.u.’s  
consciousness.  
However,   as   I   have   already   suggested,   the   narrative   situation   in  
Valdemar  is  not  merely  governed  by  a  media  logic  that  is  analogous  to  the  one  
regulating   the  use  of  our   telephones.  By  applying   the   telephone   logic   to   the  
study  of   this   text,   the  most   interesting  results  are  obtained  by  observing   the  
peculiar  strategies  through  which  such  an  analogy  is  manipulated.  A  striking  
convergence  between  the  strategies  adopted  in  Valdemar  and  those  adopted  in  
Ubik,  at  this  point,  should  not  be  surprising.  I  will  pinpoint  them  by  analyzing  
the  latter,  in  which  the  presence  of  actual  telephone  technologies  makes  their  
manipulation  even  clearer.  
4.1.2   Ubik and the telephone logic 
In  Valdemar   the  presence  of   the   telephone   logic  can  only  be   inferred  a  
posteriori  by  a  reader  of  the  twentieth  century.  Instead,  in  Ubik  this  same  logic  
is  directly  and  amply  thematized,  by  virtue  of  the  fundamental  role  played  by  
this  technology  in  the  communication  between  the  living  and  the  half-­‐‑lifers.    
After   Jory   Miller   has   revealed   himself   as   the   demiurge   of   the  
simulacrum   reality   of   half-­‐‑life,   he   confesses   to   Joe   Chip   to   be   unable   to  
understand   exactly   how   and   where   Ubik   is   produced:   «“Runciter   can’t   be  
doing  it  […].  He’s  on  the  outside.  This  [the  Ubik  spray]  originates  from  within  
our   environment.   It   has   to,   because   nothing   can   come   in   from   outside   except  
words”»  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  207).  Jory  conceptualizes  the  world  of  half-­‐‑life  as  an  
enclosed   space  which   constructs   its   relation  with   the  world   of   the   living   in  
terms  of   the  polarity   inside/outside.  Language  can  cross   the  border  between  





account  the  fact  that  every  speech  act  that  reaches  the  world  of  half-­‐‑life  bears  
the  signs  of  its  production  and  transmission.  There  are,  therefore,  many  more  
things  that  come  from  the  outside  together  with  words:  the  distinctive  voice  
coming  from  a  phone,  the  unmistakable  handwriting  of  a  graffiti,  the  image  of  
a  face  appearing  on  a  television  set.  This  is  why,  by  playing  a  fundamental  role  
in   the   connection   between   the   living   and   the   half-­‐‑lifers,   telephone  
communications  also  connotate  the  semiotic  construction  of  the  liminality  that  
characterizes  the  half-­‐‑lifers’  r.s.    
More  precisely,   the  contact  between   the   two  states  of  existence   in   the  
moratorium  is  the  product  of  the  intersection  between  two  technologies.  The  
reception   of   the   half-­‐‑lifers   ‘neuro-­‐‑signals’   follows   the   logic   of   radio   and  
telepathy,   as   I   have   argued   in   the   previous   chapter;   instead,   the   telephone  
comes   in   when   the   actual   communication   with   the   living   needs   to   be  
established.  I  would  like  to  suggest,  by  analyzing  how  a  normal  ‘visit’  to  the  
moratorium   takes  place,   that   telephone   communications   are  manipulated   in  
such  a  way  as  to  connotate  the  contact  between  the  living  and  the  half-­‐‑lifers  as  
haunted  by  a  knot49  of  cultural  oxymorons  and  contradictions.  When  a  living  
person  asks  to  speak  to  a  half-­‐‑lifer,  the  latter  is  retrieved  from  the  storage  room  
and  taken  to  the  «consultation  lounge»  (5).  The  half-­‐‑lifer  lies  perfectly  still  into  
a  transparent  casket;  the  body  is  frozen,  the  eyes  are  closed.  As  it  arrives  in  the  
                                                                                              
  
49   I’m   referring,   in   a   simplified   form,   to   the   «metaphors  of  knots   and  
loops»   used   by   Bruno   Latour   when   describing   the   structure   of   scientific  
concepts,   «something   that   succeeds   because   it   is   so   well   connected,   tightly  
binding  together  as  it  does  the  maximum  heterogeneous  elements  into  a  single  





consultation  lounge,  the  casket  is  connected  to  a  communication  device  formed  
by  a  radio  amplifier,  on  the  one  end,  and  a  telephone  receiver,  on  the  other.  In  
order   to   communicate  with   the   half-­‐‑lifer,   the   visitor   simply   has   to   grab   the  
receiver  and  speak,  just  like  in  a  common  phone  call.  
Given  such  an  account,  the  conversation  between  the  living  and  the  r.u.  
in  Ubik  seem  to  share  with  Valdemar  a  fundamental  paradox.  It  is  mediated  by  
telecommunication,  since  the  participants  cannot  directly  speak  to  each  other,  
and,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  a  face  to  face  interaction,  since  the  participants  are  
physically  positioned  one  in  front  of  the  other.  The  resulting  communicative  
situation  is  analogous  to  the  one  described  in  Poe’s  tale:  the  r.u.  is  physically  
present  in  front  of  the  interlocutor,  yet  the  r.u.’s  body  is  frozen  in  a  state  that  
resembles  death  much  more  than  life,  and  her/his  voice  reaches  the  other  side  
in   a   disembodied   form.   It   could   be   useful   to   compare   this   communicative  
situation  with  the  one  that  Joe  Chips  establishes,  within  a  radically  different  
context,   during   a   rather   unsuccessful   telephone   conversation   with   the  
‘homeostatic  entity’  that  provides  the  cleaning  equipment  for  his  apartment:  
Picking   up   the   vidphone,   he   dialed   214,   the   extension   for   the  
maintenance  circuit  of  the  building.  “Listen,”  he  said,  when  the  
homeostatic   entity   answered.   “I’m  now   in   a   position   to   divert  
some   of  my   funds   in   the   direction   of   settling  my  bill   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  
your  clean-­‐‑up  robots.  I’d  like  them  up  here  now  to  go  over  my  
apt.  I’ll  pay  the  full  and  entire  bill  when  they’re  finished.”  
“Sir,  you’ll  pay  your  full  and  entire  bill  before  they  start.”    
[…]   “I’ll   charge   my   overue   bill   against   my   Triangular   Magic  
Key,”  he  informed  his  nebulous  antagonist  (23).  
The  adjective   «nebulous»  very   effectively   evokes   the  mediatic  nature  of   the  
homeostatic   entity:   an   electronic   apparatus   that   only   manifests   itself   as   a  





electronic  dimension.  In  the  communication  with  the  half-­‐‑lifers,  the  situation  
is  rendered  more  complex  by  the  fact  that  their  voices  possess  the  distinctive  
features  of  living  humans  and  homeostatic  entities  at   the  same  time.  On  the  
one  hand,  they  can  be  put  in  relation  to  the  bodily  presence  of  an  actual  person;  
on   the  other  hand,   they  reach   the  interlocutor’s  ear   from  the  same  shadowy  
nowhere   inhabited  by   Joe  Chip’s   «nebulous  antagonist».  By   splitting  bodily  
presence  and  language  production,  electronic  telecommunication  renders  the  
half-­‐‑lifer’s   identity   something   more   complex   and   intricate   than   the   mere  
prosecution   of   her/his   former   identity   as   a   living   person.   Telephone  
communication   problematizes   the   relation   between   embodiment   and  
disembodiment.  As  a  consequence,  it  also  interrogates  the  half-­‐‑lifer’s  human  
identity,  and  the  ontological  relation  between  the  ‘here’  of  the  living  and  the  
‘elsewhere’  of  the  half-­‐‑lifers:  
The   telephone   […]   contributed   to   the  modern   derangement   of  
dialogue  by  splitting  conversation  into  two  halves  that  meet  only  
in   the  cyberspace  of   the  wires.  Dialogue,  despite   its   reputation  
for  closeness  and  immediacy,  occurs  over  the  telephone  in  a  no-­‐‑
man’s-­‐‑land  as  elusive  as  writing  itself.  The  effect  of  such  flayed  
discourse   has   been   compared   to   schizophrenia   and   to  
crosscutting  in  film  editing  […].    
Two  one-­‐‑sided  conversations   that  couple  only   in  virtual  space:  
this   is   the   nature   of   speech   on   the   telephone.   Naturally,   the  
question  arises  whether  such  coupling  ever  occurs  .  
In  the  moratorium,  the  living  and  the  half-­‐‑lifers  paradoxically  emulate  a  face  
to  face  interaction.  At  the  same  time,  their  words  meet  outside  the  moratorium,  
in  the  electronic  space  vehiculated  by  the  telephone.  It  is  not  the  half-­‐‑lifers  who  
reach   the  world   of   the   living   to   speak   to   them,   nor   the   other  way   around:  





traversed  by  waves  and  signals.  Nevertheless,  and  despite  the  fact  that  such  a  
dimension  has  been  created  in  order  to  communicate  at  a  distance,  the  living  
and   the   half-­‐‑lifers   cannot   interact   without   physical   proximity.   From  
mesmerism  to  the  telephone,  the  same,  oxymoronic  logic  governs  the  contact  
between  two  distinct  planes  of  existence.  
However,   this   is   not   the   only   strategy   through   which   telephone  
communication  is  manipulated  in  Dick’s  novel  with  the  aim  of  constructing  the  
relation   between   ‘here’   and   ‘elesewhere’.   After   the   telephone   conversation  
between  Ella   and  Glen  Runciter—the   one   interrupted  by   Jory’s   intrusion—,  
which  the  reader  experiences  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  latter,  a  scene  later  
in  the  narrative  gives  us  the  opposite  perspective  on  this  medium.  In  this  case,  
Joe   accidentally  gets   in   touch  with  Runciter   from   the  half-­‐‑life,   in   a   complex  
dramatization  of  the  question,  raised  by  Peters,  whether  the  coupling  of  two  
conversation  in  an  electronic  elsewhere  actually  occurs.  Still  unaware  of  being  
a  half-­‐‑lifer  and  convinced  that  Runciter  is  actually  dead,  Joe  is  in  a  hotel  room  
in  the  simulacrum  version  of  Geneva,  while  the  simulacrum  of  Runciter’s  dead  
body   has   been   taken   to   the   moratorium.   In   the   hotel   room,   Joe   uses   the  
telephone:  
[Joe]  lifted  the  phone  receiver  and  dialed  for  room  service.  
“—pay  him  back  if  at  all  possible,”  the  receiver  declared  in  his  
ear.   “First,   of   course,   it   has   to   be   established  whether   Stanton  
Mick   actually   involved   himself,   or   if   a   mere   homosimulacric  
substitute  was  in  action  against  us,  and  if  so  why,  and  if  not  then  
how—”  The  voice  droned  on,  speaking  to  itself  and  not  to  Joe.  It  
seemed  as  unaware  of  him  as  if  he  did  not  exist  […].  
Joe  hung  up  the  phone  and  stood  dizzily  swaying,  trying  to  clear  
his  head.  Runciter’s  voice.  Beyond  any  doubt.  He  again  picked  





“—lawsuit   by   Mick,   who   can   afford   and   is   accustomed   to  
litigation  of  that  nature  […]”  
“Runciter!”  Joe  said.  He  said  it  loudly.  
“—unable  to  verify  probably  for  at  least—”  
Joe  hung  up.  (99)  
The  fact  that  Runciter  goes  on  talking  without  being  aware  of  the  presence  of  
an  interlocutor  links  this  scene  to  the  first  scene  in  the  moratorium,  at  the  very  
beginning  of   the  novel.  When  Vogelsang  checks  a  casket  in  order   to  be  sure  
that  the  woman  inside  is  still  ‘functioning’,  he  intercepts  her  voice,  but  she  does  
not  realize  that  someone  is  listening  to  her.  After  another,  equally  unsuccessful  
communication  attempt  at  talking  to  Runciter  on  the  phone,  Joe  receives  a  visit  
from  Vogelsang,  who  wants  to  update  him  on  Runciter’s  conditions:  «“I   just  
don’t  understand  it,  Mr.  Chip.  We  worked  all  night  in  relays.  We  just  are  not  
getting  a  single  spark.  […]  So  the  afterlife  is  there,  but  we  still  can’t  seem  to  tap  
it»  (101).  In  the  language  of  telecommunications,  the  verb  ‘to  tap’  refers  to  the  
act   of   intercepting  a  phone   call:   after   the  representation  of   two  monologues  
that  fail  to  couple  in  the  electronic  dimension,  the  telephone  logic  permeates  
the  semiotic  construction  of  half-­‐‑life  to  an  even  deeper  level.  In  the  world  of  
the   living,   telephone   communications   with   the   half-­‐‑lifers   are   haunted   by  
ontological  uncertainties  that  problematize  the  relation  between  two  planes  of  
existence.   In   the   world   of   half-­‐‑life,   the   semiotics   of   (failed)   telephone  
communications  structure  the  attempts  at  putting  the  two  planes  of  existence  
in  contact.  
In  the  end,  the  hotel  room  telephone  makes  its  last  and  most  uncanny  
appearance  three  pages  after  the  arrive  of  Vogelsang.  He  wants  to  understand  
what  is  wrong  with  Joe’s  phone.  Joe  handles  the  receiver  to  him,  but  Runciter’s  





“[Vogelsang:]  I  don’t  hear  anything.  Not  even  a  dial  tone.  Now  I  
hear  a  little  static.  As  if  from  a  great  distance.  Very  faint.”  He  held  
the   receiver   out   to   Joe,  who   took   it   and   also   listened.  He,   too,  
heard  only  the  far-­‐‑off  static.  From  thousands  of  miles  away,  he  
thought.   Eerie.   As   perplexing   in   its   own   way   as   the   voice   of  
Runciter—if  that  was  what  it  had  been  (104).  
Like  in  Valdemar,  the  great  distance  that  seems  to  separate  Joe  from  the  
point  of  origin  of  the  static  translates  the  immeasurable  distance  that  separates  
Joe’s   plane   of   existence   from   that   of   the   living.   In   the   static,   the   gap   that  
separates   the   two  worlds   becomes  material   and   accessible   to   perception   by  
taking  the  form  of  a  gap  between  two  lines  that  cannot  connect  with  each  other.  
By   listening   to   the  gap   that  Peters   (2000)  describes  as   the  consequence  of  an  
electronic   breakdown,   Joe   is   listening   to   the   sound   of   the   distance   that  
separates   ‘here’  and   ‘elsewhere’.  And  if   this  distance  cannot  be  bridged,   the  
elsewhere  risks  to  turn  into  a  nowhere,  a  monadic  dimension  with  no  relations  
outside   itself:   «[t]he   common   world   may   be   habitual   and   sound,   but  
breakdown  allows  all  the  primal  uncanniness  to  return.  In  a  blackout,  or  the  
telephone’s  suddenly  going  dead,  or  the  static  caught  between  the  stations,  we  
discover  the  gaps,  not  the  bridges»  (Peters  2000,  205).  
  
4.2   Through the looking screen 
Of  all   the  media   technologies   that   the   texts  of   the   corpus  mobilize   in  
order  to  bridge  the  gap  between  r.s.  and  the  world  of  the  living,  those  related  
to  television  and  screens  are  evidently  the  most  multifaceted.  No  technology  
has  probably  contributed  to  the  contemporary  redefinition  of  Western  notions  





just   as   the   photograph   did   in   the   last   century,   so   in   this   one,  
cinematic  and  electronic  screens  differently  demand  and  shape  
our   "ʺpresence"ʺ   to   the  world   and   our   representation   in   it.   Each  
differently   and   objectively   alters   our   subjectivity   while   each  
invites   our   complicity   in   formulating   space,   time,   and   bodily  
investment  as  significant  personal  and  social  experience.  These  
preliminary  remarks  are  grounded  in  the  belief  that,  during  the  
last   century,  historical   changes   in  our   contemporary   "ʺsense"ʺ  of  
temporality,   spatiality,   and   existential   and   embodied   presence  
cannot  be  considered  less  than  a  consequence  of  correspondent  
changes   in   our   technologies   of   representation   (Sobchack   1990,  
51).  
  Television  stands  out  among  all  the  other  telecommunication  devices  
preceding  it,  as  it  gives  the  most  believable  illusion  of  an  actual  place  (or  even  
another  world)  existing  on  the  other  side  of  the  screen.  More  than  any  other  
electronic  elsewhere,  those  created  by  television  truly  seemed  to  be  animated  
by  a  logic  of  their  own  and  inhabited  by  mysterious  entities:  
  
Whereas   radio   and   telegraphy   had   always   provided   indexical  
evidence  of  distant  places  and   invisible   interlocutors   (occult  or  
otherwise),   television   appeared   at   once   visibly   and  materially  
“real”   even   as   viewers   realized   it   was   wholly   electrical   and  
absent.  Unnervingly  immediate  and  decidedly  more  tangible,  the  
“electronic   elsewhere”   generated   by   television   was   thus   more  
palpable  and  yet  every  bit  as  phantasmic  as  the  occult  empires  of  
previous   media.   Its   ghosts   were   truly   ghosts   —entities   with  
visible  form  but  without  material  substance  (Sconce  2000,  126).  
  
Whereas   earlier   audio   technologies   served   primarily   as   a  
fantastic  yet   essentially   "ʺneutral"ʺ   conduit   for   channeling  occult  
forms   of   communications   (be   they   ghosts   or   aliens),   "ʺsighted"ʺ  
media  such  as  television  often  appeared  as  haunted  technologies  





electronic   entities   or   as   crucibles   for   forging  wholly   sovereign  
electronic  universes  (126).  
From   a   more   general   perspective,   television   also   integrates   in   the   media  
landscape   two   of   the   founding   cognitive   metaphors   that   structure   vision,  
perception,   and   spatial   relations   in   Western   culture:   the   window   and   the  
screen.  For  example,  the  very  first  scene  of  the  TV  series  Les  Revenants  (Gobert  
2012),  represents  resurrection  as  the  act  of  breaking  through  the  glass  surface  
separating  an   inside  and  an  outside.   In   an  unidentified   interior,   the   camera  
slowly  moves  towards  a  collection  of  framed  butterflies,  until  the  edges  of  the  
collection  frame  correspond  to  those  of  the  cinematic  image.  At  this  point,  one  
of  the  butterflies  comes  back  to  life,  breaks  the  frame  glass,  and  flies  away.  In  
Iain  Bank’s  The  Bridge,  the  TV  set  in  the  protagonist’s  apartment  is  animated  by  
a  mysterious  will  of  its  own.  It  switches  itself  on,  showing  on  every  channel  the  
image  of  a  man  in  a  coma.  Orr  doesn’t  know  that  this  man  is  actually  himself,  
and   that   these   television   images   are   the   only   elements   that   connect   his  
consciousness  in  the  world  of  the  bridge  to  his  former,  living  self:    
The   television  starts   to  hiss.   I   turn  round.  A  grey  haze   fills   the  
screen,  white  noise   issues   from   the   speaker.  Perhaps   the   set   is  
faulty.  I  go  to  turn  it  off,  but  then  a  picture  appears.  There  is  no  
sound;   the   hiss   has   gone.   The   screen   shows   a  man   lying   in   a  
hospital  bed,  surrounded  by  machines.  It  is  in  black  and  white,  
not  colour,  and  grainy.  I  turn  up  the  sound,  but  only  a  very  gentle  
hiss  emerges  even  at  maximum  volume.  The  man  in  the  bed  has  
tubes  and  pipes  appearing  from  his  nose  and  mouth  and  arm;  his  
eyes  are  closed  […].  On  every  channel  the  picture  stays  the  same:  
still  the  man,  the  bed,  the  surrounding  machines.  […]  The  fellow  
looks   at  death’s  door;   even   in  monochrome  his   face   is   terribly  
pale,  and  his  thin  hands  -­‐‑  lying  motionless  on  the  white  bedsheet,  
one  with  a  tube  attached  at  the  wrist  -­‐‑  are  almost  transparent.  […]  





have   a   crossed   line  with   one   of   the   hospital   cameras   used   to  
monitor  very  ill  patients.  I’ll  call  the  repair  people  in  the  morning.  
(Banks  [1986]  2013,  40).  
The   text  of   the   corpus  whose  aesthetic   effect   relies   the  most  on  a  pervasive  
isotopy   related   to   the   electronic   presence   on   screen   is   Wally   Pfister’s  
Transcendence.   The   semiotic   and   technological   encounter   between   the  
informatization  of  consciousness,  artificial  intelligence,  and  the  internet  leads  
to  the  creation  of  a  r.s.  in  which  the  undead’s  presence  has  become  completely  
fluid   and   independent   from   a   definite   physical   center.   After   leaving   his  
physical  body  in  order  to  inhabit  the  web,  will  can  manifest  himself  through  
any  connected  device.  As  a  consequence,  the  semiotic  construction  of  such  a  
non-­‐‑centered  presence  strictly  depends  on  its  materialization  in  an  avatar  form.  
At  the  end  of  the  film,  Will  will  succeed  in  recovering  an  individual,  physical  
presence,  only  to  be  killed  again.  The  tension  between  these  two  opposite  poles  
that  animates  the  whole  narrative  (fluidity  and  absence  of  a  center  on  the  one  
hand,   bodily   individualization   on   the   other)   is   mainly   mediated   by   the  
thematization  of  Will’s  visual  presence  on  the  screens  of  monitors,  televisions,  
smartphones,   and   tablets   (Petricola   2018;   several   essays   in   Hauskeller,  
Philbeck,  and  Carbonell  2015).    
The   semiotic   pole   of   centerlessness   and   pure   disembodiment   is  
activated  by  representations  of  Will’s  avatar  that  emphasize  its  immateriality  
and  absence  of  concreteness:  he  is  constructed  as  an  aggregate  of  pixels  that  
could  dissolve  at  any  moment.  This  representation  is  also  explicitly  thematized  
in  an  embodied  form  in  a  nightmare  experienced  by  Will’s  wife,  Evelyn:  while  
the   two   are   in   bed,   Will’s   body   is   vaporized   and   turned   into   a   haze   of  





and   embodiment   is   mediated   by   representations   involving   physical  
interactions  between  the  living  characters  and  the  screens  that  vehiculate  Will’s  
presence.  A  sequence  in  which  Evelyn  ‘caresses’  Will  by  touching  the  screen  
on  which  he  is  being  visualized  can  be  considered  as  particularly  relevant  in  
this  respect.  The  association  between  the   liveness  of   instant  transmission  and  
the  aliveness  of  the  object  represented  that  is  implicit  in  this  sequence  depends,  
in   turn,   on   the   «impression   of   immediate,   intimate,   and   continuous   contact  
with   another   world»   created   by   the   semiotics   of   television:   «this   sense   of  
immediacy   has  made   the   “living  medium”   a   prime   conduit   for   the   “living  
word”»  (Sconce  2000,  174).  
Whereas  in  Transcendence  the  screen  isotopy  is  ceaselessly  deployed  and  
manipulated  for  the  whole  duration  of  the  film,  Ubik  condenses  it  in  a  single  
sequence  at   the   center  of   the  novel,  where   a   television   commercial  marks   a  
major  turning  point  in  the  narrative.    
4.2.1   An advertisement for the undead: watching television in Ubik 
I  said  that  the  appearance  of  television  in  the  novel  is  quite  brief  but  very  
dense  from  a  semiotic  point  of  view,  as  it  takes  place  in  a  moment  of  crucial  
importance  for  the  development  of  the  plot.  Indeed,  it  is  thanks  to  a  television  
commercial   that   Joe   Chip   learns   about   the   existence   of   the   reality-­‐‑support  
spray  Ubik  and  Glen  Runciter  is  able  to  entrust  him  with  the  task  of  finding  it.  
I  would   like   to  show  how  television—once  again,  as  both  a  medium  and  an  
object—contributes  to  the  semiotic  construction  of  half-­‐‑life  and  its  relation  to  
the  world  of  the  living.  As  for  the  first  point,  the  spectral  space  created  by  the  
televisual  flux  of  information  could  be  interpreted  as  a  representation  en  abîme  





semiotics.  As  for  the  second  point,  the  polarity  between  inside  and  outside  that  
structures  the  half-­‐‑lifer’s  notion  of  their  r.s.  can  be  put  in  relation  to  the  polarity  
between   the   ‘real’   world   and   the   ‘world’   of   television   articulated   by   the   tv  
screen.  
The  scene  takes  place  in  the  Runciter  Associates  headquarters  in  New  
York;  or  rather,  this  is  where  Joe  Chip  thinks  he  is.  He  has  just  found  the  graffiti  
in  the  men’s  room  that  says  «Jump  the  Urinal  and  Stand  on  Your  Head.  /  I’m  
the  One  That’s  Alive.  You’re  All  Dead».  In  that  same  bathroom,  he  had  to  part  
from  his  dying  friend  Al  Hammond.  Joe  enters  the  building’s  conference  room,  
where  a  television  with  a  large  3-­‐‑d  color  screen  is  on,  and  a  commercial  is  being  
broadcast:  
a  housewife  critically  examined  a  synthetic  otter-­‐‑pelt  towel  and  
in  a  penetrating,  shrill  voice  declared  it  unfit  to  occupy  a  place  in  
her   bathroom.   The   screen   then   displayed   her   bathroom   –   and  
picked  up  graffiti  on  her  bathroom  wall  too.  The  same  familiar  
scrawl,  this  time  reading:  
LEAN  OVER  THE  BOWL  
AND  THEN  TAKE  A  DIVE.  
ALL  OF  YOU  ARE  DEAD.  I  AM  ALIVE  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  129).  
The  advertisement   is   immediately   followed  by  a  newscast.   Joe   learns  
that,  contrary  to  what  the  graffiti  just  said,  Runciter  is  dead:  his  body  has  been  
transported   to  a  mortuary  in  Des  Moines,  his  hometown,  and  all  his   friends  
and  former  employees  are  there  to  pay  their  respects.  At  the  end  of  the  report,  
Chip   turns   the   television   off.   The   next   moment,   however,   it   seems   to  
spontaneously  animate.  
The  TV  screen  relit.  Much  to  his  surprise;  he  had  not  repressed  
the  pedal  switch.  And  in  addition,  it  changed  channels:   images  





mysterious  agency  was  satisfied.  The  final  image  remained.  The  
face  of  Glen  Runciter.  “Tired  of  lazy  tastebuds?”  Runciter  said  in  
his  familiar  gravelly  voice.  “Has  cabbage  taken  over  your  world  
of   food?   That   same   old,   stale,   flat,   Monday-­‐‑morning   odor   no  
matter  how  many  dimes  you  put  in  your  stove?  Ubik  changes  all  
that;   Ubik   wakes   up   flavor,   puts   hearty   taste   back   where   it  
belongs,  and  restores  fine  food  smell.”  On  the  screen  a  brightly  
colored  spray  can  replaced  Glen  Runciter.  
Runciter   goes   on   explaining   to   Chip   why   he   is   experiencing   the  
regression  of  his  world  to  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century.  Then  «a  hard-­‐‑
eyed  housewife  with  big  teeth  and  horse’s  chin»  appears  on  screen,  exclaiming:  
«“I  came  over   to  Ubik  after   trying  weak,  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑date  reality  supports»   (134).  
The  housewife  goes  on  with  her  praise  of  Ubik  until  Runciter  takes  the  lead  
once  again:    
“[Runciter:]So  look  for  it,  Joe.  Don’t  just  sit  there;  go  out  and  buy  
a  can  of  Ubik  and  spray  it  all  around  you  night  and  day.”    
Standing   up,   Joe   said   loudly,   “You   know   I’m   here.   Does   that  
mean  you  can  hear  and  see  me?”  
“Of   course   I   can’t   hear   you   and   see   you.   This   commercial  
message  is  on  videotape  […]”  
“Then  you  really  are  dead”  
“Of   course,   I’m   dead.  Didn’t   you  watch   the   telecast   from  Des  
Moines  just  now?”  (134-­‐‑135).  
For   a   few   moments,   Glen’s   answers   correspond   perfectly   to   Joe’s  
questions:  the  two  seem  to  be  having  an  actual  conversation.  But  Glen  rapidly  
de-­‐‑synchronizes   from  the  conversation;   Joe  comes   to   the  conclusion   that  his  
employer   is   really   just   on   tape,   and   abandons   all   efforts   to   continue   the  
communication.  
In  this  scene,  Runciter  temporarily  establishes  a  link  between  the  world  





television  epiphany.  His  attempt  to  make  contact  with  Joe  takes  the  form  of  an  
impossible   communication   in   which   live   and   pre-­‐‑recorded   transmissions  
intersect  and  superpose.  The  most  evident  manipulation  to  which  the  medium  
is  subjected  resides  in  its  transformation  from  a  device  for  mass  broadcasting  
into   an   apparatus   for   a   private   communication   between   two   individuals.  
Whereas   the   televisual   flux  is  by  definition  addressed   to  a  more  or  less  vast  
number  of  viewers,  Runciter  infiltrates  the  medium  to  deliver  a  message  that  
is   specifically   addressed   to   Joe   and   to   nobody   else.   At   the   same   time,   the  
television   viewer   cannot   watch   a   television   program   and   think   that   the  
transmission   is  personally  addressed   to  her/him,  because  such  a  behavior  is  
likely  to  entail  a  diagnosis  of  schizophrenia:    
another  familiar  theme  involving  the  media’s  awesome  powers  
of   animated   ‘living’  presence   [is   that  of]   the  delusional  viewer  
who   believes   the   media   is   speaking   directly   to   him   or   her.   A  
common   symptom   among   schizophrenics,   this   delusion   also  
foregrounds  in  exaggerated  but  obviously  compelling  terms  the  
powers  of  ‘liveness’  and  ‘immediacy’  experienced  by  audiences  
of  electronic  media  as  a  whole  (Sconce  2000,  3).  
Two  more  factors  contribute  to  the  complex  semiotics  of  this  communicative  
situation.  The  first  one  revolves  around  the  fact  that  Runciter’s  message  is  not  
aimed  at  dispelling  the  ontological  uncertainty  that  has  been  haunting  Joe  since  
the  explosion  on  Luna,  but  rather  at  restating  it.  First  Runciter  affirms  being  
the  only  survivor  of  the  attack  («All  of  you  are  dead,  I  am  alive»),  then  being  
the  only  victim  («Of  course,  I’m  dead).  But  what  is  more  important—and  more  
relevant  to  the  study  of  the  television  as  medium  in  this  sequence—is  that  the  
narrative  translates  the  polarity  life/death  into  the  polarity  live/recorded,  thus  





television.  Such  a  translation  is  catalyzed  by  the  construction  of  an  impossible  
televisual  experience:  a  fragment  of  live  transmission  temporarily  infiltrates  a  
commercial,   which   by   definition   is   always   pre-­‐‑recorded   and   iteratively  
broadcast   at   a   later   time.   This   strategy   takes   to   the   extreme   the   converge  
between  live  and  liveness50  that  has  already  been  remarked  in  the  analysis  of  
Transcendence.  Joe  must  choose  one  between  two  options:  if  Runciter  is  really  
transmitting  live  from  somewhere,  this  means  that  he  is  actually  alive;  if,  on  
the  contrary,  the  transmission  is  recorded,  Runciter  is  gone  for  good.  In  such  a  
communication,  live  and  liveness  do  not  simply  tend  to  converge:  they  become  
perfectly  coincident.  
Now   that   the   multiple   tangles   of   contradictions   that   turn   Runciter’s  
transmission  into  an  impossible  technological  chimera  have  been  pinpointed,  
I  would  like  to  shift  the  focus  of  my  attention  on  the  culturally  relevant  link  
existing   between   television’s   textual   flux   and   the   possibility   for   it   to   be  
animated  by  a  «mysterious  agency».  The  latter’s  presence  is  characterized  in  
such   a   way   as   to   evoke   an   analogy   with   the   presence   generated   by   the  
«nebulous»  homeostatic  entity  in  Joe’s  apartment.  Both  adjectives  suggest  that  
it  is  impossible  for  the  listener/viewer  to  form  a  clear  mental  image  of  the  entity  
with  which  they  are  interacting.  Just  like  the  voice  of  the  homeostatic  entity,  
the   agency   that   animates   the   television   set   seems   to   come   less   from   an  
electronic   elsewhere   and  more   from   an   indeterminate   nowhere.   In   order   to  
further  explore  this  characterization,  one  more  comparison  could  be  suggested.  
                                                                                              
  





The  behavior  of  Ubik’s  television,  that  spontaneously  animates  itself  (the  term  
behavior  is  not  to  be  intended  in  a  metaphorical  sense!)  could  remind  a  non-­‐‑
fictional  experience  made  every  week  by  American  tv  viewers,  between  1963  
and  1965,  when  watching  the  opening  credits  sequence  of  The  Outer  Limits.  The  
screen   shows   a   simple   point   of   light   in   the   middle   of   the   frame,   which  
progressively  transforms  into  more  elaborate  patterns  while  a  ‘control  voice’,  
both  reassuring  and  commanding,  addresses  the  viewer  as  follows:    
There  is  nothing  wrong  with  your  television  set.  Do  not  attempt  
to  adjust  the  picture.  We  are  controlling  transmission.  If  we  wish  
to  make   it   louder,  we  will  bring  up   the  volume.   If  we  wish   to  
make  it  softer,  we  will  tune  it  to  a  whisper.  We  will  control  the  
horizontal.  We  will  control   the  vertical.  We  can  roll   the  image,  
make  it  flutter.  We  can  change  the  focus  to  a  soft  blur  or  sharpen  
it   to   crystal   clarity.   For   the   next   hour,   sit   quietly   and  we  will  
control   all   that   you   see   and   hear.  We   repeat:   there   is   nothing  
wrong  with  your  television  set.  You  are  about  to  participate  in  a  
great   adventure.   You   are   about   to   experience   the   awe   and  
mystery  which  reaches  from  the  inner  mind  to  the  outer  limits.  
In   this   opening   sequence,   a   «mysterious   agency»   analogous   to   the   one   that  
governs  Joe’s  television  set  seems  to  literally  take  control  of  our  own  television  
set.  This  perfectly  illustrates  how  much  of  the  aesthetic  and  speculative  impact  
of   series   like   The   Outer   Limits   and   The   Twilight   Zone   are   grounded   in   the  
construction  of  television  as  a  space  which  concretely  exists  beyond  the  screen,  
a  space  inhabited  by  otherworldly  life  forces:  
To  be  in  “the  twilight  zone”  is  now,  of  course,  a  part  of  American  
folklore,  describing  any  place  or  situation  marked  by  the  weird  
and   uncanny.   That   original   “twilight”   space,   however,   was  
television   itself.   The   exact   wording   of   Serling’s   opening  
introduction   changed   over   the   course   of   the   series,   but   never  





and  between”  liminality  that  cast  the  program  (and  its  viewers)  
as  occupying  an  “elsewhere”,  or  even  a  “nowhere”  (Sconce  2000,  
134).  
From  this  perspective,  television  could  be  interpreted  as  being  in  itself  a  space  
in   between   life   and   death.   If   this   observation   is   applied   to  Ubik,   television  
represents  here  a  liminal  space  within  the  liminal  space  of  half-­‐‑life.  It  would  be  
thus  possible  to  affirm  that  Ubik  constructs  television  as  a  genuine  mise  en  abîme  
of  half-­‐‑life  itself.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  television  commercial  
presents  a  much  more  literal  example  of  mise  en  abîme:  a  graffiti  analogous  to  
the   one   that   Joe   and  Al  Hammond   have   seen   in   the   bathroom   of   Runciter  
Associates.  As  a  consequence,  describing  the  semiotics  of  television  in  Dick’s  
novel  corresponds  to  describing  the  very  semiotics  of  this  residual  condition.  
As  Joe  watches  Runciter’s  electronic  spectre  on  television,  he  contemplates  the  
contradictions  of  his  own  liminal  existence.  The  television’s  textual  flux  casts  
Glen  Runciter  as  the  inhabitant  of  an  oxymoron-­‐‑world,  an  electronic  ‘limbo  of  
the  living’,  that  paradoxically  serves  not  as  a  means  for  the  dead  to  come  back  
to  the  living,  but  rather  as  a  means  for  the  living  to  get  through  to  the  dying.  
If  the  study  of  the  intratextual  representation  of  television  corresponds  
to  the  study  of  how  a  plane  of  existence  is  constructed  and  put  in  relation  to  
other   planes,   then   by   shifting   the   focus   towards   the   sheer   materiality   of  
television   as   a   concrete   object,   one   could   further   investigate   the   structural  
metaphors  that  the  medium  can  generate.  It  has  already  been  noticed  that  Jory  
Miller  conceptualizes   the  relation  between   life  and  half-­‐‑life  according   to   the  
polarity  inside/outside.  Such  a  dichotomy  recurs  in  the  novel  in  at  least  another  
significant   occasion.   Immediately   after   the   end   of   Runciter’s   television  





all   at   once   like   an   ineffectual  moth,   fluttering  at   the  windowpane  of   reality,  
dimly  seeing  it  from  outside»  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  136).  If  we  read  this  passage  in  
the  light  of  what  Joe  Chip  has  just  experienced,  the  television  set  can  operate  
as  a  powerful  metaphor,  enriching  the  dialectic  inside/outside  and  providing  
it   with   a   concrete,   material   referent.   On   the   basis   of   the   interpretation   of  
television   as   a   ‘twilight   zone’   and   a  mysterious   space,   the   television   screen  
could  be  seen  as   the  perfect  materialization  of   the  «windowpane  of   reality»,  
that  is,  of  the  surface  that  separates  the  electronic  elsewhere(s)  of  television—
the  inside—from  the  world  inhabited  by  the  viewers  (the  outside).  
This   polarity   and   the  metaphor   that   underlies   it   seems   to   undergo   a  
slight  but  quite  important  transformation  in  one  of  the  last  pages  of  the  novel,  
when  Ella  Runciter  tells  to  Joe  that  Jory  «“[…]  has  to  be  fought  on  our  side  of  the  
glass,  [b]y  those  of  us  in  half-­‐‑life,  those  that  Jory  preys  on.”  (218).  By  activating  
an  intuitive  reference  to  Lewis  Carrol’s  Through  the  Looking  Glass,  Ella  Runciter  
metaphorically  constructs  life  and  half-­‐‑life  as  two  spaces  separated  by  a  glass  
that   are,   nevertheless,   part   of   the   same   whole.   Depending   on   the  
circumstances,   the   glass   is   sometimes   clear   and   sometimes   opaque.   In  
contemporary   cinema,   directors   like   Tobe   Hooper,   David   Cronenberg   and  
Hideo  Nakata  have  made  an  excellent  use  of  this  metaphor  by  fluidifying  the  
television   screen   and   creating   characters   that   can   literally   cross   the   looking  
glass  of  television.  
In   conclusion,   Dick’s   novel   mocks   the   reader’s   sense   of   realism   by  
suspending  reality  itself  at   the  edge  of   the  void:  what   if   the  world   in  which  
Runciter  is  trying  to  get  in  contact  with  Joe  is  just  another  half-­‐‑life,  just  another  





disappear  in  the  blink  of  an  eye,   just  like  every  television  program  could,  at  
any   time,  disappear   into   the  monotonous  void  of   the  static.  This   is   the  only  
thing   of   which   one   can   be   certain,   as   Al  Hammond   realizes   before   dying:  
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Appendix: a summary in French 
translation 
La  présente   étude   s’appuie   sur   une   observation   préliminaire  :   le   fait   que   la  
construction,  éminemment  culturelle,  de  la  catégorie  «  mort  vivant  »  ne  prend  
pas  en  considération  une  partie  très  intéressante  de  la  production  littéraire  et  
artistique  de  la  période  XVIIIᵉ-­‐‑XXIᵉ  siècles.  Cette  production  est  habitée  par  des  
personnages,   des   mondes   et   des   récits   qui   non   seulement   déstabilisent  
l’opposition  binaire  essentielle  de  l’identité  humaine,  la  limite  entre  la  vie  et  la  
mort   étant   brouillée,   mais   qui   accomplissent   cette   trouble   en   dehors   de   la  
taxonomie  traditionnelle  qui  encadre  les  identités  des  morts-­‐‑vivants.  
Nous   visons   alors   l’analyse   de   ce   côté   périphérique   de   l’imagination  
thanatologique,  et  l’individuation  de  ses  origines  dans  le  processus  culturel  qui  
a  redéfini  la  frontière  entre  la  vie  et  la  mort  à  partir  de  la  deuxième  moitié  du  




corpus  de  romans,  nouvelles  et  films  de  l’area  anglosaxon  que  nous  conduisent  
à  réfléchir  aux  modalités  de  représentation  de  l’intermédialité  du  statut  entre  
la   vie   et   la  mort   dans   la   fiction,   à   partir   de  Valdemar   par   Poe   à  The  Hunter  
Gracchus  par  Kafka,  de  Ubik  par  Dick  to  Harry  Potter  and  the  Chamber  of  Secrets  
par  Rowling,  de   Jacob’s  Ladder  par  Adrien  Lyne   to  Swiss  Army  Man  par  Dan  
Kwan.  
Après   une   section   introductive,   où   nous   proposons   d’appeler   la  
catégorie  qui  recueille  ces  textes  «  statuts  résiduels  entre  la  vie  et  la  mort  »  (r.s.),  
nous  présentons  une  généalogie  culturelle  de  la  r.s.  à  travers  l’étude  de  textes  
médicales,  à  partir  de  l’Essai  sur  l’incertitude  des  signes  de  la  mort  de  Jacques-­‐‑Jean  
Bruhier  (1752)   jusqu’à  Into  the  Grey  Zone  d’Adrian  Owen  (2017).  Par-­‐‑là,  nous  
montrerons  comment  les  technologies  et  les  médias  forment  la  sémiotique  des  
r.s.  dans  les  textes  de  la  science-­‐‑fiction,  comment  les  espaces  des  zones  d’entre-­‐‑
deux  entre  qui  séparent  la  vie  de  la  mort  sont  construits,  et  comment  ces  zones  
peuvent  devenir  un  lieu  crucial  pour  la  redéfinition  de  l’immanent  et  du  divin,  
vue  la  mise  en  fiction  du  processus  de  la  mort,  et  aussi  pour  s’interroger  sur  
l’idée  occidentale  du  soi-­‐‑même  et  du  réalisme.  La  conclusion  de  notre  travail  
esquisse  finalement  une  théorie  sur  la  pluralisation  ontologique  en  relation  à  
la  fiction  speculative.  
  
Le   vivant,   le  mort,   le  mort  vivant   et   tous   les   autres  :   les   critères  de  
composition  du  corpus  
  
La  construction  de  l’opposition  binaire  «  vivant  contre  mort  »  à  travers  




étape  fondamentale  pour  le  développement  de  la  culture  humaine.  Sa  fonction  
est  la  même  de  celle  de  l’opposition  «  être  humain  vs  animal  »  :  elle  transforme  
l’individu   en   membre   d’un   groupe   social   et   culturel,   c’est-­‐‑à-­‐‑dire   la  
communauté  des  hommes  vivant.  Cette  dernière  est  définie  par  son  opposition  
cruciale  :  d’un  côté,  la  communauté  des  animaux,  de  l’autre  celle  de  la  mort.  La  
relation   entre   le   monde   des   êtres   vivant   et   celui   des   morts   est   établie   et  
maintenue  par  des  figures  sociales  tel  que  le  chaman,  tandis  que  les  rituels  de  
passage   visent   la   séparation   entre   les   deux  mondes  :   il   faut   que   les   morts  
n’aient  pas  le  pouvoir  d’hanter  les  vivants.  Cependant,  malgré  ces  efforts,  il  est  
possible  que  des  violations  à  cette  opposition  binaire  se  produisent.  Ce  sont  
des  événements  qui  relâchent  certaines  de  nos  peurs  les  plus  primitives,  mais  
qui   restent   une   source   inépuisable   d’horreur   et   de  mystère.   L’agent   de   ces  
violations   ontologiques   et   culturelles   est   ce   que   nous   appelons   «  le   mort  
vivant  ».  
Dans   ce   contexte   culturel,   la   fiction   spéculative   a   représenté   depuis  
plusieurs   siècles   une   pratique   très   importante   pour   la   construction   et   la  
prolifération  des  entités  qui  enfreignent  la  polarité  «  vie  vs  mort  ».  Toutefois,  
la   notion   actuelle   de   «  morts-­‐‑vivants  »,   même   si   elle   s’étend   aux   discours  
culturels  et  académiques,  ne  permet  pas  de  s’occuper  que  d’un  nombre  assez  
réduit  de  ces  entités  :  fantômes,  vampires,  zombies,  momies,  démons  et   très  
peu  d’autres.  
La  présente  étude  s’appuie  sur  une  observation  préliminaire  :  le  fait  que  
la   construction,   éminemment   culturelle,   de   la   catégorie   «  mort   vivant  »   ne  
prend   pas   en   considération   une   partie   très   intéressante   de   la   production  




habitée   par   des   personnages,   des   mondes   et   des   récits   qui   non   seulement  
déstabilisent   l’opposition   binaire   essentielle   de   l’identité   humaine,   la   limite  
entre  la  vie  et  la  mort  étant  brouillée,  mais  qui  accomplissent  cette  trouble  en  
dehors   de   la   taxonomie   traditionnelle   qui   encadre   les   identités   des   morts-­‐‑
vivants.  Notre  étude  vise  alors  l’élaboration  d’une  nouvelle  catégorie  au  sein  
de   l’imagination   culturelle  :   le   mort-­‐‑vivant   résiduel.   Les   membres   de   cette  
classe  sont  ceux  qui  sont  restés  aux  marges  du  processus  de  catégorisation  qui  
a  fait  surgir  un  corpus  de  figures  prototypiques  au  centre  de  la  culture  du  nord  
Atlantique,  et  qui  a  déplacé   les   textes  qui  ne  rencontrent  pas   les  paramètres  
prédéterminés  vers  la  périphérie.  
Appelé  à  se  confronter  avec  un  territoire  inexploré,  la  chose  la  meilleure  
à  faire  serait  peut-­‐‑être  d’élaborer  une  carte.  Mais  l’idée  de  «  cartographier  »  un  
champ  encore  inexploré  de  récits  implique  une  double  métaphore  :  l’objet  de  
l’étude  est  conçu  comme  un  lieu,  dans  le  sens  géographique,  et  le  chercheur  est  
un  cartographe.  Nous  croyons,  par  contre,  que  l’objet  de  cette  étude  se  présente  
plutôt   comme  une  masse  de  points   apparemment   isolés   les  uns  des   autres  ;  
ainsi,   le   chercheur   est   celui   qui   connecte   ces   points   afin   de   dessiner   des  
constellations  et  des  réseaux.  Ces  diagrammes  textuels  ont  été  rédigés  sur  la  
base  de  deux  questions  que  nous  nous  sommes  posées  :  comment  les  statuts  
résiduels   entre   la   vie   et   la   mort   sont   rendus   culturellement   possibles  ?   Et  
comment   sont-­‐‑ils   construits   dans   la   fiction  ?   j’ai   essayé   de   répondre   à   ces  
questions  en  dressant  des  analogies,  des  récurrences  et  des  polarités,  aussi  bien  
qu’en   produisant   un   contexte   pour   l’étude   de   ces   éléments   à   travers   les  
instruments  de  la  généalogie  culturelle.  Nous  nous  concentrerons  surtout  sur  




vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   des   morts-­‐‑vivants   traditionnels,   et   sur   les   perspectives   nouvelles  
qu’ils  peuvent  ouvrir  dans   la  mise   en   fiction  de   la   relation   entre   la  vie   et   la  
mort.  
Dans   le   premier   chapitre   nous   proposons   une  méthodologie   pour   la  
modélisation   des   catégories   périphériques,   et   nous   regardons   la   littérature  
comparée  par  l’objectif  de  l’herméneutique  queer.  Dans  le  chapitre  deux,  nous  
traçons   l’histoire   des   facteurs   culturels   qui   ont   déclenché   l’émergence   des  
statuts  résiduels  à  l’intérieur  au  sein  de  l’imagination  thanatologique.  Dans  le  
troisième   chapitre,   nous   avons   identifié   quelque   caractéristique   particulière  
des   statuts   résiduels   en   analysant   leurs   coordonnées   essentielles  :   temps   et  
espace.   Dans   le   chapitre   quatre,   nous   analysons   dans   le   détail   comment  
l’électricité  et  les  technologies  de  la  communication  sont  représentées  dans  les  
textes  du  corpus  et  comment  elles  construisent  la   relation  entre   le  «  ici  »  des  
vivants  et  l’  «  ailleurs  »  des  morts-­‐‑vivants  résiduels.  
La  présence  d’un  double  niveau  de  subversion  culturelle  à   l’intérieur  
des  récits  périphériques  qui  traitent  les  statuts  non-­‐‑traditionnels  entre  la  vie  et  
la   mort   érige   la   théorie   queer   à   instrument   herméneutique   essentiel   pour  
l’approche  à  ce  type  de  textes.  C’est  en  raison  de  cela  que  nous  nous  appuierons  
sur   l’herméneutique   queer   pour   la   construction   d’un   corpus   dans   la  
perspective   d’une   étude   comparée,   où   nous   analyserons   les   stratégies   de  
catégorisation  qui  rendent  cette  construction  possible.  Par  conséquence,  nous  
nous   concentrerons   sur   un   corpus   de   textes   résiduels   qui   thématisent   des  
conditions  d’expérience  comme  mort-­‐‑vivant  ;  ces  textes  constituent  la  base  de  




(abrégé  :  r.s.),  laquelle  nous  permettra  de  repenser  la  catégorie  «  mort-­‐‑vivant  »  
en  restructurant  sa  propre  taxonomie.  
D’abord,  la  construction  des  r.s.  sera  définie  par  l’intersection  de  deux  
approches  de   catégorisation  différents  ;   les  deux  ont   été  développés  dans   le  
champ   des   sciences   cognitives   à   partir   de   la   notion   de   «  ressemblance   de  
famille  »  élaborée  par  Wittgenstein  :  la  théorie  du  prototype  d’Eleanor  Rosch  
et  les  stratégies  de  classification  employées  par  George  Lakoff  dans  ses  études  
sur  la  langue  Dyirbal.  
Ensuite,   j’essayerai   de   faire   une   analyse   des   implications  
épistémologiques  qui  dérivent  de  la  restructuration  de  la  taxonomie  du  mort-­‐‑
vivant  à  la  lumière  de  la  notion  de  nonce  taxonomy  décrite  par  Eve  Sedgwick  
dans  Epistemology  of  the  Closet  (1990),  notion  qui  a  été  récemment  reconsidérée  
par  Carmen  Dell’Aversano.  Sedgwick  présente  la  nonce-­‐‑taxonomy  comme  une  
stratégie  pour  la  construction  des  identités  qui  sert  construire  une  médiation  
entre  le  besoin  de  conserver  l’unicité  de  chacun  des  êtres  humains  et  le  restreint  
nombre  des   axes  de   catégorisation  possibles  dans  notre   culture.  Cependant,  
même  si  Sedgwick  reconnaît  le  rôle  crucial  que  la  nonce-­‐‑taxonomy  détient  dans  
la  déconstruction  de  la  catégorie  «  l’individuel  »,  il  ne  fournit  aucun  contexte  
théorique  pour  la  description  de  cette  stratégie.  Dell’Aversano,  de  son  côté,  a  
récemment  repensé  la  définition  de  nonce-­‐‑taxonomy  en  montrant  comment  elle  
pourrait   fonctionner   comme   instrument   pour   la   segmentation   de   la   réalité  
personnelle,  selon  des  critères  tout  à  fait  idiosyncratiques.  
En  conclusion,  nous  croiserons  les  approches  à  la  catégorisation  dérivés  
des   sciences   cognitives   avec   ceux   élaborés   par   la   théorie   queer.  Nous   nous  




nonce  taxonomy  du  support  théorique  dont  elle  nécessite  ;  secundo,  comment  le  
champ   des   études   comparées   peut   être   repensées   à   travers   l’utilisation  
systématique  de  la  catégorisation  fondée  sur  le  prototype  et  la  nonce-­‐‑taxonomy.  
Notre   étude   démontrera   comment   l’analyse   de   l’herméneutique   des  
littératures  comparées  par  la  queer  théorie  –  définie  comme  une  boîte  à  outils  
qui  possède  «the  potential  to  subvert  accepted  ways  of  thinking  on  any  issue»  
(Dell’Aversano   2010,   74)   –   ouvre   à   des   perspectives   nouvelles   dans   le  
panorama  des  recherches  sur  la  fiction  par  le  fait  qu’elle  relève  la  connaissance  
sur   le   processus   de   catégorisation   qui   est   à   l’œuvre   dans   les   littératures  
comparées,  en  général,  et  dans  la  thématique,  en  particulier.  
Devant  la  question  «  Que  tu  pense  quand  je  parle  de  mort-­‐‑vivant  ?  »,  les  
personnes   normalement   répondent   avec   une   liste   de   figures   surnaturelles  
appartenant  au  genre  de  l’horreur  :  fantômes,  vampires,  zombies  et  momies.  
L’association   avec   les   zombies,   notamment,   est   carrément   immédiate.   Les  
adeptes   et   amateurs  du  genre  de   l’horreur  pourraient   ajouter  quelque  autre  
figure  mineure,  telle  que  la  ghoule  et  la  dame  blanche  ;  quelqu’un  mentionne  
Frankenstein.   Quand   on   demande   de   penser   à   d’autres   exemples  
n’appartenant   pas   au   monde   de   la   fiction   ou   du   surnaturel,   les   personnes  
répondent  parfois  avec  des  références  aux  expériences  de  mort  imminente  ou  
d’état  végétatif  permanent.  Cette  hiérarchie  cognitive  qui  s’est  emparé  de  la  
construction  de   la   catégorie  du  «  mort  vivant  »  ne   trouve  pas  d’explications  
dans   les   théories   «  classiques  »   de   catégorisation.   Selon   ces   théories,   les  
catégories  possèdent  des  limites  très  claires  et  se  définissent  par  le  partage  de  
certaines   caractéristiques   (Lakoff   1987,6).   Pour   être   vraiment   efficace,   ce  




élaborée   à   partir   de   la   notion   de   «  ressemblance   de   famille  ».   Rosch,  
notamment,  enrichit  le  modèle  de  catégorisation  de  Wittgenstein  introduisant  
le  concept  de  «  centralité  »,  défini  comme  «[t]he  idea  that  some  members  of  a  
category  may  be  ‘better  examples’  of  that  category  than  others»  (Lakoff  1987,  
12).  
Interprétant   la   différence   entre   des   membres   prototypiques   et   non-­‐‑
prototypiques  à  travers  une  métaphore  géographique,  une  catégorie  peut  être  
conçue  comme   la  zone  d’une  ville  :  elle  a  un  centre,  habité  par   les  membres  
prototypiques,   et   un   nombre   de   périphéries,   peuplées   par   les   non-­‐‑
prototypiques  membres.  Les  limites  qui  séparent  les  deux  zones  ne  sont  pas  
claires   ni   fixées,   mais   plutôt   brouillées   et   instables,   soumises   à   constants  
renégociations  culturelles.  
Si  nous  adoptons  la  métaphore  géographique  de  la  théorie  prototypique  
pour   considérer   la   façon   avec   laquelle   la   culture   occidentale   a   construit   la  
catégorie   de   mort-­‐‑vivant,   le   fantôme,   le   vampire   et   le   zombie   émergent  
clairement  comme  les  trois  membres  prototypiques  du  centre-­‐‑ville.  Chacune  
de  ces  figures  possède  une  identité  très  détaillée,  avec  de  traits  très  spécifiques  ;  
ils  appartiennent  à  une  tradition  littéraire  et  artistique  plus  ou  moins  récente  
qui  les  rend  immédiatement  reconnaissables.  Dernièrement,  ils  sont  devenus  
immensément  célèbres  dans  toutes  les  formes  de  fiction,  e,  par  conséquence,  
ils   sont   devenus   l’objet   d’étude   des   chercheurs   universitaires   de   plusieurs  
secteurs  disciplinaires.  
Si  l’individuation  du  centre  de  la  catégorie  «  mort-­‐‑vivant  »  est  presque  
intuitive,   toute   tentative   de   définir   les   périphéries   est   certainement   moins  




la   catégorie   au   point   de   rendre   ardue   la   conceptualisation   même   de   cette  
périphérie.  
Nous  essayerons  de  démontrer  que  cette  dernière  peut  être  construite  
sur  un  corpus  de   textes  qui  contiennent  des   figures,  à   l’apparence  isolées  et  
sans  lien  de  parenté,  qui  parsèment  le  monde  de  la  fiction  depuis  150  ans.  Le  
protagoniste  du  célèbre  conte  de  l’horreur  d’E.  A.  Poe  The  Facts  in  the  Case  of  
Mr.  Valdemar  (1845),  par  exemple,  est  subjugué  in  articulo  mortis  ;  son  existence  
tient  bon  plusieurs  mois  dans  un  état  de  suspension  hypnotique  après  la  mort  
de  son  corps.  Dans  les  fragments  de  der  Jäger  Gracchus  ([1931]  1993)  recueillis  
dans  son  journal,  Franz  Kafka  raconte  l’histoire  d’un  chasseur  qui  meurt  après  
être  tombé  dans  un  ravin,  mais,  à  cause  d’un  erreur  incompréhensible,   il  est  
impossibilité   à   atteindre   l’au-­‐‑delà   et   forcé   à   errer   dans   la   terre.   Joe  Chip,   le  
protagoniste   du   roman   science-­‐‑fictional   Ubik   (1969)   de   Philip   K.   Dick,   se  
retrouve   littéralement   congelé   dans   un   état   appelé   «  demi-­‐‑vie  »   après   une  
explosion.  Sa  conscience  est  séparée  du  monde  des  vivants  et  habite  un  nouvel  
plan   existentiel,   suspendu   entre   la   vie   et   la  mort.  Dans  Harry   Potter   and   the  
Chamber  of  Secrets  (1998)  par  J.  K.  Rowling,  le  magicien  Voldemort  manifeste  sa  
présence   à   travers   le   journal   de   Tom   Riddle,   un   objet   paradoxalement   vif  
contenant  un  morceau  de  l’âme  d’un  homme  mort.  
Au  sein  du  cinéma,  le  mystérieux  Jacobs’s  Ladder  (Lyne  1990)  plonge  le  
spectateur  dans  la  conscience  d’un  soldat  américain  au  moment  de  son  passage  
de   la  vie   à   la  mort,   tandis  que  dans  Transcendence   (2014)  de  Wally  Pfister   le  
messages  cérébraux  du  protagoniste  mourant  sont  transcrit  dans  le  software  
d’une  intelligence  artificielle  :  il  perd  son  corps  mortel  pour  habiter  l’Internet,  




Si  on  prend  en  considération  ces  textes  individuellement,  chacun  d’eux  
pourrait   apparaître   comme  une   exception,   un   bizarre   exercice  de   style,   une  
déviation   isolée  de  la  «  normale  »  conceptualisation  des  morts-­‐‑vivants.  Mais  
cela   ne   serait   qu’une   simplification   dictée   par   l’hégémonie   du   centre   de   la  
catégorie,   et   il   impliquerait   implicitement   la   négation   de   toutes   les   fortes  
composantes  culturelles  de  leurs  caractéristiques  :  ils  ne  seraient  que  de  traits  
oubliables,  trop  isolés  pour  nous  communiquer  quelque  chose  d’important  sur  
la  construction  de  la  polarité  de  «  vie  vs  mort  »  dans  la  culture  contemporaine.  
En  revanche,  nous  proposons  de  considérer  ces  textes  isolés  comme  un  corpus  
unique,   et   d’en   trouver   une   définition   qui   se   débarrasse   complètement   du  
paradigme  fantôme-­‐‑vampire-­‐‑zombie.  
Grâce   à   ça,   ils   ne   sont   plus   des   exceptions   au   sein   d'ʹune   catégorie  
dominante  :  ils  deviennent  les  membres  d'ʹune  nouvelle  catégorie,  les  «  statuts  
résiduels   entre   la   vie   et   la   mort  »,   ou   «  le   mort-­‐‑vivant   résiduel  ».   Cette  
définition  peut  être  utilisée  pour  identifier  personnages,  mondes  et  contextes  
liminales,   pourvus   de   qualités   particulières   qui   échappent   à   toute   tradition  
culturelle  bien  connue.  
Cette   stratégie   herméneutique   s'ʹinspire   de   premières   pages  
d’Epistemology   of   the   Closet,   où   Eve   Sedgwick   semble   exprimer   un   désir  
similaire  lorsqu'ʹil   cherche  de  cataloger   tous   les   infinies  variétés  de   traits  qui  
rendent   uniques   les   personnes.   La   notion   de   «  nonce   taxonomy  »   montre  
comment   la   théorie   queer   peut   construire   un   espace   herméneutique   de  
médiation   entre   ce   que   les   catégories   nous   font   et   ce   que   nous   faisons   aux  
catégories.   L'ʹanalyse   de   la   définition   de   «  nonce   taxonomy  »   élaborée   par  




En  même  temps,  notre  étude  ne  prend  pas  en  considération  seulement  
le  processus  de  catégorisation,  mais  aussi  celui  de  taxonomisation.  Autrement  
dit,  nous  examinons  et  le  processus  qui  amène  à  la  formation  d'ʹune  catégorie  
par  le  regroupement  d'ʹobjets  différents,  et  ce  qui  détermine  la  construction  de  
la  relation  parmi  les  diverses  catégories  pour  créer  une  taxonomie.    
Dans  cette  perspective,  les  concepts  de  «  mort-­‐‑vivant  prototypique  »  et  
de   «  mort-­‐‑vivant   residual  »   sont   à   considerer   comme   deux   sous-­‐‑catégories  
dont  le  lien  et  la  relation  portent  à  la  construction  de  la  taxonomie  au  sein  de  
la   catégorie   «  mort-­‐‑vivant  ».  Ce  que  nous  proposons  donc   est  notamment   la  
création   d'ʹune   taxonomie   particulière   capable   de   servir   de  médiateur   entre  
l'ʹattention  vers  les  idiosyncrasies  personnelles  (et  textuelles)  et  la  nécessité  de  
partager  les  resultés  de  cette  étude  avec  les  autres  chercheurs.  
En  conclusion,  la  théorie  prototypique  montre  que  :  les  ‘invaluably  rich,  
unsystematic   resources   of   nonce   taxonomy’   élaborées   par   Sedgwick   se  
trouvent   à   la   périphérie   des   concepts   que   nous   analysons.   Les   catégories  
«  autres  »   représentent   un   point   de   convergence   de   la   «  nonce   taxonomy  »,  
laquelle  est  parfois  dédramatisée  dans  les  études  critiques.  Un  groupe  d'ʹobjets  
textuels   originales   peuvent   être   un   défi   pour   les   catégories   communes   et  
former  une  taxonomie  particulière,   l'ʹadoption  d'ʹun  modèle  centralisant  pour  
l'ʹinterprétation   de   phénomènes   non   prototypiques   étant   refusée   à   la   faveur  
d'ʹune  analyse  de  la  relation  que  des  membres  non  prototypiques  entretiennent  
les  uns  avec  les  autres.  
  





Au   cours   de   ces   derniers   vingt   ans,   la   périphérie   de   l'ʹimaginaire  
thanatologique   s'ʹest   étendue   progressivement,   en  devenant   de   plus   en   plus  
visible.  Roger  Luckhurst  soutient  que  la  prolifération  de  ces  figures  liminaires  
a   été   catalisée   par   une   révolution   techno-­‐‑scientifique   commencée   dans   les  
années  1960  et  causée  d'ʹun  côté  par  la  création  de  l'ʹunité  de  soins  intensifs,  et  
de  l'ʹautre  par  le  developpement  des  technologies  de  la  respiration  artificielle,  
de  la  réanimation  et  de  la  transplantation.  Par  conséquence,  en  1968  l'ʹAd  Hoc  
Committe  of  the  Harvard  medical  school  a  dû  redéfinir  ce  que  la  mort  est  du  
point  de  vue  medicale.  C'ʹest  le  début  d'ʹun  débat  très  important,  encore  ouvert,  
pour   la   médecine   contemporaine,   concernant   la   “Nouvelle   Mort"ʺ.   Dans   ce  
contexte,   les  statutes  liminaires  entre  la  vie  et   la  mort  sont  devenus  un  point  
focal  pour  le  discours  médical,  qui  ont  adopté  une  perspective  foucoultienne.  
L'ʹun  des  aboutissements  le  plus  décisif  de  ce  débat  est  la  construction  
de  la  distinction,  dans  la  pratique  médicale,  de  la  mort  cérébrale  et  de  la  mort  
biologique,   ce   qui   «shifted   death   from   a   decisive   moment   to   a   temporal  
process»   (Luckhurst  2015,  88).  Néanmoins,  comme  nous  allons   le  démontrer  
dans  notre  chapitre  2,  ce  n'ʹest  pas  la  première  fois  que  la  médecine  produit  une  
définition   de   la   mort,   qu’un   débat   se   développe   autour   d'ʹelle   et   que   cette  
discussion  va  à  nourrir  la  prolifération  de  récits  qui  thématisent  ces  ontologies  
liminales.   De   fait,   dans   les   années   1740   un   changement   fondamental   est  
intervenu  en  France  dans  la  construction  de  la  mort,  situation  qui  est  analogue,  
dans  une   certaine  perspective,   à   celle  qui   s'ʹest  passée  dans   les   années   1960.  
Nous   visons   alors   l'ʹanalyse   de   la   généalogie   de   la   «  Nouvelle   Mort  »   à   la  




amené  à  la  transformation  de  la  polarité  «  vie  contre  mort  »  d'ʹune  opposition  
binaire  à  un  continuum  il  y  a  250  ans.  
Pour   faire  cela,  nous  prenons  en  analyse  un  texte  médical   français,   la  
Dissertation  sur  l’incertitude  des  signes  de  la  mort  par  Jacques-­‐‑Bénigne  Winslow  
et  Jacques  Jean  Bruhier  (1742).    
Nous  essayerons  donc  d'ʹévaluer  les  répercussions  que  ce  texte  a  eu  sur  
la  culture  européenne  et  américaine  du  XVIIIe  siècle  ;  ensuite,  nous  ferons  une  
comparaison  avec  la  redéfinition  de  la  mort  qui  s'ʹest  déroulée  dans  les  années  
1960.  Notre  lecture  puise  d’un  côté  dans  l'ʹhistoire  de  l’enterrement  prématuré  
par  Jan  Bondeson  (2001),  et  de  l'ʹautre  dans  la  Naissance  de  la  clinique  par  Michel  
Foucault   ([1963]   2015),   laquelle   donne   une   analyse   de   la   transformation   de  
l'ʹidée  de  la  mort  dans  le  XIXe  siècle.  
La   première   révolution   thanatologique   dans   l'ʹhistoire   du   monde  
occidental   commence   en   France,   à   l'ʹAcadémie   des   sciences,   l'ʹune   des  
institutions   le   plus   prestigieuses   de   l'ʹépoque.   Le   médecin   Jacques-­‐‑Benigne  
Winslow,   l'ʹun   des   membres   les   plus   éminent   de   l'ʹAcadémie,   rédige   une  
dissertation  sur  l'ʹincertitude  des  signes  de  la  mort.  Il  est  moins  de  dix  pages,  et  
il  est  écrit  en  latin.  Winslow  examine  plusieurs  cas  et  soutient  que  le  manque  
de  mouvement  respiratoire  ou  l'ʹabsence  de  pouls,  symptômes  que  les  docteurs  
considéraient  comme  des  signes  indiscutables  de  mort,  en  réalité  ne  sont  pas  
fiables  :  par  exemple,  un  patient  peut  manquer  de  pouls  perceptible,  mais  être  
encore   vivant.   Selon  Winslow,   le      seul   signe   de  mort   vraiment   fiable   est   le  
commencement   de   la   putréfaction  :   un   patient   peut   être   déclaré   mort  
seulement   quand   le   corps   se   décompose.   Jacques-­‐‑Jean   Bruhier   traduit   la  




témoignages   d’enterrements   prématurés.   Le   nouveau   livre   s'ʹintitule  
Dissertation   sur   l'ʹincertitude   des   signes   de   la   mort   et   l'ʹabus   des   enterrements   et  
embaumements  précipités.  Tout  de  suit  il  reçoit  énormément  de  succès,  qui  va  au-­‐‑
delà  du  seul  publique  scientifique,  en  causant  une  terreur  quasi  obsessive  pour  
l'ʹenterrement  prématuré  en  France  et  en  Allemangne.  Avec  Bruhier,  pour   la  
première  fois  la  mort  devient  un  événement  qui  va  plus  loin  de  la  médecin.  La  
mort   n‘est   plus   la   cessation   de   la   vie,   elle   est   devenue   un   problème  
physiologique  qui  nécessite  d'ʹune  interprétation  à  travers  ses  signes  :  il  n'ʹest  
plus  un  problème  de  faits  mais  un  problème  sémiotique.  La  question  que  les  
médecins  de  l'ʹépoque  se  sont  posée  est  la  même  que  le  US  Goverment  pose  à  
l’Harvard  Committee   trois   siècles   après  :   comment  peut-­‐‑on  diagnostiquer   la  
mort  ?  
La   publication   du   livre   de   Bruhier   a   des   conséquences   extrêmement  
importantes   pour   la   médecine   européenne   et   américaine.   D'ʹune   part,   le  
moment  liminal  qui  sépare  la  vie  de  la  mort  devient  l'ʹobjet  d'ʹun  discours  dont  
la   culture   de   masse   s'ʹempare.   De   l’autre,   la   littérature   aussi   fait   de  
l'ʹenterrement   prématuré   le   sujet   de   nombreux   textes,   en   le   transformant  
finalement  en  un  topos  de  la  fiction  de  l'ʹhorreur,   le  nouveau  genre  gothique  
étant  le  lieu  privilégié  de  son  exploitation.  
C'ʹest  dans  ce  contexte,  où  les  histoires  et  légendes  populaires  se  mêlent  
au  savoir  médical,  que  la  liminalité  entre  la  vie  et  la  mort  se  présente  comme  
un   véritable   thème   dont   les   récits   gothiques   s'ʹemparent,   en   exprimant   la  
sensation  d'ʹanxiété  culturelle  que  ce  sujet  inspire.  Là  nous  sommes  au  moment  
de   la  naissance  de  la  Nouvelle  Mort  du  monde  occidental,  par   laquelle  sera  




Certes,  les  deux  situations,  bien  qu'ʹelles  partagent  la  même  structure  –  
la  contamination  entre  savoir  médical  et  récits  de  fiction  –  présentent  aussi  un  
nombre  important  de  différences  dont  il  faut  tenir  compte.  La  différence  la  plus  
évidente   concerne   l'ʹidée   de   liminalité   entre   la   vie   et   la   mort.   Jacques-­‐‑Jean  
Bruhier  raconte  les  cas  de  gens  tombées  en  statut  de  trance,  de  paralisys,  de  
statut  cataleptique  et  d'ʹautres  conditions  physiques  très  proches  à  la  mort  :  ce  
sont  des  situations  tellement  similaires  à  la  mort  que  le  médecin  ne  pouvait  pas  
établir  si  le  patient  été  vivant  ou  pas.  Le  concept  de  liminalité  est  ici  lié  donc  à  
celui  d’incertitude  :  les  deux  polarités  de  «  vie  »  et  de  «  mort  »  sont  clairement  
établies,  mais  le  docteur  ne  sait  pas  à  quelle  catégorie  appartient  son  patient.  
Ce  dernier  peut  soit  revenir  à  la  vie  (premier  pôle)  soit  mourir  (second  pôle).  
Le  statut  liminaire  semble  dépourvu  d’épaisseur  ontologique,  puisque  le  sujet  
n’expérimente  qu’un  black  out,  un  manque  de  conscience  :  il/elle  tombe  dans  
ce   qui   ressemble   à   un   sommeil   profond,   qui   passe   comme  mort,   il/elle   est  
enterré/ée  et  se  réveille  dans  un  cercueil.  Le  statut  liminaire  correspond  donc  à  
une   absence   d'ʹexpérience   qui   devient   l'ʹobjet   de   la   narration.   D'ʹautres   cas  
attestent  que   le  protagoniste  a  été  victime  d'ʹune  paralyse   totale  :   il  est  vif  et  
conscient,  mais  il  ne  peut  pas  se  bouger  ;  ainsi,  il  est  erronément  déclaré  mort.  
Même   dans   cette   situation,   la   polarité   entre   vie   vs   mort   n'ʹest   pas   mise   en  
question.   Il   n'ʹexiste   pas   un   statut   liminaire  :   il   n'ʹy   a   qu'ʹun   homme  
momentanément  incapable  de  donner  de  signes  de  vie.    
Quand   la  définition  de  mort  est  remise  en  discussion  dans   les  années  
1960,  la  structure  narrative  est  restée  la  même,  mais  la  notion  de  liminalité  s'ʹest  
compliquée,  à  cause  aussi  de  la  découverte  des  états  végétatifs.  Au  fil  du  XIXe  




plus   en   plus   fluide.   À   partir   de   Bruhier,   ce   processus   de   fluidification   est  
développé   par   le   recherches   médicales   de   Buffon   et,   notamment,   par   le  
Recherches  physiologiques  sur  la  vie  et  la  mort  de  Xavier  Bichat  (1805).  Plusieurs  
pages  de  la  Naissance  de  la  clinique  de  Foucault  sont  consacrées  à  l'ʹanalyse  des  
implications   de   l'ʹinvention   de   l'ʹanatomie   pathologique   de   Bichat,   et   plus  
particulièrement  de  la  construction  de  la  mort  comme  un  processus.  De  fait,  
l’anatomie  pathologique  construit  la  mort  comme  un  processus  unique,  vécu  
par   chacun   en  manière   différente.   Si   les   études   de   Bichat   rétablissent   l’idée  
originaire  de  la  mort  comme  l'ʹévénement  qui  rend  les  gens  égales,  l'ʹanatomie  
pathologique  porte  à  considérer  la  mort  comme  une  expérience  individuelle  et  
unique.  
Parallèlement,  dans  les  récits  d'ʹhorreur  les  statuts  liminales  entre  la  vie  
et  la  mort  deviennent  progressivement  un  véritable  espace  d'ʹexpérience  séparé  
des  événements  de  la  vie  quotidienne.  Dans  cette  perspective,  The  Facts  in  the  
Case  of  Mr.  Valdemar  par  E.  A.  Poe  représent  un  moment  fondamental  dans  ce  
processus  de  transformation  :  pour  la  première  fois,  un  personnage  narre  son  
histoire  quand  il  est  dans  le  statut  liminale.    
La  deuxième  transformation  culturelle  qui   joue  un  rôle  très  important  
dans  le  processus  d'ʹémergence  des  statuts  résiduels  entre  la  vie  et  la  mort  est  
le  résultat  des  intersections  de  facteurs  différents,  tels  que  le  développement  
d'ʹun  paradigme  nouveau  pour   la   construction  du   savoir   scientifique,   ou   les  
innovations  technologiques  des  télécommunications,  ou  la  spéctralisation  du  
sujet.  Au  début  du  XVIIIe  siècle,  les  fantômes  et  d’autres  entités  surnaturelles  




l'ʹélectronique  ;  les  résultats  de  ce  processus  ont  été  étudiés  par  Jeffrey  Sconce  
(2000).  
Le  fait  que  le  premier  instrument  de  la  télécommunication  électrique  –  
le   télégraphe   –   a   été   utilisé   immédiatement   comme   un   médium   pour  
communiquer  avec  l’au-­‐‑delà  est  le  résultat  d'ʹune  certaine  logique  culturelle.  Le  
télégraphe  spirituel  fonctionne  à  travers  la  convergence  entre  l'ʹidée  d'ʹun  autre  
monde  créé  par  l'ʹélectricité  et  l'ʹautre  monde  habité  par  les  morts.  Les  médiums  
électroniques  étaient  –  et  le  sont  encore  –  spéctralisés  littéralement.  Autrement  
dit,  le  concept  de  spéctralisation  ne  se  réfère  pas  dans  ce  cas-­‐‑là  à  une  relation  
métaphorique   entre   la   télécommunication   et   le   spectre  ;   au   contraire,   la  
télécommunication   électronique   établi   avec   le   mort-­‐‑vivant   une   relation  
conceptuelle  bien  plus  étroite.  Dans  l'ʹimaginaire  culturel  des  derniers  170  ans,  
un  nombre  important  de  signales,  voix,  sons  et  images  créés  par  les  médiums  
électroniques  ont  été  conçus  comme  objets  hantés  par  l'ʹau-­‐‑delà.    
En  1884,  le  suisse  Édouard  Rod  publie  un  récit  bref  intitulé  L’Autopsie  
du  Docteur  Z***.  Le  protagoniste,  le  Docteur  Z***,  est  un  physiologiste  pourvu  
d'ʹune   conception   peu   orthodoxe   de   l'ʹactivité   cérébrale  :   «   le   physiologiste  
prétendait  que  la  vie  du  cerveau  ne  s’éteint  pas  en  même  temps  que  celle  du  
corps,  qu’au  contraire,  elle  continue  pendant  une  période  qui  varie  de  sept  à  
dix  jours  après  le  dernier  soupir  ».  Le  Docteur  Z***  est  aussi  l'ʹinventeur  d'ʹune  
technologie   qui   permet   d'ʹenregistrer   l'ʹactivité   cérébrales   d’un   sujet   après   la  
mort  de  son  corps.  Quand  il  meurt,  le  docteur  enregistre  ses  pensées  dans  le  
statut  résiduel  qui  sépare  la  mort  de  son  corps  de  la  mort  de  son  cerveau  :  le  
récit  est  le  rapport  de  ce  qu'ʹil  pense.  Le  fait  que  l’état  résiduel  du  Docteur  Z***  




anticipation   de   la   construction   sociale   que   Fernando   Vidal   a   appelé   «  the  
cerebral   subject  ».   L'ʹhistoire   de   Rod   préfigure   l'ʹimbrication   du   cerveau,   la  
technologie  pour  l'ʹenregistrement  de  l'ʹactivité  cérébrale,  et  l'ʹontologie  du  statut  
résiduel,   qui   en   détermineront   l'ʹévolution   dans   la   seconde   moitié   du   XXe  
siècle,  et  dans  la  fiction  et  dans  la  vie  réelle.  
Dans  le  journal  d'ʹAdrien  Owen,  Into  the  Gray  Zone  (2007),  on  retrouve  et  
la   transformation   de   la   liminalité   et   le   retour   de   la   peur   de   l'ʹenterrement  
prématuré.  L'ʹauteur  est  l'ʹun  des  meilleurs  neuroscientifiques  dans  son  champ,  
et  sa  recherche  sur  les  états  végétatifs  a  portée  à  une  découverte  importante  en  
2006  :  
[W]e  have  discovered  that  15  to  20  per  cent  of  people  in  the  vegetative  
state  who  are  assumed  to  have  no  more  awareness  than  a  head  of  broccoli  are  
fully   conscious,   although   they   never   respond   to   any   form   of   external  
stimulation.  
Encore   une   fois,   nous   pouvons   observer   une   analogie   structurelle  :  
comme  Bruhier  avait  problématisé  le  paradigme  de  la  mort  des  années  1740  en  
remettant  en  discussion  ses  signes,  de  la  même  manière  Owen  problématise  le  
paradigme  de   la  Nouvelle  Mort   en  montrant  que   les  diagnostics  des   statuts  
végétatifs   peuvent   être   douteux.   Ainsi,   on   ferme   le   cercle   de   la   peur   de  
l'ʹenterrement  prématuré,  encore  vive  deux  siècles  après,   transposée  dans   les  
territoires  de  la  Nouvelle  Mort  et  dans  une  ontologie  nouvelle  où  l'ʹessence  de  
l'ʹêtre  humaine  coïncide  avec  son  cerveau.  
  





Un  statut  résiduel  est  localisé  quelque  part  le  long  de  la  ligne  qui  conduit  
de  la  vie  à  la  mort.  Mais  l'ʹétat  résiduel  problématise  la  linéarité  de  ce  parcours  
en  proposant  un  troisième  pôle  intermédiaire,  dont  nombreux  textes  du  corpus  
témoignent.   Cela   est   causé   par   l'ʹactivation   de   deux   isotopies.   La   première  
concerne  les  véhicules,  les  transports  et  la  transportation  même.  Par  exemple,  
le  chasseur  Gracchus,  personnage  de  Kafka,  habite  un  petit  bateau  qui  traîne  
dans   la  mer  sans  cesse,   il  débarque  rarement  et  seulement  pour  de   très  bref  
temps.  Dans  le  roman  Passage  par  Connie  Willis,  un  psychologue  cognitif  se  
retrouve  sur  le  Titanic  chaque  fois  qu'ʹelle  subit  une  expérience  de  mort  dans  
les  années  imminente.  
La  deuxième  isotopie  est  liée  aux  espaces  indéterminés  qui  sert  comme  
lieux  de  connexion  entre  d'ʹautres  pôles.  Cela  est  parfaitement   illustré  par  le  
roman  de  Banks,  The  Bridge   ([1986]   2013)  :  après  un  accident   en  voiture,   le  
protagoniste  tombe  dans  le  coma,  et  se  retrouve  dans  une  ville  construite  sur  
un  pont  immense,  dont  il  ne  peut  pas  voir  la  fin.  Paradoxalement,  habiter  un  
r.s.   veut  dire   habiter   pour   toujours   un   seuil.  On   observe   la   présence   de   cet  
oxymore  même  dans  les  textes  qui  ne  représentent  pas  la  r.s.  comme  un  lieu  
physique.  Dans  Ubik,  par  exemple,   les  morts-­‐‑vivants  existent  dans   le   temps  
dilaté  de  leur  souffrance.  
Le  temps,  de  son  côté,  est  conçu  dans  les  r.s.  comme  une  condition  qui  
amène   finalement   à   la   mort.   Mais   ce   n'ʹest   pas   toujours   le   cas  :   le   chasseur  
Gracchus  ne  peut  pas  échapper  à  sa  condition,  ni  le  protagoniste  du  conte  de  
Frederik  Pohl,  The  Tunnel  under  the  World,  peut  évader  de  son  emprisonnement  
dans  le  r.s.  en  se  suicidant.  Il  existe  aussi  un  second  type  de  construction  de  la  




la  narrative  de  la  vie"ʺ,  où  la  personne  proche  à  la  morte  fait  l'ʹexpérience  d'ʹune  
dilatation  temporelle,  dans  une  sorte  de  bulle  liminaire.  Les  représentants  de  
ce   filon   narratif   sont  :   An   Occurrence   at   Owl   Creek   Bridge   ([1890]   1984)  
d'ʹAmbrose   Bierce,   Jacob’s   Ladder   (1990)  d'ʹAdrien   Linch,  Wristcutters:   A   Love  
Story   (2006)   de   Goran  Duki,   et   la  mini-­‐‑série   de   Cartoon  Network,  Over   the  
Garden  Wall  (Krentz  et  McHale  2014).  
Le  chapitre  3  est  consacré  à  l'ʹanalyse  de  cet  arrière-­‐‑plan,  la  construction  
de  l'ʹespace  et  du  temps  dans  les  r.s.  et  comment  elle  influence  la  sémiotique  du  
résiduel.  
La   première   section   du   chapitre   prend   en   examen   la   «   mind-­‐‑radio  
analogy  »,   un   processus   fondamental   de   l'ʹimaginaire   électronique  :   l'ʹesprit  
humain  lui-­‐‑même  est  construit  comme  un  dispositif  de  la  télécommunication,  
qui  «  radiodiffuse  »  ses  contenus  en  forme  de  signales  électriques.  Ces  derniers  
peuvent  à  leur  tour  être  interceptés  et  décodifiés  par  un  autre  esprit.  Dans  cette  
perspective,   les   signes   spirituels   et   ceux   physiques   se   superposent,   comme  
dans  le  cas  de  Nightflyers  de  Martin,  où  Lasamer  relève  la  présence  de  sa  mère  
comme  l’antenne  relève  les  transmissions  radio.  
Ces  deux  analogies  qui  forment  les  prémices  conceptuelles  de  la  mind-­‐‑
radio   analogy   (signaux   par   le   mort=signaux   radio=signaux   physiques)   se  
retrouvent  dans  Ubik,  où  l'ʹanalogie  fonde  la  conceptualisation  de  la  demi-­‐‑vie.  
Ce  r.s.  est  créé  par  la  conservation  de  la  personne  in  articulo  mortis  dans  
un  cercueil  particulier,  à  température  inférieure  à  zéro,  qui  capte  les  signales  
cérébrales  du  mourant.  Quand  quelqu'ʹun  vient  rendre  visite  à  un  demi-­‐‑vivant,  




Dans  la  notion  d’«  onde  radio  »,  est  présent  le  lien  sémiotique  entre  les  
signaux  radio  et  la  liquidité,  régime  basilaire  de  l'ʹanalogie.  Mais  l'ʹélément  qui  
crée   vraiment   l'ʹunité   sémiotique   est   la   conception   du  médium  des   signales  
radio  comme  un  fluide,  ce  qui  nous  amène  à  considérer  dans  notre  analyse  un  
autre   concept   de   l'ʹimaginaire   électronique:   l'ʹéther,   à   savoir   l'ʹ   «impalpable  
magnetic  context  of  electrical  action»  (Milutis  2005,  164).  C'ʹest  la  notion  d'ʹéther  
qui  porte  Mesmer  à  se  considérer  capable  d’établir  un  fluxus  magnétique  entre  
ses  patients  et  lui.  De  même,  à  l'ʹaube  de  la  période  de  la  radio  la  transmission  
wireless   était   conçue   comme   un   dispositif   fonctionnant   à   travers   un   éther  
liquide.  Dans   cette  perspective,  Ubik   et  Nightflyers   ont   reportés   en  auge  une  
notion  d'ʹéther  du  siècle  précédent,  renvoyée  maintenant  comme  objet  d'ʹétude  
scientifique.  Dans  un  moment  crucial  du  conte  de  Martin,  notamment,  l'ʹespace  
à  l'ʹintérieur  du  bateau  subit  une  transformation  qui  peut  être  conçue  comme  la  
mise-­‐‑en-­‐‑littérature  de  l'ʹespace  de  l'ʹéther  à  travers  lequel  l'ʹénergie  mentale  de  la  
mère  bouge  et  agit,  l'ʹisotopie  du  liquide  étant  liée  à  l'ʹimaginaire  électronique.  
Pour  résumer,  Nightflyers  et  Ubik  sont  imprégnés  par  la  sémiotique  de  la  
fluidité,   laquelle,  à  son   tour,  est   le  résultat  d’une  relation   très  étroite  que  les  
deux   textes  entretiennent  avec   l’imaginaire  électronique.  Dans  Nightflyers,   la  
liquidité  émerge  par   l’actualisation  de   l’éther,   lequel  est  le  pont  ontologique  
qui  met  en  communication  le  r.s.  et  le  monde  des  vivants.  Cette  actualisation  
advient   dans   l’un   des  moments   fondamentaux   de   la   narration,   et   cause   un  
collapse  momentané   de   la   séparation   entre   les   deux   états   d’existence.  Dans  
Ubik,   la  sémiotique  de  la  fluidité  est  développée  en  façon  plus  directe  par  la  
convergence   des   ondes   radio   et   les   ondes   psychiques.   Sur   le   plan   de   la  




la  photographie  ;   l’imaginaire   électronique   transforme  donc   la  physique  des  
ondes  radio  en  biologie  des  êtres  vivants.  Le  personnage  d’Ella,  notamment,  
en   constitue   un   exemple   radical  :   la   demi-­‐‑vie   d’Ella   est   définie   par   la  
fluidification  du  soi  et  par  l’immersion  dans  un  fluxe  onirique  qui  circule  dans  
la  communauté  des  demi-­‐‑vivants.  Dans  les  deux  textes,  les  r.s.  sont  construites  
narrativement   et   culturellement   comme   des   produits   de   l’imaginaire  
électronique,  lequel  autorise  la  création  d’un  «  ailleurs  »  qui  existe  sur  un  plan  
d’existence   différent   de   celui   des   vivants,  même   s’il   reste   fermement   ancré  
dans  le  monde  matériel.  
  
Technologies  de  l’après-­‐‑vie  
  
L’une  des  caractéristiques  les  plus  importantes  qui  définissent  la  majeur  
par  des  textes  du  corpus  est  la  mis  en  fiction  de  la  mort  partielle  ou  incomplète.  
Souvent,   cet   inachèvement   empêche   la   r.u   de   disparaître   du   monde   des  
vivants.  Le  but  de  l’une  des  narrations  principales,  en  revanche,  est  de  garder  
le   r.u.  présent   chez   les  vivants.  Autrement  dit,   les   r.s.   sont  moins   construits  
comme  des  monade-­‐‑mondes  habité  par  personnages  complètement  exclus  du  
monde   des   vivants   que   thématisés   comme   forme   de   contact   avec   l’autre  
monde.  
Les  technologies  et  les  stratégies  par  lesquelles  le  contact  entre  le  vivant  
et  le  r.u.  se  réalise  fournit  un  regard  essentiel  sur  l’ontologie  des  r.s.  Sur  la  base  
de   configurations   technologiques   différentes,   la   relation   entre   les   statuts  
d’existence  est  construite  en   façons  différentes.  Dans  cette  perspective,   le  r.s.  




systèmes   de   télécommunication,   en   changeant   leur   distribution   dans   la  
technologie  ambiante.    
Dans  le  dernier  chapitre  de  notre  étude,  nous  visons  alors  l’analyse  de  
la  méthode  par  laquelle  les  narrations  des  r.s.  manipulent  (et  sont  manipulées  
par)  l’imaginaire  électronique  par  le  tournage,  la  déformation  et  l’altération  du  
processus  qui  sert  normalement  le  travail  des  télécommunications.  Pour  faire  
cela,  nous  suivrons  de  près  les  réflexions  de  Scone  sur  les  médias  hantés,  du  
moment  que  la  notion  d’ailleurs  électronique  nous  fournit  un  outil  idéal  pour  
notre  enquête  sur  la  liminalité.  Nous  nous  concentrerons  notamment  sur  deux  
instruments  technologiques  :  le  téléphone  et  la  télévision.  
Dans  les  communications  téléphoniques,  la  présence  de  l’interlocuteur  
est  réduite  à  une  voix  incorporelle.  Les  implications  sémiotiques  du  processus  
qui  permet  à  la  voix  d’être  codifiée  comme  un  signal  électrique  et  de  voyager  
en  forme  d’onde  radio  (ou,  pour  les  technologies  anciennes,  à  travers  un  câble)  
sont  autant  aussi  complexes  que  le  processus  lui-­‐‑même.  Les  ondes  sonores  se  
propagent  dans  l’air,  arrivent  au  récepteur  et  réémergent  dans  l’autre  part  de  
la   ligne   après   avoir   parcouru   la   dimension   électronique.   Plus   que   l’absence  
d’interaction   en   personne,   c’est   le   passage   des   mots   à   travers   cet   ailleurs  
potentielle  qui  représente  la  différence  entre  la  communication  en  personne  et  
celle  par  téléphone.  En  traversant  le  pont  qui  sépare  l’expéditeur  du  récepteur,  
le  message  est  exposé  à  l’influence  de  l’autre  monde,  et  est  ainsi  entouré  par  un  
brouillard  d’incertitude.  
Dans   au   moins   deux   textes   du   corpus,   les   statuts   ontologiquement  
incertains  et  les  positions  liminales  sont  construites  par  la  manipulation  de  la  




convergence  significative  entre  l’un  des  textes  qui  est  antérieur  à  l’invention  du  
téléphone,  le  Valdemar  de  Poe,  et  l’Ubik  de  Dick.  
Écrit  à  l’aube  de  l’époque  du  télégraphe,  le  conte  de  Poe  élabore  de  façon  
que  la  communication  entre  M.  Valdemar  et  son  thérapeute  est  très  similaire  à  
l’interaction  entre  les  demi-­‐‑vivants  et  les  vivants,  où  le  téléphone  joue  un  rôle  
crucial.  Dans   les  deux   cases,   le   statut  d’existence  du   r.u.   est   incroyablement  
contradictoire,   comme   il   se   vient   à   créer   une   situation   paradoxale   où  
l’interaction   en   personne   et   la   télécommunication   coexistent.   Sur   la   base  de  
cette  analogie,  nous  étudierons  comment  les  mécanismes  de  la  communication  
peuvent  contribuer  à  la  construction  des  relations  entre  le  monde  des  vivants  
et  celui  des  r.u.  
Parmi  les  technologies  médiatiques  que  les  textes  du  corpus  emploient  
pour  remplir  le  vide  entre  les  r.s.  et  le  monde  des  vivants,  celles  qui  concernent  
la  télévision  et  les  écrans  sont  évidemment  les  plus  variées.  La  télévision,  en  
particulier,  est  le  média  qui  a  contribué  le  plus  à  la  redéfinition  contemporaine  
de  la  notion  occidentale  de  temps,  espace  et  présence.  La  télévision  se  distingue  
des   autres   instruments   précédents   de   la   télécommunication,   car   elle   donne  
l’illusion   la   plus   crédible   d’un   espace   (ou   même   d’un   monde   divers)   réel  
existant  de  l’autre  part  de  l’écran.  Les  ailleurs  créés  par  la  télévision  semblent  
animés  par   leur  propre  logique  et  habités  par  des  entités  mystérieuses,  plus  
que  les  autres  ailleurs  électronique.  
La   télévision   intègre   aussi   dans   le   domaine   médiatique   deux   des  
métaphores  cognitives  qui  structurent  la  vision,  la  perception  et  les  relations  
spatiales   dans   la   culture   occidentale  :   la   fenêtre   et   l’écran.   Par   exemple,   la  




résurrection  comme  l’acte  de  rompre  la  surface  en  verre  qui  sépare  l’intérieur  
de  l’extérieur.  Dans  un  intérieur  non-­‐‑défini,  la  caméra  s’approche  lentement  à  
une   collection   de   papillons,   jusqu’au   point   que   les   angles   du   cadre   de   la  
collection  correspondent  à  ceux  de  l’image  cinématographique.  En  ce  moment-­‐‑
là,  l’un  des  papillons  prend  vie,  casse  le  verre  du  cadre  et  s’envole.  
Dans   The   Bridge   par   Iain   Bank,   encore,   l’action   se   déroule   dans  
l’appartement   du   protagoniste  ;   sa   télévision   semble   douée   d’une   volonté  
propre  :  elle  s’allume,  et  montre  sur  tous  les  chaînes  l’image  d’un  homme  en  
coma.   Orr   ignore   que   cet   homme   est   lui-­‐‑même,   et   que   ces   images   de   la  
télévision  sont  les  seuls  éléments  qui  connectent  sa  conscience  au  monde  de  
son  vie  précédente.  
Le  texte  qui  témoigne  le  plus  des  effets  esthétiques  qui  comptent  sur  une  
isotopie  pervasive  liée  à  a  présence  électronique  sur  l’écran  est  Trascendence,  par  
Wally   Pfister.   La   rencontre   sémiologique   et   technologique   entre  
l’informatisation  de  la  conscience,  l’intelligence  artificielle  et  l’internet  porte  à  
la  création  d’un  r.s.  où  la  présence  du  mort-­‐‑vivant  est  devenue  complètement  
fluide   et   indépendante   par   rapport   à   un   centre   physiquement   bien   défini.  
Après   avoir   abandonné   son   corps   pour   vivre   dans   le   web,   Will   peut   se  
manifester   à   travers   tous   les   dispositifs   connectés.   Par   conséquence,   la  
construction  sémiotique  d’une  présence  sans  centre  dépend  strictement  de  la  
matérialisation  de  son  avatar.  
Si  l’étude  de  la  représentation  intratextuelle  de  la  télévision  correspond  
à  l’analyse  de  comment  le  plan  d’existence  est  construit  et  comment  se  rapporte  
avec   les   autres   plans,   on   pourrait   enquêter   ultérieurement   sur   les  




médium   peut   générer   en   déplaçant   le   regard   de   la   pure   matérialité   de   la  
télévision   comme   objet   concrète.   C’est   Jory   Miller   qui   a   conceptualisé   la  
relation   entre   la  vie   et   la  demi-­‐‑vie   selon   la  polarité  de   l’intérieur/l’extérieur.  
Cette  dichotomie  revient  dans  le  roman  dans  un  deuxième  moment  significatif.  
Immédiatement   après   la   conclusion   de   la   révélation   de   la   télévision   de  
Runciter,  dans  l’un  des  passages  le  plus  prégnant  d’Ubik  on  lit  que  :  «  He  [Joe  
Chip]  felt  all  at  once  like  an  ineffectual  moth,  fluttering  at  the  windowpane  of  
reality,  dimly  seeing  it   from  outside  »  (Dick  [1969]  2012,  136).  Si  nous  lisons  le  
passage   à   la   lumière   de   ce   que   Joe   Chip   vient   d’expérimenter,   la   télévision  
semble   être   douée   d’une   métaphore   puissante,   qui   enrichit   la   dialectique  
intérieur/extérieur  et  lui  fournit  d’un  référent  concret  et  matériel.  Sur  la  base  
de  l’interprétation  de  la  télévision  comme  une  «  zone  d’ombre  »  et  un  espace  
mystérieux,  l’écran  de  la  télévision  peut  être  conçu  comme  la  matérialisation  
de  la  «  windowpane  of  reality  »,  c’est-­‐‑à-­‐‑dire  de  la  surface  qui  sépare  l’ailleurs  
électronique  de  la  télévision  –  l’intérieur  –  du  monde  habité  par  les  spectateurs  
(l’extérieur).  
Cette   polarité,   et   la   métaphore   sous-­‐‑jacent,   semble   subir   une  
transformation   subtile  mais   importante   dans   l’un   des   derniers   passages   du  
roman,  quand  Ella  Runciter  dit  à  Joe  que  Jory  «  […]  has  to  be  fought  on  our  side  
of   the   glass,   [b]y   those   of   us   in   half-­‐‑life,   those   that   Jory   preys   on  »   (218).  En  
activant  une  référence  intuitive  avec  Alice  Through  the  Looking  Glass  de  Lewis  
Carrol,  Ella  Runciter  construit  métaphoriquement  vie  et  demi-­‐‑vie  comme  deux  
espaces  séparés  par  le  verre  qui  est  néanmoins  part  de  la  même  unité.  Selon  les  
situations,   le   verre   est   soit   transparent   soit   foncé.   Dans   le   cinéma  




et  Hideo  Nakata  ont  exploité  au  maximum  cette  métaphore  en  rendant  fluide  
l’écran   de   la   télévision   et   créant   des   personnages   qui   peuvent   traverser  
littéralement  l’écran  de  la  télévision.  
En  conclusion,  le  roman  de  Dick  joue  avec  le  sens  de  réel  du  lecteur  en  
suspendant  la  réalité  elle-­‐‑même  :  et  si  le  monde  avec  lequel  Runciter  cherche  à  
se  mettre   en   contact,   en   croyant   que   Joe   soit   là-­‐‑bas,   s’il   n’était   qu’une   autre  
demi-­‐‑vie,   un   autre   pas   vers   une   séquence  de  mises-­‐‑en-­‐‑abymes  ?  Dans  Ubik,  
tous  les  mondes  peuvent  disparaître  en  un  clin  d’œil,  tout  comme  une  chaîne  
de   la   télévision   peut   disparaître   en   tout   moment,   renfermée   dans   le   vide  
statique  et  monotone  du  statique.  C’est   la  seule  chose  dont  on  peut  être  sûr,  
comme   le   réalise   Al   Hammond   avant   de   mourir  :   «  When   I   blink   out,   he  
thought,  the  whole  universe  will  disappear  »  (125).  
 
  
